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## A R T

## SPEAKING:

Written in French by

Messieurs Du Port Royal:

In persuance of a former Treatise, Intituled,

THE

## A R T


## THINKING.

Rendred into English.

The Second Edition, Corrected.

#### LONDON:

Printed for W. Taylor, at the Ship; and H. Clements, at the Half-Moon in St. Paul's Church-Yard MDCCVIII.



## PREFACE.

That to speak Eloquently, it suffices to cram our Memory with such Precepts as are prescrib'd by it. In this opinion, several People read with great eagerness those Books which are writ of that Subject; but after all their pains and assiduity sinding their improvement but small, and themselves little more Eloquent than before, they impute it to the Author, as if he had not discovered the Mystery of the Art according to his presence: So that not receiving the benefit they expected, their disappointment turns into disgust, and makes them despite all that he writes.

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I should expect no better Fortune for this Book, had not our Author avoided a particular fault that renders most Books of Rhetorick ineffectual. He does not trouble the Reader with a throng and huddle of Precepts, that serve only to load and incumber the Mind. He endeavours to lay open the bottom of the Art be undertakes, and its natural Principles, which being well under-stood, leaves as under no necessity of multitude.

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#### The PREFACE

of Rules, that do but crowd one another out of

she Memory as foon as they are entred.

To make us comprehend the true Reasons of the Principles of Rhetorick, our Author begins with an explication how Speech is form'd: To shew from Nature it self after what manner words are to be contrived for the Expression of our Thoughts, and the Motions of our Wills, he has supposed a company of new Men met togesher, who had never convers'd before, nor knew bow to Speak. He considers what these Men would do; he makes it appear, they would quick-ly find the benefit of Speech, and frame a Language to themselves. He considers what form shey would give it, and in his refearch discovers the Fundamentals of all Danguage, and gives his Renfons for all Rules prescrib'd by the Grammarians. It may be, his Disquisition will appear inconsiderable to some, who will be discouraged from reading this Book, when in the Front they find him speaking of Nouns Substantives, Adjectives, Declentions, Verbs, Conjugations, &c. But, besides that the Consequence will easily evince, that it is useful for teaching Languages with more readiness, and to make us speak more exactly; Order would not permit him to pass over those little things, which if you will believe Quintilian (as great a Master of Rhetorick as any has writ ) make the most important part of che Art of speaking; and this he declares, by comparing them to the Foundations of a House which

#### The PPEFACE.

which though laid low under ground, are yet as

necessary parts as any that appear.

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When his new Men have acted their parts, our Author shews what is the true Original of Language, and that 'tis not have accident that supplied us with words. Nevertheless he demonstrates, that Language depends upon the Will and Consent of Men, and that Custom, or common Consent, exercises an absolute dominion over our Words, and therefore he gives us Rules to know the Laws of Custom, and directions how they are to be kept. And all this in his first Book.

In his second Book be observes that the plentifullest, and most copious Languages cannos furnish proper Terms for the Expression of all our Idea's, and therefore recourse is to be had to Are, and we must borrow the Terms of things that bear resemblance, or retain some reference or connexion with those which we would signific other ways, had common Custom afforded us Natural' Terms, These borrow'd Expressions are call'd Tropes; be speaks of all sorts of Tropes, and of their Use. He observes likewise in the same Book, that as Nature has dispos'd the Body of Man fo, as to put it felf into fuch postures immediately as are best proper for avoiding what is like to be buriful, and for receiving what is like to de good: So Nature directs us to certain tricks and artifices in speaking, able to produce in the Minds of our Hearers the Effects which me defire, whether it be anger, or mildness, or detesta-A 3. tion,

#### THE PREFACE.

tions or love. These mays and artistics in speaking, are call de Figures, of which our Author
treats with more than ordinary care, not contenting himself with mentioning their Names,
and adding some sew Examples (as is commonby done) but be discovers the Nature of each Fi-

gure, and bom it is to be used a trade of the

The easiness wherewith me speak, and the pleafure me take to hear an harangue well pronounred (as our Author has observed at the beginming of this Book ) has disposed Mankind to make ufe of Words to Signific his Thoughts, nather than of any other fign. In the ordering and ranging of Words, great pains has been taken to find our what it is that makes a Discourse go well off of the Tongue, and prove grateful to the Heavers. We have at large in his third Book ; what me are to word, what we are to observe, what we were do in the ranking our Words for better premunication, and what we are to do to make them acceptable to the Ear. In this Book it is he discourses of Periods, explains the dre of Kerfiftcation; and after he has taught what it is in the Sound of Words that is pleafant to the Ear, be shows how the Rules prescribed by other Masters for the Composition of Periods, and Making of Kerfe, are for no other end, but to discover in Discourse the conditions that render prennaciatien most agreeable and case. Atomben's to head mo.

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The last Bank treats of Styles, or mays of speaking, which Aden assume according to their natural.

### The PREFACE.

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manural inclinations. He gives direction for regulation of our Styles; and that every Subject might be treated in a convenient way, he shows how our Style aught to be heightned or debased, is the Matter of our Discourse is considerable an otherwise. He shows how the quality of our Subject; how our Style ought to be strong on smeath; severally show our Style ought to be strong on smeath; severally show our Style ought to be strong on smeath; severally show our Style ought to be strong on smeath; severally subject termines. He inquines impathed Style of an Orator, as show as Rhitosopher, and Historian; and at the end of his Discourse, speaking of Rhetorical Oxnaments, he demonstrates that they are produced by tenact absence of the Rules which he has prescribed.

Thef Bour Books of the Ant of Speaking, are followed by a Difoon for in which the Author pivocus an Idea of the Aut of Persuation Ar the Encrance of his Discourse, he gives Reasons why he has separated that Art from the Art of Speaking, which Reafons are need medifing to be inferred in this place. Though his Descourse be shore, I am of opinion it affords a better Defoription of the Art of Persuasion, than greet Molames which others have compos'd of that Subjest. And therefore our Author displaying the true Fundamentals of the Arts of Speaking, and Porfoading, & both which are comprehended in our Idea of Rhetorisk ) I do not despair but these who fout feriously perufe this Rook, will receive fuch benefity more non to be found in the Writings dedeunara A 4 of

#### The PREFACE.

of the ancient Rhetoricians, who present us only with Rules, without may Character or Besaring

Though this new Rhetorick should give us nothing but speculative Notions, that contribute little to the making us Etoquent, yet the rending of it would not be altogether aseless, because in his Descourse of the Nature of this Art, he makes several important reflexions upon our Mind (where of Discourse is the Image) which reflexions conduce highly to the knowledge of our selves, and by consequence deserve our attention.

Besides this, I persuade my felf, there is no person of any moderate curiosity, but will be glad to understand Reasons for all Rules prescribed by the Att of Speaking. When our Author tells ns what is pleafing in Discourse, be does not call ir je ne scay quoy, without a Name, be names it, and conducting us to the very Fountain from whence our Pleasure springs, he presents to our view the Principles of those Rules that make them agreeable; which must needs be more fasisfactory, shan the Works of those who please only by the prac Spice of the faid Ruter: 1500 the Pleasures of the Mind, are so be prefer a before the Pleafaces of the Senfe. Is would be absurd and irregular (fays Sr. Auft in ) to prefer Pleasure caused by the running of a Verse, before the Knowledge bow to vompole them. Nonnulli perverse, magia umans verfum, quam arcem iplam qua confeicur verfus; quia plus auribus quam intelligentie lese dederunt.

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#### The PEEFA

dederunt. Some are so Idle as to fancy a Verse more than the Art of composing them, because they are more devoted to their Ear, than their

Under flanding

But this Treatife will be more particularly useful to young Men, by reason our Author treats of every thing in its Natural Order; and conducts the Reader to the understanding of what he teaches by such easie Reasons, as are not deferib'd so accurately and plainly in most other Masters. It has been a daily complaint, that sufficient care has not been taken to inform and fortific the Judgments of young Feople, who have been hitherto taught like young Parrots, only by words, without regarding the improvement of their Judgments by accustoming them to argue and reason upon the small things that they are taught. Hence it is, that Sciences many times do but trouble the Mind, and corrupt the Natural Judgment that is often conspicuous in some persons who study but little.

Our Author thought not fit to swell up his Book with multitude of examples, though perhaps they might have been convenient; for there is no Ma-Ster but may supply this defect, by causing his Scholars to mark Juch places as are excellent in the Works of such as bave transcended in the Pra-

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This Treatise is not intended for the Orator alone, but in general for all that either speak or write ; for Poessa Hiftorians, Philosophers, Di-Vines, dederunt.

#### THE PREFACE.

rines, &c. And though it was composed in French, it may ferue for all Languages, because it inquires into the Fundamentals of Speech; and the Rules prescribed in it, are not peculiar to any one Language.

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## ART of SPEAKING

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The Organs of the Voice, and how our Speech

E may speak with our Eyes, and our Fingers, and make of the motions of those parts to express the idea's

which are present to our Minds and the Affections of our Wills: But this way of Speaking is not only imperfect, but troublesome. We cannot without much labour express by our Eyes, or our Fingers, all the variety of things which occur to our thought: We move our Tongue with ease, and can readily diversifie the found

of our Voice in different manners or For this reason Nature has disposed Man to make use of the Organs of the Voice to give fenfible figns of what he wills and conceives

The disposition of these Organs is wonderful. We have a natural Organ, of which the aspera arteria or Wind-pipe (proceeding from the Lungs to the Root of our Tongue) is the paffage or Canal. The Lungs are like Bellows, drawing in the Air by their dilatation, and expelling it by their contraction. The part of the afpera arteria next the root of the Tongue is call'd the Langue, and is incompass'd with Cartilages and Muscles, by which it opens and shuts. When the orifice of the Larynx is streight, the Air being violently forc'd out, is dash'd and broken, and receives motion which makes the found of the Moice's but which is not yet articulated. This Voice is receiv'd in the Mouth, where the Tongue modifies it, and gives it different forms, according to its propultion against the Teethor the Palate; according as it is derain'd or transmitted; or according as the Mouth is more or less open.

This facility of exprelling our Sentiments by the Voice, has caused Mankind to apply themselves studiously to the consideration of all the differences which it receives from the several motions of the Organs of Pronunciation; and they have distinguished every particular

ticular modification by a Letter . These Letters are the Elements of Speech, and though their number be not great, yet they are fufficient for all the Words not only of the prefent, but of all the past, and future Languages in the World. The conjunction of two or more Letters makes a Syllable, one or more Syllables make a Word; fothat we may fay, Speech is a compolition of Sounds of the Voice, by Men established to be the figns of their Thoughts, and having the power to a waken the Idea's to which they have annexed them. Their Number is but 24, yet are they capable of composing a prodigious mul-situde of different Words: I have shown elfe where what an feveral Lecters may be forvarioully transposed, as to make 576 several Words of two Letters: That 24 times as many Wordsmay be form'd of three feveral Leners, that is to say, 13824 Words. That 24 times as many more may be made of 4 saveral Letters; and to on proportionably in From whence we may judge of the valt variety of Words that might be made of them all, and indeed they are little less than infinite.

And here it is of importance to observe the distinction betwixt the foul of Words and the body; betwirt that in them which is corbetwixuthar which is common to us with Birds, and that which is peculiar to our felves. The

Idea's

mands the Organs of the Voice to form fuch sounds as are the light of those Idea's yare the sounds as are the light of those Idea's yare the sounds formed by the Organs of our Voice (which, though of them felves they have nothing telemoling those Idea's, do notwithstanding represent them are the material part, and may be called the Body of our Worlds.

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Painter will not lay on his Colours the has formed in his imagination what he deligns to draw. Discourse is the Peters of our thoughts; the Tongue is the Peters which draws that Picture; and Words are the Colours. We dught therefore in the first place to range our Thoughts, and put facility as we intend to represent by our Words into natural order; disposing them 10, that the knowledge of some sew of them, may tender the rest more case and intelligible to the Reader.

The Natural Order to be observed in the ranging of our thoughts, belongs properly to those

those that write of the Act of Thinking: B very Art has its bounds, which are not to be transgress'd. For such things as relate to the Matter of our Discourse, my following Rules will not be (I suppose) unworthy of Confideration. The first is, That we meditate upon our Subject, and make all reflection necesfary for the discovery of such means as may direct us to our proposed end. We must forget nothing that may make that Subject perspicuous. But it many times happens, that endeavouring to clear and explain a thing, we overcharge the attention of the Reader, and render it more abstruce, by our prolix explications. Abundance is fometimes the caple of sterility: The Husbandman fears the rankness of his Corn, and feeds his Sheep with it to prevent it. We cannot comprehend any Argument or Sciences untels our meditation supply us with things necessary, and retrench what is superfluous; which pains an Anthor is to spare to such persons as he undertakes to instruct. A Man that writes by halves, gives an imperfect account; but a great Book is a great evil; wine sickien, wine nauto. We wander in it, we lose our felves, and have scarce patience to turn is over. When therefore we have made an exact collection of all things relating to the matter of which we treat we must contract them, reduce them to their just bounds, and making a strict choice and felectistods

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on of what are absolutely necessary, reject the reft as fuperfluous Wetare to be continually intent upon the end to which we would are rive; we are to take the shortest cut to it, and avoid all manner of deviation. Unless we flightly run over things of fmall importance, not at all essential to our delign, our Reader will be weary, and his application diverted from such as are, as bologong the on as both

This Brevity, fo necessary to make a Book neat and compact; confifts not only in the retrenchment of what is onnecessary, but requires that we infert fuch circumftances as may illustrate our discourse, and imply many things that are not expressed. When this we are to imitate the address of Timanibes, the famous Painter, who being to represent the prodigious stature of a Giant in a small picture, painted him lying along in the midst of a Troop of Satyrs, one of which was measuring the Giant's Thumb with his Thyrles intimating by that ingenious invention, how valt his Body must needs be, when fo finall a part of him; was to be meafured wish a Launce. Thefe Inventions require much with and applications and therefore it was; that Monfienr Palcal (an Author very famous for his felicity in comprising much in few words) excused himself wittily for the extravagant length of one of his Letters, by faying, he had not time to make it fhorter. III. To

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To i fignific the difference of our Thoughts of well have meed of Words of different in Orders well to the offerent in Orders well to the offerent in Orders well to the order of the order

A Swe cannot finish a Picture, nor diftinguilt the different flrokes of things to be represented therein, with one fingle Colour; fo tie impeffible to express whatever or curs in our Mind, with Words of one fingle Order Mier Nature be Militels in this cale, and teach us what this diffinction oughs to be: lee us fee how Men would form their Language, and make themselves intelligible one to another, should they be brought together from trange and remote places. Let us make we of the liberty of the Poets, and fetch either out of the Earth or the Heavens a Troop of new Men, altogether ignorant of the benefit of Words. The fight must needs be agreeable, because it is pleasant to fancy them speaking, and conversing together with their Hands, their Eyes, gestures and contortions of their Bedies; but it is plain, it would not be long before they would be weary of thefe pollunes of and either chance on discretion would flew them the conveniency of Words. We cannot discover what form they would give to their Language, but by confidering what

what we our selves should do in the same company. Diversity of Words then, being necessary, only in respect of the different things which pass in our Mind, and we are included to impart; we must observe enably all that so passes, that we may be enabled thereby to find out what we are to do to paint the different Ecatures of our Thoughts.

When our Organs of Sense are free, and undillurbed, we perceive what it is that strikes them, and at the same time we have the idea's of their things present to our Mind. For which reason these ideals are not improperly called, The Objects of our Perception. Beauties these idea's which result from our Senses, there are others fundamentally inherent in our Natures, and not falling that way into our Minds; as those which represent to us Natural and Original Truths, such as these, That we are to give every Man his due; That is impessible for a thing to be and not to be at the fact of the forms time, esc.

Doubtles if these new Men would make it their business to find out Words that might be signs of all these Idea's which are the Objects of our perception (which, according to the Philosophers, is the sust operation of the Mind) in the infinite variety of Words, it would not be difficult to find particular signs to mark every idea, and give it a particular Name. In as much as we haturally make use

use of these primitive Notions, we may believe, that if other things should present themfelves to their Minds, bearing any refemblance or conformity to those things which they had denominated before, they would not take the pains to invent new words, but ( with some limle variation) make ofe of the first Names to denote the difference of the things to which they would apply them. Experience perfuades me, that where a proper Word does not occur immediately to our Tongue, we fhould make use of the Name of some other thing bearing some kind of resemblance to it. In all Languages, the Names of things almost alike have very little difference : From one fingle Word many other are derived, as is obvious in the Dictionaries of fuch Languages. as we know an other of the offended the

The same Word may be diversified several ways; by transposition, retrenchment, addition of Vowels or Conforants, or by change ing the Termination. So that it is no hard matter, when we give the proper Name of a particular thing, to feveral others that are like it, to fignifie by fome little variation, what fuch things have in peculiar; and in what they differ from the things from whence they have their Names granter annihilation and the same

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Q Uch Words as figuifie the Object of our Thoughts, (that is to fay Things) are called Nouns. We confider in every thing, its being, and its manner of being: The being of a thing, as for example, the being of Wax, is the Substance of Wax. The roundness or foureness of the figure ( which may be changed without prejudice to the Wax) are its manners of being. To be ignorant, or knowing, are manners of our being. It is necellary therefore, that among the Names of things; some should be appointed to signific the fooftance, and fome the manner of their being. Thole which describe the absolute being of a thing, are called Substantives. Those which describe the manner only, are called Adjectives, because having no natural subfiftence of their own, they fublift by nothing but the Noun Substantive to which they are joyned ... In thefe two Words, Round Earth, the last is the Substantive, and the first lignifies nothing but its manner of being. Noons Substantives do become Adjectives, or rather things of absolute existence; and substances are expressed by Nonns Adjectives, when being ing applied to other things, they are used to signific their manner of being, as in these Adjectives, Silvered, Tinned, Leaded, &c.

Nouns do commonly signifie things in a general and unlimited way: Articles, in Languages where they are used, (as in Greek, Latin, French, &c. ) do ferve to restrain and determin the fignification of Nouns, and apply them to a particular thing. If we fay 'tis a happiness to be King, the expression is vagous, but if you add the to it, and fay it is a happinels to be the King, it determins the bufinels, and cannot be understood but of the King. of a particular People mentioned before. So that Articles do contribute very much to the clearness of Discourse, and tis not impossible but these new Men, in the composure of their Language, would make use of them; and the necessity of determining the unfixed fignification of Words would affift to the finding of the Religious and a second state of them out.

The different ways of termination, may be instead of another Noon. We find in all Languages that Noons have two several terminations. One imports the thing mentioned to be of the Singular Number, the other of the Plural; for which reason Noons have generally two Numbers, the Singular and the Plural. The word Homo, with the termination of the Singular Number, implies only a single Person; but Homines, in the termination of the

the Plural, implies more Men; the variation of the termination ferving instead of all, or many.

#### V.

How to mark the references which things have among themselves.

TIE do not always confider fimply the V things that are the Objects of our thoughts; we compare them with other things; we reflect upon the places where they are; upon the time of their duration; unon what they are; what they are not; and upon their references and relations. There is need of particular Terms to express their references, with the Series and Connexion of all the idea's that the Confideration of thefe things imprints in our Minds. In fome languages the different terminations of the fame Nonn do create new differences, and supply those Words which are necessary to expreis the reference of a thing. There are commonly called Cafes, and are fix in each Number, both Singular and Plural. The Noe minative, the Genitive, the Dative, the Accufutive, the Verative, the Ablative, The fame Nouni (belides the principal Idea of the thing? which it figuifies) contains a particular reference

rence betwirt that thing and some other, according as it is in the Genitive or the Dative Case, &t. The Nominative, signifies a thing simply and positively. The Genitive, its reference with the thing to which it relates, as Palatium Regis. The Dative, its relation to the thing as it tends to profit or prejudice, as Utilis Reipublica. The Accusative, its relation to a thing which acts upon it, as Casar vicit Pompeium. The Vocative, is used when we address our discourse to the person or thing signified by the Noun. The Ablative, is osed in such infinite cases, that it is not possible to mark them all.

The Languages whose Nouns do not admit of these different Cases, do make nie of httlewords called Particles with the fame effect: as of the ta, by, they &c. Adverbs are used likewife with little difference from the Declention of Noons, carrying with them fometimes the force of those Particles, as this Adverb Wifely imports as much as thefe two Words together wish Wildom. The different relatione betwixt things, in respect of their place, figuation, motion, tepole, diffance, oppolition, and comparison, are infinite. We cannot discourse a proment, but something will arise to figgest them. We are not to doubt then, but thefe Men; whom we suppose brought together from remote parts, of no correspondence. would quickly find out some way or other to fignifie SORE

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fignific these references and relations, either by Particles (as in the French, where the Nouns have not that way of Declension) or by the different terminations of the Names of the Things themselves, as in the Latin and Greek.

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vicit Tompeium. The Vocative, is used when

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figurified by the Noun. The Ablative, is of in a light of Verbani in a light of Verbani in the control of the Nature of Verbani in the control of the Nature of Verbani in the control of the Nature of Verbani in the control of the c

THE operations of the Mind are referred commonly to three principals.

Perception, by which we differn the difference of things. Judgment, by which we affirm of a thing, that it is, or that it is not. And Ratiotination, by which we draw confequences to evince the truth or fallacy of a Proposition contested, by comparing it with one or more incontestable Propositions. If we attend seriously to what passes in our Mind, we shall find that we do rarely consider of things, without making judgment of them. So that when these new Men had furnished themselves with words to significate objects of their Perceptions, they would doubtless seek out for words to express their Judgments, that is

to fay, the action of the mind, which affirms that a thing is so, or not so. And the part in discourse which expresses our Judgment, is called a Proposition, which Proposition does necessarily comprehend two Terms, the Subjest and the Attribute: The Subject is That of which we affirm: The Attribute is, That which is affirmed of the thing. As in this Proposition: God is just; God is the Subject; Just is the Attribute, it being the thing affirmed, or attributed to the Subject of the Proposition. Besides these two, there is in every Proposition another Term, which couples the Subjest with the Attribute, and fignifies that Action of the Mind by which we judge, affirming the Attribute of the Subject; and the Terms which express this Action, are in all Lan-guages called Verbs. Verbs, as is observed by a judicious Grammarian, are words which fignifie affirmation. A fingle word would fuffice to fignifie all the like operations of our judgment, as the Verb Effe, which is the natural and ordinary fign of affirmation. But if we judge of these new Men, by those who have lived in all former Ages, the defire of contracting their discourse, would prompt them to make one word fignifie both the Affirmation and Attribute, according to the pradice in many Languages, where infinite numbers of words do denote both the Affirmation and the thing affirmed. For Example, I which I perform when I read, at the same time. These words, as is said before, are called Verbs. And when, in some Languages, they take from them the power of signifying affirmation, they degenerate into the nature of Nouns, and are used accordingly, as when in French we say, le boire, le manger.

#### II. Of Pronouns.

With one single Verb we may be able to express an entire Proposition.

HE frequent repetition of the same words being disagreeable and troublefeme, and we in the mean time obliged to fpeak often of the same thing; to rectifie that inconvenience, in all Languages that are known to us, there are certain words effablished which are called Pronouns, and their number is three: The first implies the Perfon speaking, as I; the second, the Person to whom we speak, as Tou; the third, the Perfon or thing of which we speak, as He, That. These Pronouns have two Numbers, as the Nouns. The Pronoun of the first Person, in the plural Number, implies the persons speaking, as We; the Pronoun of the fecond Person, in the plural Number, implies the perfons

fons to whom we speak, as ye; and the Pronoun of the third Person, in the Plural Number, implies the persons or things of which

we fpeak, as They, Those.

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Again, to avoid the inconvenient repetition of these Pronouns, which otherwise would often occur; in the ancient Languages they added certain Terminations to their Verbs. which supplied the place of these Pronouns, by which means a fingle Verb became fufficient to make an entire Proposition; so this Verb Vobera, comprehends the fense of this whole Proposition, Ego fum verberans: And befides that, this Verb intimates the affirmation, and the thing affirm'd, it fignifies also the person beating, who is the Person that speaks of himself; and the reason is, because the Verb has a Termination that supplies the place of the Pronoun of the first Person. In this new Language that is proposed, we

## ting because rue do nor

### Of the Tenfes of Verbs.

What is affirmed of the Subject of a Proposition, is either past, present, or to come. The different inflexions of Verbs, have power to denote the circumstance of time belonging to the thing affirmed. The

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eircumstances of time are very numerous : We may consider the time past with refepence to the prefent, as when I fay, I was reading when he entred into my Chamber. The act of my reading is past, in regard of the time in which I fpeak; but I fignifie the time present, in regard of the thing of which I speak, which is the entrance of such a Man. We may also consider the time past, with reference to another time past, as, I had supp'd when he came in, both which actions are past, in respect of one another. We may consider the time past two ways, as Definite, or Indefinite: We may speak precisely, when an action was done; or we may only fay, it was done. We confider the Future Tenfe in the same manner, using sometimes a precise and definite term, and sometimes an indefinite, without any Limitation no 19 oding ansie

In this new Language that is propos'd, we cannot tell whether all the different circumstances of times would be express'd by so many different inflexions, because we do not find the People have distinguished with the same exactness all the circumstances of time. The Hebrew Verbs have only two Tenses, the Preter Tense, and the Future Tense: They have but two inflexions to express the diversity of times. They make use of the inflexion of the Future Tense, to signific the Present Tense. The Greeks are more exact, their Verbs

Verbs have all the Tenses aforesaich. Yet I doubt not, but the Terms of this new Language would bear at least the signs of some of these circumstances, seeing in every Proposition the time of the Attribute is to be determined; and the desire to abbreviate our discourse is natural to all Men. When I say, I shall love, the instexion of the Future Tense that I give to that Verb, eases me of the trouble of this long Phrase, It will happen some time or other that I shall be in love. When I say, I have loved, the instexion of the Preterpersect tense saves me several of these words, There was formerly a time when I was in love.

## not the aministica s, and therefore they are called Participles, by we they participate both of the Verb and of the Noun; stair up

hosels, figulfies only the thing affirmed, and

By Verbs may be signified the divers manners of affirming, and certain circumstances of the action which they imply.

VErbs have their Moods, that is to say, they signifie besides the circumstances of time, the manner of the affirmation. The first is the Indicative Mood, which demonstrates simply what we affirm. The second is the Imperative, and implies a command to such a one to do such a thing. The third is the Optative, a Mood of great use among the B 3 Greeks,

Greeks, and intimating an ardent defire that fuch a thing may happen. The fourth is the Subjunctive, so called, because it has always fome condition annexed to what we affirm, as I should love him, if he did love me. If that condition were not inferted after the Subjunctive, the fense would be doubtful. The fifth Mood is the Infinitive; a Verb in this Mood has a large and undetermined fignification, as To drink, to eat, to be beloved, to be beaten, &c. We shall see hereafter that Infinitive Verbs are used principally for the coupling and connexion of two Propositions. A Participle may be faid to be a fixth Mood. A Verb in its Participle, fignifies only the thing affirmed, and not the affirmation; and therefore they are called Participles, because they participate both of the Verb and of the Noun, fignifying the thing affirmed by the Verb, without any affirmation. The Participle Beaten, imports as much as the Verb to beat, yet he who fays Bearen, affirms nothing, unless it be added or understood, He is, or he has been beaten.

All Verbs (except Sum, Es, Est, Est) do comprehend two Idea's, the Idea of affirmation, and the Idea of some action assimpled. An action has commonly two terms, the first a que, the second and queme In an action we consider the Author that acts, and the Person upon whom: The first is called the Agent, the second the Patient. It is necessary

to determin the Term of the action of which we speak, whether it be the subject of the Proposition, of which we affirm the action, that is either Agent or Patient; and therefore in ancient Languages, the Verbs have generally two Terminations, and different Inflexions, which discover whether the Verb be taken actively or passively: As Petrus amat, & Petrus amatur; Peter loves, and Peter is beloved. In the first Proposition, the Verb being active, imports that it is Peter that loves; in the second Proposition, the same Verb, with a passive instead in implies that Peter is

the Object of that love.

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It is not impossible then, but the Verbs of this new Language would have two inflexions, one active, the other passive. 'Tis possible they would not comprehend in one fingle Verb all the various circumstances of an action; as whether it was done with diligence, whether performed by the Author himfelf, or whether by an Instrument; which among the Hebrews was fignified by the various inflexions of their Verbs. There are a hundred feveral ways of a Man's expressing himself, that are not essential, but peculiar to certain Languages. I cannot fay whether our new Society would omit them, and stick only to those which were essential, and without which they could not explain themselves. But my delign being only to display the fundamental B 4

Rules of the Art of Speaking, I hold my felf oblig'd to enlarge only upon the last.

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What Words are necessary to express the other Operations of the Mind.

TE have seen how the two first Operations of the Mind are to be expressed, that is to say, our Perception and Judg-We come now to the third, which is our Reasoning or Argumentation. We argue, when from one or two clear and evident Propositions, we conclude the truth or falfity of a third Proposition that is obscure and disputable. As if to prove the innocence of Milo, we should say thus: It is lawful to repel force by force, Milo in killing Clodius, did only repel force by force; Ergo, Milo did lawfully kill Clodius. Reasoning is but an extention of the second Operation, and a chaining of two or more Propositions. It is evident we have need only of some short words to make this connexion, as these Particles, then, at length, for, for asmuch, seeing that, &c. Some Philosophers will have a fourth Operation of the Mind, and they call it Method, by which they range and dispose their Arguments into order. This disposition and order may be expressed by certain Particles. The

The other Actions of our Mind, by which we distinguish, divide, compare, connect, &c. are reducible to one of these four Operations, and are expressed by certain Particles, which receive different denominations, according to the difference of their office. Those whose office it is to unite, are called Copulatives, as Et. Those which divide, are call'd Negatives or Adversatives, as Not, but. Others are conditional, as If, &c. These Particles do not fignifie the Objects of our Thoughts, but some particular Action of the Mind, as we have faid before. Discourse is but a connexion or continuation of feveral Propositions; and therefore Men have fought out ways of fignifying the connexion of feveral Propolitions. Our That answers the on of the Greeks, and performs that office, as when we fay, I know that God is just, 'tis evident the word That unites the two Propositions I know, and God is just; shewing also that the said Propositions were united in our Minds. Sometimes for shortness fake the Verb in the second Proposition is used in the Infinitive Mood, and 'tis one of the greatest uses of the Infinitive, to couple two Propositions in that manner. entre de la constante de la companione de la constante de la c

The first is called the statem.

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The Construction of Words. and Rules for that Construction.

Having found all the Terms of a Lan-guage, the next thing to be consider'd is the array or disposition of those Terms. If the words which comprehend a Proposition, do not carry marks and tokens to fignifie the connexion which they ought to have; and if we perceive not their scope, the discourse produces no reasonable seuse in the Mind of the Auditor. Among the Nouns, as we have faid before, some signific the things, and others the manner of those things. The first are called Substantives, the second are called Adjettives. In like manner, as the Modes of Being, appertain to the Being it felf, the Adjectives ought to depend upon the Substantives, and carry the marks of their dependance. In a Proposition, the Term that is the Attribute of it, refers to the Subject of it, and that reference ought to be exprelled.

The Nouns of all known Languages are distinguished by different Terminations, in two Genders: The first is called the Masculine, the fecond the Feminine. The inconstancy of custom is very strange in this distribution, fometimes the Gender has been determined

by the Sex; and the Names of Men, and every thing belonging to them, were of the Masculine Gender; The Names of Women, and all things relating to them, were of the Feminine, with regard only to the fignification: And another time, without confidering either the fignification or termination, it has given to Nouns what Gender it pleased. Nouns Adjectives, and other words, which fignifie rather the manners of things, than the things themselves, have usually two terminations, one Masculine, the other Feminine: The Hebrew Verbs are capable of different Genders, as well as their Nouns.

The difference of Genders serves to denote the connexion of the Members of Discourse, and their dependance one upon another. Adjectives have always the same Gender with their Substantives; that is to fay, if the Noun Substantive be Masculine, the Adjective has a Masceline Termination; and it is that Termination that shows to which it belongs. When a thing is multiplied, its manners of Being are multiplied also; and therefore the Adjectives are likewise to follow the Number of their Substantives, whether Singular or Plural. Verbs have two numbers like the Nouns: In the Singular, they imply that the Subject of the Proposition is single: In the Plural, they imply a plurality in the Subject: And therefore Verbs are to be put in the same Num-

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ber with the Noun that is the Subject of the Proposition, whether it be expressed or understood.

Men are sometimes so intent upon things, that they do not reflect upon their Names, nor regard what is their Gender, or what is their Number: They regulate their discourse by the things: They place the Verb in the Plural, though it agree with a Noun of the Singular Number, because they look upon the Noun collectively, and importing an Idea of Plurality; as in Virgil Pars Mersi tenuere ratem, for Pars Mersa tenuit ratem; because without Respect to the Word Pars, which is of the Feminine Gender and Singular Number, he speaks of Men, which are the Masculine and Plural Number. So in French at Sixof the Clock we fay, Il est fix heures, considering the fix hours as a determined point of time. Sometimes we omit or neglect a word, that those to whom we speak may supply it, as in Latin where it is faid, Trifte Lupus stabulis, the word negotium is understood.

Figures are extraordinary ways of speaking. There are Figures of Rhetorick, and Figures of Grammar: Rhetorical Figures express the commotions and violent agitations of the Mind in our passions, or form an agreeable cadence. Figures Grammatical are used in construction when we digress from ordinary Rules, as in this manner of expression we now

now mention, which by the Grammarians is call'd Syllepsis or Conceptio, because in that, we conceive the sense otherwise than is imported by the words, and so the construction is made accordingly. Sometimes we may make use of different expressions which give the same Idea, so that it 'tis indifferent which of them we use, as Dare classibus anstros, or Dare classes austris: And when of these two ways of speaking, we make choice of that which is least used, we call it Hypallage or Immutation.

#### CHAP. III.

I.

We must express all the principal Idea's or Images that are formed in our Mind.

When all the Images that are formed in the Mind of the Speaker, are not legible and plain, his Discourse is imperfect. When we speak therefore, it is necessary that every one of those Idea's which we desire to communicate, have some sign or other to represent it in our Discourse. But we must observe likewise, that there are words which have the Power of signifying several things and are able, besides their principal Idea's, to awaken many other. Nouns,

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Nouns in Languages that admit of different Cases, do signific at the same time both the things and their references, as is said before. Verbs have a power of signifying a whole Proposition, the Subject, Attribute, and Copula. When all our Idea's are expressed with their connexion, 'tis not possible to understand all that we think, unless we give our thoughts such signs as are necessary: For which reason they speak most clearly and intelligibly, who speak most simply, and most according to the natural order and impressi-

ons upon their Mind.

'Tis true, that Discourse is tedious, where we give to every thing that we defire to fignifie, particular terms; 'tis tirefome to the Hearer, if he has but common capacity. Befides, our Ardour and impatience to communicate our thoughts, will not endure fo great a number of words: When it is possible, we chuse rather to explain our selves by a single word, and do therefore felect fuch terms as may excite feveral Idea's, and by confequence supply the place of words; and we retrench fuch, as being omitted, cannot produce obscurity. The Rule to be observed, is to have a particular regard to the capacity of the Perfon to whom we speak; if his parts be but indifferent, we must speak every thing expresly, and leave nothing to his divination.

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The Ellipsis or retrenchment of some part of our Discourse, is a Grammatical Figure, as in this Latin Expression, Paucis to volo, in which these words, verbis alloqui, are left out. This Figure is very common in the Oriental Languages: The People of those Countries being hot and quick, their ardour and vehemence will not permit them to speak any thing in terminis that may be as well underflood. The French Language uses not this kind of Figure fo frequently, nor indeed any other of the Grammatical Figures: It affects clearness and perspicuity, and therefore as near as possible expresses every thing in the

simplest and most natural order.

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When we speak, we ought particularly to confider the principal things, and make choice for them of fuch Expressions, as may make deepest impressions in the mind of the Hearer, either by the multitude of Idea's they contain, or otherwise. A Painter draws the principal Lines of his Picture groß, and then heightens it with his colours; in the mean time fweetning and refining his other strokes, that their foftness and obscurity may set off the lustre of the other. Trifling things, that are not essential to Discourse, should be mentioned by the By: 'Twould shew great defect of Judgment to dilate upon them; it would divert the Reader, and take off his Mind from that which is more material. There are two ways (and those

those very different) of transgressing in our choice of Expressions: The one is, when we are too diffuse and prodigal; the other when we are too sparing and dry. The last reprefents only the carkass of things, and are like the first Touches in a Picture, by which the Painter marks only the places where he defigns the Eyes, Mouth, Ears, &c. The first by its fecundity and redundance perplexes as much on the other side. A just temperament is to be observed therefore. When the Painter has perfected his necessary strokes, all that he adds afterwards does but spoil what he did before. Words that are superfluous, do but render the necessary more obscure, and binder their impression; they tire the Ear, and never reach the Memory.

Omne supervacuum pleno de pestore manat.

Politeness consists partly in astrict retrenchment of unnecessary words, which are as it were the Excrements of Discourse: A thing is polish'd, when the little rugged particles are taken away with the File, and the surface made smooth and even. This repetition of words, which serves only to lengthen out discourse and tire the Reader, is called by the Grammarians Tautology. When discourse is fill'd up with unnecessary and supersuous words, it is called Perissology. Nevertheless we

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are not obliged to such frugality, that we should be afraid to add one word more than is necessary, as when in Latin we say, vivere vitam, auribus audire: This is an Elegancy sometimes, and called a Pleonasmus, expressing a vehemency in us, and a greater certainty in the thing.

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What ought to be the order or Disposition of Words:

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As to the ordering of Words, and the Rules to be observed in ranging a Discourse. Natural Light directs us so clearly, that no Man can be ignorant. We cannot conceive the sense of a Discourse, if we do not understand the Matter of it first.

Natural order requires therefore, that in every Proposition the Noun that signifies the Subject of it, be placed first: If it be accompanied with an Adjective, that the Adjective be put after it: That the Attribute be placed after the Verb that couples the Subject with the Attribute: That the Particles which denote the reference betwixt one thing and another, be inserted betwixt them: That the Words which make the connexion, may be found betwixt the two Propositions.

And

And this as near as we can, is the Natural Order to be commonly observed in Discourse. I say commonly, because in some cases we may transgress with advantage; and this transgression is an Ornament among the Grammarians, and a Figure call'd Hyperbaton: Of which sort Virgil has one in these Verses:

Furit immissis Vulcanus habenis Transtra per & Remos.

The Preposition per being out of its natural

place.

When we reject a word to the end of a Proposition, without which word the sense of the Proposition is imperfect, the interruption which the Reader receives, makes him more attentive; his defire of understanding it grows more vehement and ardent, and his impatience makes his conception the clearer. Befides, this little transgression does many times make the Proposition strong and intelligible; for the Reader, to understand the fense of it, being obliged to meditate and confider all the parts together, that confideration impresses him the more. For this reason no doubt the Romans and the Greeks did frequently put the Verbat the end of the Proposition, and having the authority of Custom, it is not altogether to be blamed: But he who intends

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nds to to write clearly and simply, must observe Natural order as much as in him lies: I say as much as in him lies, because sometimes we are obliged to transgress, to avoid the concurrence of certain rough words that will not admit of conjuction.

This array and disposition of words, is well worth our serious application: And we may affirm, that it is by this Art of well-placing their words, that those excellent Orators have distinguish'd themselves from the multitude. For words being not made by the Orator, but natural to every Body, 'tis only the faculty of ranging them well, and inducing them properly that belongs to them, and pronounces them Orators.

Dixeris egregie, notum si callida verbum Reddiderit junttura novum----

I speak not here of that disposition of words which renders a Discourse harmonious, but of that which renders it clear. Clearness without doubt depends much upon Natural Order; and whatever interrupts that Order, perplexes our Discourse. But there are many Errors opposed to this Natural Order, and by consequence to that clearness that ought to be observed. The first is the Hyperbaton, or too bold and frequent transposition of words. Our Language is so great a Lover of Clearness.

ness, that it admits none of those transgreffions. It would not be Elegant to fay, There is no Man, who more than he, may justly promife bimself Glory: We are rather to fay, There is no man, who more justly than he, may promise himself Glory. A second Vice consists in the multitude and huddle of words, when we'express our thoughts by long and tedious circumlocutions, or infert words that are altogether unnecessary, as thus, In this, many people do continually and wonderfully abuse their leifure: This Expression is confused, and it would be much better to cut off what is inperfluous, reducing it to these terms: In this, many abuse their leisure. Another defect is, when we do not exactly observe the Rules of Syntax or Construction. Other terms there are, whose fignification being vagous and indefinite, cannot be determined but by their relation to some other term. When we make use of such terms, and do not fignifie their reference, we make our Propositions doubtful and equivocal. As if I should fay, He always loved fuch a per-Con in his affliction; it would be equivocal, because the Reader would not be able to determin to whom the Pronoun his related, whether to the Person, who loved, or the Person in affliction; which fault would be very confiderable. There is another thing also, that is a great enemy to clearness, and that is, when our Expressions seem to look one way, and

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and are intended another, as in this Answer of the Oracle.

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Pyrrhus, the son of Aatus, to whom this Answer was addressed, understood it thus, O Son of Aacus, I say you may overcome the Romans: Whereas it was meant, that the Romans should overcome him. This defect is called by the Greeks, Amphibologia. Besides these, long Parentheses, and too frequent, are neither decent nor convenient, as may be observed too often in several Authors.

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How we may express the Pussions and Moti-

A L L that passes in our Minds, is either A action or passion. We have seen already which way we may express our actions: Let us now see what Nature dictates to signific our Passions, that is, to signific the esteem, contempt, love or hatred, we bear to things, which should be the objects of our thoughts and our affections. Our Discourse is imperfect, unless it carry with it the marks of the Motions of our Will: It resembles our Mind Whose

(whose I mage it ought to bear) no more than a dead Carkass resembles a living Body. To resolve therefore, what our new Men would be obliged to do to express their passions, let us fee-what we our felves should do, had we

the fame parts in that Comedy of

There are Names which have two Idea's That which may be called the principal Idea. represents the thing signified. The other (which may be termed the accellory) reprefents it as invelted with fuch and fuch circumflances. For example, the word Lyer implies a person reprehended for not speaking the truth; but it imports likewisethat the Person reprehended is efteemed an ill Person, one who has cunningly or malicionfly conceal'd the truth, and therefore deserves our hatred and contempt.

"These second idea's, which we have called accessories, are annexed to the Names of things, and to their principal Idea's in this manner: When Cuftom has obtained that we freak with certain terms of what we efteem, thefe terms do instantly assume an Idea of Grandeur: Infomach, that a Person no fooner makes wie of those terms, but we conceive he has an efteen for those things of which he speaks. When we speak in passion, the air of our Looks, the tone of our Voice, and feveral other Circumstances, are sufficient to fignific our commotion. And the very words

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of which we make use upon those occasions, may afterwards of themselves renew the idea of those commotions: As when we have often seen one of our Friends in a certain habit, the same fort of habit is capable of reviving the idea of our Friend. All proper Names of Natural things have their accessory idea's, but they are smutty and obscene: For loose and debauched People speaking of these things in an unusual and immodest way, the soul images of their thoughts, are annexed to the very words; and therefore we may take up the same complaint that was long since made by a wife Pagan, and say, Honesta nomina perdidings.

So then, the words themselves contradicting accessory Idea's that represent the things, and the manner in which those things are conceived, our new Gentlemen would have no trouble to invent new words to signify these accessory Idea's. It would plainly appear, that in their new Language there would be terms sufficient to express the different Motions, as the love, hatred, esteem, contempt, &c. of the Speaker. And moreover (as we shall demonstrate hereaster) our Passions do often deferibe themselves in our Discourse, and sorm their own Characters without Study or Art.

We have feen what Men are obliged to do of necessity, to fignify their thoughts; let us now fee what depends upon their choice. Having all of us one and the same Nature,

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(he the Language that we speak what it will) we follow all those Rules which we have flewn to be Natural and Essential to the Art of Speaking. But it is yet in our power to chuse among the infinite variety of words. what we think good; and this liberty is it that has changed all the ancient Languages, and does still refine or impair them every day.

Diversity of Languages is incommodious, and a great impediment to Society and Trade. Some Persons have anciently proposed to make an Univerfal Language, which might be learnt in a short time, and be common to the whole World. I conceive the great Secret of those Undertakers lay in making that Language to confift of few words: They would have had every thing expressed by one fingle term, and that term with some little alteration, should have signified all other things that had reference to it. They would have made all their Nouns indeclinable, denoting their different Cases by Particles, and their three Genders by three Terminations. They would have had but two Conjugations, one to fignifie the Active, and the other the Paffive: Nor should their Tenses have had different Terminations instead of Pronouns. By which the whole Grammar of that Language might have been quickly and easily learn'd. Hagt noon abnagab thin sol. Won aving all of us one and the fame Nature,

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Language, as in the

### Custom is the Master of all Languages.

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Ultom is the Master and sovereign Arbiter of all Languages. No Man can dispute its Empire, as being oftablished by Necessity, and confirm'd by Universal Confent. It is of the nature of a Sign, to be known to those who make use of it. Words are figns of those Idea's to which they have been formerly joyned. It is necessary there-fore to employ them only for the fignification of things, whole lignifications were known before by the Persons to whom we speak. We might if we please, call a Horse a Dog, and a Dog a Harfe; but the Idea of the first being fix'd already to the word Horse, and the latter to the word Dog, we cannot transpose them, nor take the one for the other without an entire confusion to the Conversation of Mankind. It is ridiculous fantasticalness, not to follow those Modes which long Custom has established: And it is little less than stupidity, when we speak, to leave the ordinary Methods, and deliver our thoughts in The Art of Speaking. Part 1.

in dark obsolete terms, when we desire to im-

part them.

Tis the same thing with us in respect of Language, as in respect of Habit. Some People push on the Modes to the highest extremity: Others with as much eagerness and vanity oppose themselves against them. Some People affect fuch terms and exprellions as are modern or new: Others digging into the Dialects of their Great Grand fathers, will not speak a word now, that was not in wie two hundred Years lince. Both of them are to blame. When Chitom affords not terms pro-per to express what we have to say, it is lawful to use litch words as are almost antiquated and lost: Nay, a Man is exculable, if to make himself understood, he coins a new word: In that cale we may blame the barrennels of our Language, but must commend the secon-dity of his Wit that was able to supply it. Datur venta verborum novirari, obscuritati reframfervienti. With this proviso, notwith-francing, that the word be a-ta-mode, and not dress dup in a lound quite differing from the withquetag entire confesion for a

tion of Mackind: It is ridiculous fastaffe.
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There is a good and a bad Custom, and three ways to distinguish them.

THEN we advance Cultom to the Throne, and make it Sovereign Arbiter of all Languages, we do not intend to put the Scepter into the hands of the Populace. There is a good, and there is a bad Custom: And as good Men are the properest Examples to those who desire to live well; so the practice of good Speakers is the fittest Rule for those who would speak well. Usun, qui sit Arbiter dicendi (says Quintil.) vocamus confensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi, confensum bonorum. But it is no hard matter to differn betwixt the good and the bad; betwixt the depraved Language of the common People. and the noble and refin'd Expressions of the Gentry, whose condition and merits have advanced them above the other.

And to make this distinction, there are three ways. The first is Experience: We are to observe those who speak well; we are to consider the manner of their expressions, what latitude they give to their words, what it is that they assect, and what it is they avoid: If we cannot arrive at their conversation, we

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have Books where Men speak commonly with more exactness, having time and leisure to correct such improprieties as slip unavoidably in discourse; for the Memory being sull of all words continually sounded by the common People; tis very hard to be so constantly upon our guard, as not to let some of them fall from us in conversation before we are aware. When we write, we review what we have done, and expunge such expressions as we find

onapt or impertment.

The second way to discriminate betwixt good Customs and bad, is Reason. All Languages have the fame Fundamentals, which Men would establish, if by accident ( like that we have pretended) they were oblig'd to invent a new Language. By the Notion we have given of these Fundamentals, we may make our felves Masters and Judges of any Language, and condemn the Laws of Custom where they are opposite to the Laws of Nature and Reason. Though we have no right jed such as are bad. Languages are never refined, till Men begin to canvass and examine them; till fuch expressions are exploded, as corrupt use has introduced; but those are not to be found out by the ordinary People: At must be learned and fagacious Men, and Men that have exact knowledge of this Art. When just and proper Expressions are used, a Language Language may be faid to refine, and the difcontinuance from speaking ill, fixes the custom

of fpeaking well.

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Yet in the establishment of Language, Reafon (as we have flewn in the precedent Chapters) prescribes but very few Laws; the rest depend upon the Will and Consent of Men. In speaking, the whole World propofes but one end; but because we may arrive at that end by different ways, the liberty of chusing them as we please; causes difference in the manner of expression, even in the same Language. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the liberty Authors have taken in the formation of Language, we may observe a certain uniformity, and constant regularity running quite through all our Expressions. Men do commonly adhere to fuch customs as they have formerly embraced. Wherefore though . words depend much upon the fancy and capricio of Men, yet, as is faid before, we may difcern a certain uniformity in Custom.

If we know then, that words of such a found are of such a Gender, when we doubt of the Gender of another word, we must compare it with words of the same termination, whose Gender is known: And so in Verbs, If I would know (in the French Language) whether the third Person of the Preterpersect Tense of a proposed Verb be to end in a, I go no farther than to the Infini-

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tive, and if that ends in er, my business is done; because 'tis evident all Verbs of that Language ending in er in the Infinitive, do end with e in the Tense and Person aforesaid.

This way of understanding the Custom of a Language, by comparing its expressions, and considering the proportion which they bear one to the other, is call'd Analogie, which is a Greek word, and signifies proportion. By means of their Analogie, it is that Languages have been fix'd: By virtue of Analogie, Grammarians have found out their Rules, and the good Customs of a Language; have compos'd their Grammars, which, if well made, are very useful, as furnishing us with Rules in short, which we should be oblig'd to find out by Analogie with infinite labour and diligence.

Of all the three ways for the discovery of good Custom, Experience is the best. Custom is always Master: Our choice must be of the most reasonable expressions, and by that choice Languages are purged of their impurities. But when Custom, assords but one single word or phrase, to express what we are obliged to say, Reason permits that we give place to custom, though it be contrary to Reason; nor are we to be blam'd at all, if the expression be bad. This was the occasion of that old and true Maxim among the Lawyers Communic error sacie jus. Analogie is not the Mistress of Language; the is not come down from

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from Heaven, to give haws in that case; the describes only the Laws of Gustonn Non est lex loquendi, sed observation. Quintil, and in the

To perfectly understand the Cultoms of a Language, we must inform our folges of the Genus, and observe the Idioms or peculiar Manners of speaking which belong to it. The Genius of a Language confifts in certain culalities, which those who speak do affect to give to their Stile. The Genius of the French Language is perspicuity and livelines; in which they differ much from the Eastern Nations, who do rather prefer mysterious and enigmatical Expressions, that may find work for the thought. Idioms distinguish Languages one from the other, as well as words. To speak French it is not enough to make use of French words; for if we jumble them together, or dispose them as a German would do the words of his own Language, we mould rather speak Durch than French. We call Hibraifms, the Idioms of Hebren ; Hellenefme, the Proprieties of Greak; and fo of the veft. 'The an Hebrailm to lay Vanity of Vanities, instead of The greateft of all Vanities; as also to fignifie distribution, by repetition of the same word as in this Sentence: Noah put into the Ark feven and feven of all Creatures, to fignific that Noah put imothe Ark feven pairs or couples of all Creatures. Tis an Helenism to use the Infinitive instead of a Noun, and that Idiom is frequence or haps we delign to all strate. in our Language, which has great affinity with the Greek. Expressions obsolete rejected by new custom, and to be found only in ancient Authors are called Archaisms. Every Province has its Idiom, which it is no easie matter to quit. Titus Livius, an Author of great Eloquence and Purity, could not cleanse his Stile from the Impurities of Padua, where he was Born. Asimins Polio tells us, In Tito Livio, mine sacundia viro, pato inesse quandam Paravinitatem.

#### III.

Words are not to be afed but in their proper fignification, and to express the Idea to which Custom has annexed them.

Since then we are to submit to the Tyranny of Custom, we must follow her Laws,
and observe them strictly. The first thing
to be considered, are the particular words,
whose peculiar idea's are to be enquired after
exactly, and not employed but in their proper significations, that is to say, to signific exactly the idea's to which Custom has affixed
them. Besides which, we are to have regard
to the accessory idea's that belong to them,
otherwise we shall be in danger of mistaking,
and give a low and abject idea to things which
perhaps we design to illustrate.

Some

Some are of Opinion, that to speak well, it is fufficient to make use only of such words as are authorised by custom, as we have said before; but we must also take our words in the precise fignification that custom affords: To draw the Picture of the King, 'tisenot enough that we draw a Face with two Eyes, a. Nose and a Mouth; but we must express the Features, and particular Lineaments of the

King's Face.

Some People fency themselves Eloquent, if they can but throng their Memories with Phrases, huddled together out of the Works of fuch Persons as are renowned for their Eloquence; but they are mistaken, and those who take that course shall never be exact: They accommodate their Matter to their ... Phrase, without considering in what place, or upon what occasion it was used by the Author. So that their Stile becomes wild and extravagant, like a Grotefque Picture, patch'd up of Shells of a thousand several colours, and other whimsies, that have not the least natural relation to the Figure represented.

Phrases in Discourse, like patches in a Cloak, are great figns of Poverty of the Master : For they ferve only to fill up void Places, and he that abounds with them, shall never write.

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### Some are of Opine

We are to consider whether the Idea's of the Words we joyn, may be joyned as properly.

T is not enough that we make choice of proper or familiar terms, unless their connexion be reasonable. Without that, our Discourfe will have no more form, than the Letters of a Press thrown by accident upon a Table: For the the Idea of every word feparately and alone may be sufficiently clear, yet joyned together, they may be Nonsense, because the idea's to which they are applied by custom, may be incompatible. These two words, Square and Round, are very good; and their Idea's intelligible: We do readily understand what it is to be Square, and what to be Round: But if we should say a Square Round, no body could comprehend it. If I should fay, fuch a one was food with his Gloves, who could understand it? Yet shod and Gloves, are words that every Man knows. If when a Man gets up, I should bid him Descend upon his Horse, the standers by would think me a Sot. When the repugnance betwixt the Idea's is not so manifest, and the connexion of the terms terms not so palpably condemned by custom, as in these two expressions, sod with Gloves, and descended upon his Horse, many People are not disgusted. These following words being spoke in company before several Persons, most of them would be taken with their noise, and not perceive that they carried in them nothing of sense or signification: Noble and brown Barries that carry high Destines beyond the Seas. The words are good and intelligible of themselves, but applied in that manner, they signification.

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Who can tell what the Author fays in that Verse? The Idea's of accumulating and undermining are incompatible, and tis not possible to reconcile them. We know what the Poet intended, but he was out in his Expression. This is rather our want of sudgment, than ignorance of Language; so that to speak exactly, we must study as well to adapt our judgement as Tongue.

For the Order to be given to words, when they are joined together, our Ears do instruct us so sensibly what Rules are to be observed, that we have no need to mention them here. Custom does not always observe Natural Or-

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der in certain words. It requires that some be placed sirst, and others sollow at a distance. The Ear being used to these kinds of array, perceives the least transgression, and is offended at it. We are more disturbed at a thing ungrateful to our Senses, than to our Reason: Nonsense or an Error in arguing, would be less abominable than if a Man should transpose his words, and say Head my for my Head. And this is a fault so visible, 'tis not

worth an admonishment.

A Discourse is pure, when we follow the best Custom, when we use what it approves, and reject what it condemns. The Vices opposed to this Purity, are Barbarisms and Solecifms. The Grammarians do not agree about the definition of these two Vices. Monsieur de Vaugelas applies Barbarifm only to Words. Phrases and Particles; and Solecismto Declenfions, Conjugations and Construction. We commit a Barbarism in using a word for English that is not English; in using an English word improperly; in using an Adverb for a Prepolition; in using a Phrase improperly:
Tis a Barbarism likewise to use or omit such Particles as are unnecessary or convenient. And the same absurdity committed in Declension, Conjugation, or Construction, is a Solecism.

Monlieur de Vangelas, has distinguished very well, betwix the clearness we mentioned in

the precedent Chapter, and the purity we have mentioned in this. A pure Stile is that which Ouintil calls Emendata Oratio: A clear Stile is that which he calls, Dilucida Oracio. And these are so different (says Monsieur de Vaugelas) that there are thousands of People, who write clearly and intelligibly in all fort of matters, (that is to fay, explain themselves fo, as the meanest capacity may conceive what they intend) and yet nothing more impure than their Stile On the other fide, there are those who write purely and correyet their words are ranged fo ill, their Periods fo ill order'd, and their Stile fo perplex'd and confus d, they are not, without great difficulty, to be understood. doldw abroW slods or the Lenened are rejected by every body;

retire into the Country and become the Lan-

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Tis Choice of Expression that makes a in the state of Man Elegant. I said the said t

HE best Expressions grow low and degenerate, when prophan'd by the Populace, and applied to mean things. The use they make of them, infecting them with a mean and abject idea, causes that we cannot use them without fullying and defiling those things

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things, which are figuified by them. Vulgar Exprellions are carefully avoided by those who write politely; and caution, as to them, is the occasion of continual alteration of Languages.

Ut Sylva foliis pronos mutantur in Annos, Prima cadant ; ita verborum vetus interit aturi, Es Juvenum rieu, florens modo nata, vigenta,

Persons of Quality and Learning endeavour to advance themselves above the Vulgar, and therefore avoiding to speak like them, will not make use of Expressions that they have spoiled. Persons of Condition but readily instated by everybody, so that in a short time, those Words which are rejected by the Rich, or the Learned, are rejected by every body, and forced from the Court and the City, to retire into the Country, and become the Language of the Peasants.

To be short, besides exact keeping of the Laws of Gustom, and the care of making use only of pure ways of Speaking; it must be confessed, that that which advanced those Perfons, who are most Eminent for their Elequence, was a certain Art and Felicity they had in finding out rich and ingenious Expressions to signific their thoughts, It requires no great care nor pains to avoid the Gensiae

of the Critick; but we cannot please every body without extraordinary fortune: Who can find fault with these following words? Tis to Cadmus that Greece is indebted for the Invention of Letters: Tis to him she is indebted for the Art of Writing. Yet I have read the same thing expressed with more fancy and charm.

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Chan, in . in when the speaking. or the Tritish; but we cannot please every bady without extraordinary formula Who dea field feat with these following wende? The roland state of the condepted for the Levenner of Levens The column free or endelies ed for the Ar of Writing. Yet I have road the fants thing expressed with more sincy and charge - we were here the supersupplied the particular was the was making the first of the first of the transfer of the thirty of the transfer of the Harrist A. C. Landing and T. Ameletica of interest or comprehensive states a transfer of 23,00 62 of . Company of the Party of the to be found, hereby beautiful and at the contract will Control of the Contro of the Control of the San Andrews

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# Second PART

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### ART of SPEAKING.

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No Language is rich enough to supply us with terms capable of expressing all the different Faces upon which the same thing may be represented: We must have recourse to aertain manners of speaking called Tropes, whose Nature and Invention shall be explained in this Chapter.

HE Mind of Man is so fertile, all the Languages in the World are too barren to express its secundity. It turns things so many ways, and represents things with so many different Faces, that its impossible to contrive words for all the

the forms of our thoughts: The ordinary terms are not always adequate, they are either too strong or too weak. Therefore to express our meaning exactly, we are many times obliged to the same address we are glad to make use of, when we know not the Man's Name of whom we desire to speak; we do it by such signs and circumstances, as by their connexion to his Person, do stir up and excite that Idea, which we could not signify by his proper Name; that is, we describe him as a Soldier, Magistrate, Dwarf, &c.

Crine ruber, niger ore, brevis pade, lumine lasus.

Those Objects that have reference and connexion betwixt them, have their idea's also in some manner connex'd. We no sooner see a Soldier, but War occurs immediately to our Memory: We no sooner see a Man, but we remember all those whom we have observed to resemble him. So the idea of a thing may be excited at the naming of any of those things with which it has any resemblance.

When to express a thing we make use of an improper word, which Custom has applied to another Subject, that way of explaining our selves is figurative; and the words so transported from their proper figuration, and applied to other things than what they naturally mean; are called Tropes, or Changes of Custom,

Custom, as the Greek Verb retro imports. These Tropes do not signific the things to which they are apply'd, otherwise than by reason of the connexion and reserence that those things have with the things whose Names they do properly bear: So that we may reckon, there are as many fort of Tropes, as there are different references; but it has pleased the Massers of this Art to establish but sew.

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# A List of the most considerable Tropes.

#### METONYMIA.

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I Place this Metonymia at the head of the Tropes, because it comprehends several forts of them, and is the most capacious of them all. Metonymia, in Latin, Transnominatio, is the putting off one name for another; and as oft as we use any name or word to express a thing, besides that which is proper to it, we express our selves by a Metonymia. As if we should say, Casar ravaged the Gauls: All the World reads Cicero: Paris is allarmed. It would be plain we intended, Casar's Army ravaged the Gauls: The World read Cicero's Works: And, That the People in Paris are allarmed. There

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There is so strong relation betwixt a General and his Army, betwixt an Author and his Works, betwixt a Town and its Inhabitants; that we cannot think of the one, but the Idea of the other presents it self instantly to our Minds; which is the cause, that this changing of Names produces nothing of consuson.

#### STNECDOCHE.

Synecdoche is a kind of Metonymie, where we put the name of the whole for a part, or the name of a part for the whole: As if we should say Europe for France, or France for Entope: The Nightingal for Birds in general, of the Bird for the Nightingal: The Tree for a particular Tree. If we should say, The Plague is in England, when perhaps it is only in London: Or, That it is in London, when it is all over the Kingdom. If speaking particularly of the Nightingal or of an Oak, we should say, This is a fine Bird, This is a fine Tree. So that by the benefit of a Metonymie we have liberty to use the name of a part for the whole, or the whole for a part.

We refer also to this Trope, the liberty we take to put a certain for an uncertain Number: We may say, This House has an hundred fair Avenues, when perhaps it has more or less: And to make our reckoning round and compleat, if a Man be ninety nine years old

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and odd months, we may fay he is an hundred, without any great Solecism:

#### ANTONOMASIA.

Antonomasia is a sort of Metonymie, when we apply the proper Name of one thing to feveral others; or econtrario, the names of feveral ral things to one. Sardanapalus was a voluptuous King: Nero a cruel Emperour. By this Figure Antonomasia, we call any voluptuous person a Sardanapalus, and any cruel person a Nero. The words Orator, Poet, Philosopher, are common words, and to be given to all of the respective Professions; yet they are applied to particular persons, as if they were only proper to them: When we speak of Cicero, we fay the Orator gives us this Preceptin his Rhetorick. The Poer has given us the Defcription of a Tempelt in the first of his &neids, intending Virgil. The Philosopher has prov'd it in his Metaphysicks, meaning Ari-Storle. In every condition, that Man who excels the rest of his Brethren, may appropriate the Title of his Profession. We cannot talk of Eloquence, but Cicero falls naturally into our thoughts, and by consequence the Idea of Cicero and Orator, are fo close and infeparable, we cannot mention the one, but the other will follow. Perch. a. Chain, 1-1 Water

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#### METAPHORA.

Tropes are words transported from their proper fignifications, and apply'd to things that they fignifie but obliquely. So that all Tropes are Metaphors or Translations, according to the Etymology of the Word. And yet by the Figure Antonomasia we give the name of Met aphor to a particular Trope, and according to that definition, a Metaphor is a Trope by which we put a strange and remote word for a pro-per word, by reason of its resemblance with the thing of which we speak. We call the King the Head of His Kingdom: because as the Head commands the Members of the Natural, fo the King commands the Members of the Politick Body. The Holy Scripture, very Elegantly to fignifie a great Drought, fays, The Heavens were Brass. When a house looks pleasantly, we say, and not improperly, It fmiles upon us; because it in some measure resembles the agreeableness that appears in the countenance of a person when he smiles.

#### ALLEGORIA.

An Allegery is a continuation of several Metaphors. There is an excellent Example of a perfect Allegory in the Poem of S. Prosper, Part. 2 Chap. 14. where he speaks of Divine Grace.

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By this the Soul of Man becomes a Soil,

Fit to receive the Seed of Faith, and while

By this Divine Efflux, the drooping Mind

Is rais'd above her felf, that Plant doth find

Room to take root and largely spread, thro' all

Those thoughts and actions, which fince the Fall

Defence the Name of Good To this w're bound.

That that good Fruit, for which the Saints are

(Crown'd,

Comes to misourity was is not kill d By th' Daves of Ruffieus, with which is fill d Depraced humane Mature: Tis this strength By which Faith brings forth Fruit, and at the

Mangre the despirate Onsers of fieres lasting Grows up secure to Him in whom she stuffs. This props up tender Faith from being struck (down

Till happy Perseverance gives a Crown.

Great care must be taken in an Allegary that it ends as it begins; that the Metaphors be continued, and the same things made use of to the last, from whence we borrow our first Expressions; which Prasper observed exactly in his Metaphor from Corn. When these Allegaries are obscure, and the natural sense of the words not presently perceptible, they may be call it Engras, as in these Verses, where the Poet describes the agitation and

and ebullition of the Blood in the time of a

Ce sang chaud & bonillant, carre stâme liquide, Certe source de vie à ce conphomicide, Et son let agité, ne se peut reposer Et consume le champ qu'elle doit aroser. Dans ces canaux troubles, sa course vagabonde Porte un tribut Mortel au Roy du petit Monde.

This last Verse is more particularly Enigmatical; and on a sudden we do not perceive that he intends by the word King the Heart, as the principal part by which the Blood of the whole Body passes continually. It must first be considered, that Man is called frequently a Microcosm or little World.

#### LITOTES.

Litotes, or Diminutio, is a Trope by which we speak less than we think, as when we say, I cannot commend you, it implies a secret reproach or reprehension for something committed that hinderens. I do not undervolveyour Presents, is as much as I accept them.

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#### HTPERBOLE.

An Hyperbole is a Figure which represents things greater, lesser, better, &c. than in reality

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when our ordinary Terms being too weak or too strong, carry no proportion with our idea; and is fearing to speak too sittle, we say out and say too much. As if to express the swiftness of a Horse, I should say he was spifer than the Wind. If the slowness of a Rerson, I should say, His motion was slower than the motion of a Terroise. In strictness these Expressions are Lyes, but they are innocent Lyes, and deceive no body: For no one but understands what we mean, and in the precedent Examples, all that is intended, is only this, That one ran very fast, and the other moved very slow.

#### IRONIA

An Ironic is a Trope, by which we speak contrary to our Thoughts, as when we say, such a one is a very honest man, when we know he is notoriously corrupt. The tone of the Voice wherewith these ironics are commonly pronounced, and the quality of the Person to whom we give the Title, being contrary to what we say, undeceives the Hearer, and gives an exact notion of our Thoughts.

peak and hopely us the Tropes, which pro-

a Planto on on GATA

#### TO THE WOLL COM TON CIRESUS. TO BE IN

lity they are. We make off of an Phiperpole.

Catacresis is the freest Trope of them all:
By it we have liberty to borrow the Name of a thing, though quite contrary to what we would signifie, because we cannot otherwise express it; as when we say a wooden link-horn. Reason demures at the Expression; but necessity obliges us to make the of it. To ride on Horseback upon a Stick; Equitare in avanding longa; is not so proper, because riding does naturally presuppose an Horse, and there is great difference betwixt an Horse and a Stick: Yet the these Expression appear contradicto-

ry, they are easily understood.

These use the most considerable of the Tropes, and to one or other of these, all the rest may be reduced. I do not pretend to shew how we are to find them: Besides, that Custom will plentifully furnish us in the heat of Discourse, no Man's Imagination but will supply him. And as in our passion we never want Arms, our choler directing us to whatever lies in our way; so when our Imagination is stirr'd, we make use of all the Objects of our Memory to signific our thoughts. There is nothing in Nature, but may some way or other be applied to the thing of which we speak, and supply us with Tropes, where proper Terms are desective.

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#### CHAP. II.

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The use of Tropes, and the Necessity of their being clear.

HE richness of a Language consists in its Tropes; and as the ill use of a Man's Wealth, is the destruction of his Estate; so the ill choice of Tropes occasions a multitude of faults in Discourse. 'Tis necellary therefore that Rules be prescribed: And first great care is to be taken, that we use no Tropes, but where we must express our felves imperfectly without them; and when we are obliged to use them, they must have two qualities; one is, they must be clear, and contribute to the understanding of what we intend, feeing the only use of them is to make us more intelligible; the other is, that they hold proportion with the Idea we defign to delineate.

Three things hinder the perspicuity of a Trope: The first is, when it is too remote, and gives no present advantage to the Hearer, to discover what it is that the speaker intends. As if we should call a scandalous House, t'e S ree .

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Syrtes of youth. We should not reach the meaning of the Metaphor, till we had recollected that the Syrres were certain Banks of Sand (upon the African Coast) very dange-Whereas if we should say the same House was a Rock for Touth, what we intended to lignifie would be obvious enough. To avoid this inconvenience, the best way will be to take our Metaphors from fensible things, and fuch as are frequently represented to sour Eyes, whose Images are easily apprehended without ferutiny or trouble. If I would describe a Person whose Name I had forgot, I should be ridiculous to do it by dark and obfoure Signs, that gave no ready occasion to my Hearers to form an Idea of his Person : But this that is a fault fo dangerous, and fo much to be avoided in conversation, is looked upon by Tome Authors as an Elegance, and highly affected. Some People delight to fetch their Metaphors afar off, and to take them from things unknown to oftentate their Learning. If they speak of a Kingdom, they will be fure to make use of a Synecdoche, and call it by some part that no body knows: The nearest of their Tropes shall be fetch'd out of Afia or Africk. And he who would under-stand them, must inform himself of all the Willages, Fountains and Mole hills in those Countries. They never mention a Man, but by the Titles of his Grand-Father or Great Grand-

to:

Grand-Father, and all to make a Parade of their great Skill in Antiquity. Whereas the: Idea of a Trope ought to have fuch reference: and Connexion with the proper word; that: one cannot be mentioned, without exciting; the Idea of the other: And this fault in the connexation; is the fecond thing that renders a Trope obscure. This connexion is either natural or artificial. I call that natural, when things fignified by their proper, and by their metaphorical Names, have natural refemblance or dependance one upon the other... As when we fay a Man has Arms of Brafs, to fignifie the strength of his Arms, we may call this refemblance betwixt the Trope and the proper Expression, natural. The artificial connexion, is that which arises from Cufrom. 'Tis the custom to call a rough untractable Man an Arab; 'tis an usual term, and the frequent using it in that sense, makes the Idea of that word Arab awake the Idea of: an untractable Man. And therefore an artificial connexion is more obvious than a natural, because it is establish'd by Custom.

The too frequent use of Tropes, is the third thing that renders them obscure: The clearest and most perspicuous Metaphors express things but indirectly. The natural Idea of what is represented only by Metaphors, arrives not at the mind without pain and reflexion, and there are sew but would be willing:

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to have that labour spared. Yet when we condemn this frequency of Tropes, we intend only those which are extraordinary. Some there are as useful as natural Terms; and those can never perplex our Discourse. When we make use of metaphorical Expressions, they must be of this latter fort, otherwise our Hearers must be prepared to understand them. A Trope ought to be preceded by something that hinders mistake, and the sequel of the Discourse ought to make it appear that we are not to stop at the natural idea represented by the Terms which we imploy,

Unless we be very extravagant and delight in not being understood, we will never continue a Book or Discourse, from the beginning to the end in perpetual Allegories. We cannot discover a Man's meaning, but when he gives us at least some natural signs of it, without fallacy or equivocation. How can we tell when he is in jest, and when in earnest, unless we have seen him serious before? How can we destinguish a Mimick from a real Fool, but by observing that the one is a Fool only for a time, and the other as long as he lives? When therefore we see an Author express himself Wholy by Metaphors, we may conclude him extravagant, unless there be some se-

reet reason that makes him obscure.

## ing of a Rock of an immense height, and or a bottom of a prodiction of a prodiction of a prodiction.

Tropes must be proportioned to the Idea's, we would give.

THE Use of Tropes is absolutely necessary fary, because many times ordinary words. are deficient. If I would give the Idea of a very high Rock, the words large, high andt. lofty, being given to ordinary Rocks, would afford but a short and imperfect demension of mine. But if I would fay, It threatned the Heavens, the Idea of Heaven (which is the highest thing in Nature) and the Idea of threatning (which belongs properly to people above us) would form in my Mind an Ideaof fuch an extraordinary height, as could not be expressed without an Hyperbole. We say more then we intend, for fear we should say less. But these kind of Expressions are to be used with great caution and decorum: We must have a care that there be always a proportion betwixt the natural Idea of the Trope, and the thing we would explain; otherwise the Hearer may misunderstand, and take one thing for another. If speaking of an indifferent low Vally, I should say, It went as low as Hell; or of a Rock of more than ordinary height, I should say, It touched the Skies; who would not believe I was speak+ ing: ing of a Rock of an immense height, and of a bottom of a prodigious lowness? So that we must have particular regard that our Trope does not give a contrary or extravagant Idea of the thing we intend, lest whilst we pretend to be serious, we make our Auditors laugh, as in this Expression, Morte Catonis Respublica castrata est.

There are thousands of ways to correct and temper thefeextravagant Expressions of which fometimes we are forced to make use. If our reputation be in danger, we excuse our selves, or prepare the Reader by some previous complement: For 'tis plain, an ill introduc'd Trope, is a figh of an irregular Fancy: Thefe bold Expressions are Indications of our Judgment or Paffon: When an Object is rare, and we think it fo in our Minds, (whether it befor its height or profundity) we presently are fenfible in our selves of Motions tending to Esteem or Contempt, Hatred of Love. which we express by words proportioned to our Judgment and Passion: If therefore the Judgment we make of these Objects be rash and temeratious; if our Sentiments be irrational, our Discourse betrays all, and discovers our weakness. 'Tis not enough therefore, that our Tropes be fuited to our Idea's, but they must quadrate among themselves. Men are naturally Lovers of great things; and therefore Authors, who make the fatisfaction

of their Readers the Rule and Scope of their Art, do affect great words, high Metaphors, and bold Hyperboles, that, to be examin'd would appear ridiculous, and even in those persons who are delighted with them, produce nothing but vain admiration. A Man of Reason cannot endure that Mountains and Molehills should be confounded; that trisses should be made great things, and great things trisses; and that the equality of stile should not leave it in our power, to discriminate betwixt things of none, and things of the most serious importance.

#### TIL

### Tropes are an Ornament to Discourse.

The thing we intend: When we call a Great Captain, The Thunderbolt of War, the Idea of thunder informs present with what force, with what swiftness, with what noise, the said Captain overcomes: Men do not commonly receive any thing into their Minds, that comes not first to their Senses. To make them conceive well, we make use of Comparisons that are both sensible and pleasant; such Comparisons are easie to the Mind, extempting

ing it from that study and serious application. that is necessary for the discovery of that which falls not under our Senfes. For this reafon, Metaphors taken from sensible things, a revery frequent in Scripture. The Prophets never speak of God, but they describe Him by things subject to our Sense. They give him Arms, and Hands, and Eyes, and describe Him with Darts, Arrows, and Tunderbolts, by fuch visible things to intimate to the people his Spiritual and Invisible Power. Sapientia Dei que cum infantia nostra Parabolis, & Similitudinibus quodammodo ludere non dedignata est, Prophetas voluit humano more de divinis loqui, ut habetes hominum animi, divina & eclestia, terrefrium similitudine intelligerent. St. August.

A fingle Metaphor many times expresses more than a long Discourse. If we should fay, Sciences have corners and depths that are very unprofitable, that Metaphor would fignihe more than could be expressed by many natural words in an easie and comprehensible way. Besides, by help of a Trope, we can vary and protract a Discourse as we see occafion. When we speak long upon one Subject, and have no mind, by too frequent repetitions, to trouble the hearers, it is the best way to borrow Names from such things as have connexion with the things of whichwe speak, and

to express our selves by Tropes.

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The Passions have a peculiar Language, and are expressed only by what we call Figures.

and zanahadrang oray. Wake maka dinas D Esids the proper and metaphorical Ex-O pressions, wherewith Custom and Artsupplies us, to signific the Motions both of our Will, and our Thoughts, our Passionsalfo have their peculiar Characters, by which they represent themselves in our Discourse. We fee in a Man's Face what paffes in his Heart; the fire in his Eyes, the wrinkles inhis Brow, the paleness in his Looks, are evidences of more than ordinary commotion-The Circumstances of his Discourse, the new and fudden way of expressing himself, (quite contrary to his way when he was cool and in Peace) are certain Characters of agitation. and imply disturbance in the Person who speaks. The matter to be and below. I was

Passion makes us consider things otherwise than we do when we are calm and sedate. It magnifies the Objects, and fixes our thoughts upon them in such manner, that our thoughts are wholly imploy'd about them; the Objects making as strong an impression in us, as the things themselves. Our Passions do many times produce contrary effects, transporting the Mind, and in an instant carrying it through several variations: They force our considetions from one Object, and throw it upon another: They precipitate, interrupt, and divert it: In a word, Passion in a Man's Heart, has the same effect as the Wind in the Sea: Sometimes it forces the Waves upon the shore, sometimes it hurries them back into the deep; on a sainst the Sky, and presently tumbles them down to the very Centre of the Earth.

So our words answer to our thoughts: The Discourse of a Man that is moved, cannot be equal: Sometimes it is dissue, and describes exactly the thing that is the Object of our Passion: Another time it is short; his expression is abrupt, twenty things said at a time, twenty Interrogations, twenty Exclamations, twenty Digressions together; he is altered by a hundred little particularities, and new ways of signifying his mind, which ways are as different, and distinguishable from his ordinary way, as the Face of a Man is when he is angry, from his Face when he is quiet and

ferene. Michiganal encompanion all marchine and a

These ways of Speaking (which are Cha-

are the famous Figures mentioned by Rhetoricians, and by them defin'd, Manners of Speaks ing, different and remote from the ways that are ordinary and natural; that is to fay, quite other than what we use, when we speak without passion. There is nothing obscure in this definition, that requires explication, and therefore we will go on to the use and necessity of these Figures. When a factored and all architectures and w

# Figures are useful and necessary.

tendemeda and love. Wirm appreciate W. Wr. HreeReafons oblige usparticularly to the Use of Figures. First, when we describe a person under commotion, if we would do it exactly, we must represent his Discourse with all its proper Figures, turning and altering them, as Men in pattion do generally turn and alter their Discourfe. A skilful Painter, to express (as much as in him lyes) the thoughts and passions of the person whom he draws, gives his Picture fuch touches and lines, as he observes to be in the Face after extraordinary provocation; which Brokes, are great indications of the temper of the Mind

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Our Passions (as I said before) will shew themselves in our Eyes, our Words, our Motions, &c. The expression of Anger and Mirth cannot be the same: These Passions have disferent Characters, and therefore it is in vain to think to represent them, either by Colours or Words, unless we do it by the same Strokes and Figures by which they are distinguished

among themselves.

When a Discourse has life in it, and is animated with the Motions and Characters, and Passions of the Person who speaks, it causes a fecret Pleasure, and is extreamly delightful. We cannot read these following Verses, without compassion, and resentment of the same tenderness and love. Virgil represents Nisus in great consternation, upon the danger of his Friend Euryalus, against whom Volcens was advancing with his Sword in his Hand to revenge the death of Tagus, who as he thought was flain by Euryalus. Nisus discovers himfelf to have flain Tagus, and presents himself to receive that mortal stroke that was directed to Euryalus. His words are these, and they are highly emphatical addition beautiful and monor dor house

Me me adsum qui seci, in me convertite serrum, O Rutuli: mea fraus omnis, nibil iste nec ausus, Nec potuit: Calum boc, & conscia Sydera testor: Tantum inselicem nimium dilexit amicum.

READ LAND LOUIS LOUIS

I'm, I'm the Man! Turn, turn you Swords

Mine was the fraud; alas, poor harmless he Nor durst, nor could, the Heaven and Stars can tell:

His only guilt was loving's Friend too well:

The second Reason to prove the Use and Necessity of Figures, is stronger than the sirst: We cannot affect other People, without we appear to have some impression upon our selves.

Primum ipse tibi

Men will never think us concerned, unless they observe in our words the marks and indications of trouble. No Man ever conceived Sentiments of pity, for a Man that was laughing; to move us to compassion, his Eyes must be fix'd upon the ground, and his Cheeks all dabbled with tears. For the same reason, our Discourse ought likewise to bear the marks of the passion we feel, and would communicate to our Auditors. We judge of things according to the zeal and servour of the Speaker. The most part of Men, and of things, that have extraordinary esteem, are indebted for it, to those who never mention them but with transports

transports of admiration: Were they mentioned with contempt, the World would think contemptibly of them. Non (fays St. August.) and res alia forent, & ipfe home alias, fed

tantummedo affectus alius narrantium.

Animals know how to defend themselves; to acquire what is useful, and to keep it by Those who have fancied them but Machins, have shew'd very ingeniously, their Bodies to be fo organiz'd that they may perform those actions without assistance from the Soul. We find in our felves, that our Members (without direction from our Soul) difpose themselves into postures to avoid injury. That the Body frames it felf into a proper condition, either to invade or defend. The hands and the Feet expose themselves for the safety of the Head. The Feet stand firm to support the Body, and put it into a capacity of with-Randing the infults of the Enemy. The Arm Riffens, and lifts it felf up to strike with greater force. The whole Body twifts, and contracts, and extends it felf, to avoid or invade the Adverfacy. And this is done naturally, without reflexion or debate.

Tis not to be thought, that these Figures are only Rhetorical Figments, invented for ornament of discourse: God has not refus'd to the Soul, what he has given to the Body. The Body knows how to move, and dispose it felf dexteroully, for the repelling of Injuries ;

juries; and the Soul may defend it felf as well: Nature has not made her immoveable upon any infult : The Figures imploy'd by her in discourse, do the same, as Postures in defence of the Body. If Postures be proper for defence, in corporal invalions; Figures are as necessary in spiritual attacks. Words are the Arms of the Mind, which she uses to dissiwade or persivade, as occasion ferves. I shall shew the efficacy and force of these Figures, after I have given a particular definition of each of them. But it being impossible to describe all the Postures which our Passions do dictate to our Bodies, so 'tis as impossible to enumerate all the Figures wherewith our Pallions do furnish our Discourse. I shall speak only of the most remarkable, and fuch as are commonly mentioned by all Masters in this Art.

#### III.

## A List of the Figures. EXCLAMATION:

Exclamation, in my judgment, is not improgures, feeing it is by that, our Passions do first exert, and discover themselves in discourse. Exclamation, is a violent extension of the Voice. When the Soul comes to be disturbed, and agitated with a furious impulse, the animal Spirits passing through all the parts of the Body, and thronging into the Muscles that are about the Organs of the Voice, swell them up in such manner, that the passage being streight'ned, the Voice comes forth with more impetuosity, by reason of the passion that propels it. Every Ebullition of the Soul is follow'd by an Exclamation; and therefore the Discourse of a Mans in that condition, is full of these Exclamations, Alas! good God! O Heavens! O Earth, &c.

#### DOUBT

Mark to oct Month

The motion of the Passions is no less changeable and inconstant, than the Waves of the Sea; and they who abandon themselves to the violence of their Passions, are in perpetual disquiet: They will, and they will not: They take an Enterprize in hand, and they quit it immediately: They approve, and disapprove the same thing in an instant. In a word, the inconstancy of their Passions hurries them this way, and that way, and holding them in continual irrefolution, plays with them, as the Winds with the Waves of the Sea. The Figure which in our Discourse represents this irresolution is call'd Doubt, of which we have an excellent Example in Virgil's Description of Dido's anxiety, when Anens had given her the ship. - What

-What shall I do? Shall I now scorn'd my former Suiters woo? Make Overtures, Some Lybyan Prince to gain? Lovers whom I so often did disdain: Or shall I venture in the Ilian Fleet, And to the Trojans proud Commands Submit? Since they for my Affistance prove so kind, And my late Favours bear fo well in mind? Grant I were willing, who will give me leave, And me neglected in proud Ships receive? Ah! hast thou not sufficiently known The perjur'd Race of false Laomedon? Shall I alone with churlish Seamen fail, Or try if by my power I may prevail? And those who scarce I could perswade from Eyre, To venture to the Sea again desire? No, Wretch, as thou hast well deferved, die; And with a Sword conclude thy Mifery.

#### EPANORTHOSIS.

A Man in his passion is never satisfied with what he either says or does; the heat of his indignation carries him still farther, in so much that his words are (in his own thought) still short of what he would say; he thinks his first expression too weak, and by adding fresh and more strong, endeavours to correct them.

Nec tibi Diva Parens, generis nec Dardanus Au-Etor Perfide: sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens Caucasus, Hyrcanaque admorunt ubera Tigres.

The word Epanorthosis is a Greek word, and the same with Correttie or Emendatio in Latin.

#### ELLIPSIS.

A violent passion never permits us to say: all that we would: The Tongue is too flow to keep place with the swiftness of its motions; fo that when a Man is cool in Discourse, his Tongue is not so full of words, as when he is: animated by passion. When our Passions are interrupted, or diverted another way, the Tongue following them, produces words of no reference or analogy with what we were faying before. The old Man in Terence was: so inrag'd against his Son, that he could utter only the word Omnium; his passion was: too violent to permit him to go through with his Exprobation, or to call him as he intended, Omnium bominum pessimus. Ellipsis is the fame thing with Omiffio, or Defectus.

#### APOSIOPESIS.

Apostopesis is a kind of an Ellipsis or Omission; and it is formed when on a sudden we change our passion, or lay it quite aside, cutting

ting off our Discourse in such manner, that the Hearer cannot easily divine what it is we intend. This Figure is used most commonly upon occasion of threatning, as If I, &c. Bm, &c.

Quos ego. Bed motos praftat componere fluttus.

#### no event doipment ipsis a

This Figure is a pretended deline in us to omit what we fay, and it is natural enough: When a Man is inraged, Arguments prefent themselves in crowds to his Mind: He would willingly make use of them all, but sears they may be troublesome: Besides, the activity of his agitation hinders him from enlarging upon all of them, so he is forced to deliver them in a huddle, and pretend that he has not so much time as they require to be dilated on. I will not speak (Gentlemen) of the Injury that my Enemy has done me: I am willing to forget the wrong that I have received from him: I shot mine Eyes at all his contrivunces against me:

#### REPETITION

Repetition is a Figure very ordinary among those who speak in a heat, or are impatient to make us understand what they mean. When

we are in Combat with our Enemy, we think it not enough to give him one wound and no more; we multiply our Blows, for fear one should not do the business; So in Speaking, if we think our first words not well understood, we repeat them, or explain them another way. Passion having got the Mastery of us, possesses it felf of our Minds, and imprints ftrongly in us those things which have caufed it; of which the Mind being very full, no wonder if we speak with emotion. Repetition is made two ways; when we repeat the same words, or when we repeat the same thing in different words. Cicero gives us an Example of the former, in his first Oration against Cariline: Nibil agis, nibil moliris, quod ego non modo, non audiam, sed etiam videam planeque sentiam. And Prosper has another of the second, where in different man-ners he expresses this single Truth, That of our selves we can do nothing well, but only by the Assistance of Divine Grace: In repeating the fame words there are ways of dispoling them with fuch Art, that answering one another, they make an excellent Cadence, and are very pleasing to the Ear. These are called harmonious Repetitions, of which I shall speak farther in my following Book.

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A Pleonasm is when we use more words than are necessary; as when I say, I heard such a thing with my Ears. The word is Greek, and signifies the same with Redundantia in Latin.

#### of our land IMTWONTS us with an

A Synonomie is when the fame thing is expressed by several words that have but one and the same signification: And this happens when the Mouth being too narrow for the Heart, we make use of all the words we can remember to express our thoughts, as Abiit, Evasit, Erupit; He went away, he escaped, he sted.

#### HTPOTTPOSIS

The Objects of our Pallions are almost always present to our Minds: We fancy we see and hear those continually, who have made any strong impression upon our Minds.

Illum absens absentem auditque videt que. lo

For which reason, all descriptions of these Objects are lively and exact. They are cal-

led Hypotyposes, because they figure the things, and form an Image of them, that represents the things themselves. The word is a Greek word, and signifies to represent or delineate.

#### DISTRIBUTION.

Distribution is a kind of Hypotyposis, used when we enumerate the parts of the Object of our Passion. David supplies us with an Example, when in the heat of his indignation against Sinners, he gives a description of their Iniquity; Their throat is an open Sepulchre, they flatter with their Tongues; the poison of Asps is under their lips: wheir mouth is full of sursing and lyes, and their feet are swift to shad Blood.

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## ANTITHESIS

Antitheses, Comparisons, and Similitudes, which are Figures proper to represent things with clearness are the effects of that strong impression made upon us by the Passion that animates us, of which by consequence it is an easie matter to discourse clearly and exactly, having as it were present before the Eyes of our Mind. Contrario juxta se posta, magis elucescunt. And white plac'd by black is the more illustrious. We have an Example of an Antithesis in Prosper, where speaking of those

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those who act without the impulsion of the Holy Spirit, he says,

Leur ame en cet état recule en s'avancant, En voulant monter tombe, et perd en amassant : Comme elle suit l'attrait d'une lu eur trompeuse, Sa lumiere l'effusque, et la rend tenebreuse.

#### SIMILITU DE.

For a Similitude, I cannot give a better Pattern than out of the Paraphrase upon the First of King David's Psalms, where speaking of the Happiness of the Just Man, it says,

He shall be like a Tree by the Water's side,
Whose root receives the tribute tide:
The tender Plant does into vigour grow,
Is always green, has always fruit,
Extends into the streams its root,
And spreads in top as that does spread below.

So shall the Righteous flourish, and that Hand That planted him at first, shall make him stand: No storm or drought against him shall prevail, But bending to the streams his root,

He shall be green, he shall have fruit, Which, till they cease to flow, shall never fail.

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#### COMPARISON.

The difference is not great betwirt a Simidicude and a Comparison, unless it be in this, that a Comparison is more spritely and emphatical, as appears in this Comparison, wherein David shews; that he preferr'd the Law of God before all things, Psal. 19.

The finest Gold to them looks wan and and pale, And Hony from the Comb does of its wonted sweetness fail.

But there are two things to be observed in Comparisons: The first is, we are not to require an exact analogy and proportion betwixt all the parts of a Comparison, and the Subject of which we speak. Certain things are inserted, only to render the Comparisons more lively, as in that which Virgil makes of the young Lightian vanquished by Camillus, with a Pigeon in the Pounce of an Hawk: After he had said what he thought sit of the Principal, to which the Comparison related, he adds,

Jum Cruor, et Vilsa labantur ab ethere pluma.

Which belongs not to the Comparison, but is prought in only to make a more sensible description

scription of a Pigeon torn in pieces by a Hawk. The fecond thing to be observed in fovour of that excellent Poet, I have thought good to infert, to defend him from the Criticisms of those who condemn his Companisons as too mean and low. But it is with much Art that this Great Man in his Aneids, makes his Comparisons of mean things: He does it to case and relax the mind of the Reader, whom the Grandeur and Dignity of his Matter had held in too strong an intention; and to differn that this was his defign, we need no more than to confider the Comparisons in his Georgicks, which are lofty and frong am arrant to nation and and the supred for to moments and that least wend Car-

#### THE TO SHE SUSPENSION.

When we begin our Discourse in such manner, that the Hearer knows not what we mean, and the expectation of some great thing makes him attentive, that Figure is called Suspensio. Brebauf has an Example of it in his Solitary Entertainments, where speaking of God, he says:

Les ombres, de la nuit, a la clarte de jour;
Les transports de la rage az donceurs de l'amour;
Al etroite, amitie la discord ou l'envie;
Le plus hruiant orage, an calm le plus donz;
La douleur auxplaisers; le trepas à la vie;
Sont bein moins opposez que le pecheur a vous.
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Darkness to Light, cold Winter's Frost to Fire, Transports of Rage to sweetnesses of Love, Loud roaring Tempests to the smoothest Calm, Torments to Pleasure, Death it felf to Life; Are not so opposite, as Sin to thee.

#### PROSOPOPEIA

makes his Compacificas obmeanthings at t When a Passion is violent, it renders them anad in some measure that are possess'd with it. In that case we entertain our selves with Rooks, and with dead Men, as if they were living, and make them speak as if they had Souls. Good God, Protestor of Innocency, permit that the Order of Nature may be interrupted for a moment, and that this dead Car-kass losing its Tongue, may resume the use of its Voice! Methinks God Almighty grants this Miracle to my Prayers: Do you not bear the Carkass (Genelement publishing my Innocence, and declaring the Authors of its Death ? If it be just re-Sentment ( Says the Carkass) against the Author of my Death, that animates you, turn your Indignation against this Calumniator, who triumphs in an absolute security, having loaden this innocent with the burden of his Crime.

## SENTENCE.

Sentences are but Reflections made upon a thing that surprizes, and deserves to be consider'd.

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Quoties

sider'd, They consist commonly in a few energetical words that comprehend great sense, as in this: There is no disguise that can long conceal Love where it is, or dissemble it where it is not. The restection which Lucan makes upon the Errour of the ancient Gauls, who believ'd the Transmigration of the Soul, will serve for an Example of a more prolix Sentence.

But those wild People happy are
In this their Error, whom Fear greatest far
Of all Fears injures not, the Fear of Death;
Thence they are prone to War; nor loss of Breath
Esteem; nor spare a Life that comes again.

#### ERIPHONEMA.

Epiphonema is an Exclamation containing fome Sentence, or great Sense, plac'd at the end of a discourse: It is the last touch or stroke wherewith we would affect our Auditors, and a pressing and lively reflexion upon the Subject whereof we speak: This Hermistich of Virgil is an Epiphonema:

#### - Tantane animis Calestibus ira?

Lucan finishes by a kind of Epiphonema the Complaint of the Inhabitants of Rimini against the Situation of their City, which was exposed to the first Commotions in all the Wars, both Civil and Foreign.

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## Thom the Errour of the ancient Canta, who be-

Interrogation is very much used in Discourse: Our Passion produces it frequently towards them we would perswade, and makes us address our selves wholly to them; so that this Figure is very useful to fix the attention of our Auditors to what we would have them understand. The Prophet David gives us a lively instance, when in the tenth Pfalm he seems to expostulate with God Almighty, and question him for abandoning the Innocent in the time of their Trouble.

My God, why dost thou thus thy self withdraw,
And makes as if thou didst not see
Those Miseries which are better known to thee,
Than him who bears their sharpest law?
Why dost thou thus thy face in trouble hide?
Twere Hell, should I be ever so deny di

#### APOSTROPHE.

An Apostrophe is when a Man in extraordinary commotion, turns himself on all sides, and addresses to the Heavens, the Earth, the Rocks, the Forests, things sensible fe:

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and insensible: He makes no difference in his fury, but searcheth every where for succour, quarrels with every thing, like a Child beating the ground upon which he has fallen! So David, in the First Chapter of the Second Book of Samuel, lamenting the Death of Saul and Jonathan, Curses the Mountains of Gilboa where that Tradegy was acted: Ye Mountains of Gilboa let there be no Dew, neither let there be Ruin upon you, nor Field Offerings, &c.

#### PROLEPSIS & HTPOBOLE.

Prolepsis is a Figure by which we prevent what might be objected by the Adversary; and Hypobole is the manner of answering those Objections which we have prevented. We. may find an example of these two Figures in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, Chap. 15. where speaking of the Resurrection to come, he answers a Question that might be objected: But some will say, how are the dead raised up? and with what Body do they! come? Thou Fool, that which thou fowest is not quickned except it dye: And when thou Sowest, show sowest not that body that shall grow up, but only the grain perhaps of wheat, perhaps of some other thing. Meeting the Leading the could been

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#### COMMUNICATION.

Communication is, when deliberating with our Auditors, we defire their Judgments: As, What would you do (Gentlemen), in the like case? Would you take other Measures than, &c. 'Tis a kind of Communication that St. Paul uses in the Sixth Chapter to the Romans, where having reckon'd up the advantages of Grace, and the Miseries that follow Sin, he demands of the Romans, What fruit had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death.

#### CONFESSION.

Confession is an acknowledgment of our faults, and such an acknowledgment as ingages the person to whom it is address'd to pardon don the fault, the hopes of which pardon gives us the confidence to confess. And this is a Figure very frequent in the Psalms of David, and particularly in the Twenty fifth Psalm.

Let not my fins to thy remembrance come,
Nor all those spots which stain'd my youth;
But wash them out, and mindful of thy truth,
Receive the Prodigal returning home, (room.
And let thy Mercy for thy ancient Love make
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## TOTAL OUE PITROBE OF CONSENT.

By this Figure it is, that we invite our Enemy some times to do all the mischief he can, in order to give him a sense and horror of his Cruelty. It is common likewise in the Complaints betwixt Friends, as when Aristens,

in Virgil, complains to his Mother :

Quin age, & ipfa manu felices erue sylvas,
Fer stabulis inimicum ignem, at que interfice messes,
Ore faca & validam in vites molire bipennem:
Tanta mea si ve caperunt tædia laudis.

Go and my fertile Groves thy felf annoy; And burn my Stalls, with Fire my Corn destroy, Hew down and spoil my Vineyards; if to thee So grievous are those Honours granted me.

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#### PERIPHRASIS.

Periphrasis is a Circumtocution, used to avoid certain words whose Idea's are unpleasing; and to prevent the speaking of some things that would produce ill Estects. Cicero being forc'd to consess that Glodius was slain by Milo did it with address: The Servants of Milo (says he) being hindred from souccouring their Master (whom Clodius was reported to have kill'd) and believing it to be true, they did in his absence, without his knowledge or consent, what every body would have expected from his Servants upon the like occasion. In which he avoids the words Kill and put to Death, as words ingrateful (if not odious) to the Ear.

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The number of Figures is infinite, eath Figure being to be made an hundred different ways.

Have not fet down in this Lift the Hyperboles, the Grand Metaphors, and several other Trops, because I have spoken of them elsewhere. They are nevertheless true Figures, and though the scarcity of Language obliges us many times to make use of these Tropical Expressions, even when we are quiet and

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and at ease; yet they are more commonly used when we are under a Transport, 'Tis our Passion that makes Objects appear to us extrarodinary, and by confequence is the Cause that we have not common Terms to represent them either so big, or so little as they appear. Befides that I never pretended to speak of all the Figures, it would require a large Volume to describe the Characters of our Pallions in Discourse, as well as those which the same Passions do describe in our Faces. Threats, Complaints, Reproaches, Intreaties, have their Figures in all Languages. There is no better Book than a Man's own heart, and it would be folly to fearch in other peoples Works, for that wherewith our own Breast may supply us. If we would know the Figures of Choler, we need no more than watch what we naturally fay, when we are transported with that Passion.

In a word, it is not to be imagin'd, that all Figures are to be framed according to the Examples which I have used; or that I intended them as Univerfal Models for all the Figures that I have mentioned. Apostrophes. Interrogations, Antithefes, may be made an hundred feveral ways. It is not Art that regulates them; it is not Study that flews them: They are the natural Effects of Paffion as I have faid before, and shall demonstrate more at large in the following Chapter.

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### CHAP IV.

to be entrared that we had by confequence is

Figures are the Arms of the Soul. A Comparison betwixt a Soldier Fighting and an Orator Speaking.

TE have shewn the Necessity and Advantage of Figures by three Reafons, of which the two first have been fufficiently explain'd. The third (that Figures are the Arms of the Soul) is still to be clear'd : wherefore for better illustration, and to give it the deeper impression upon our Mind, I will in this place describe a Soldier fighting, his Sword in his hand; and an Orator speaking in a Cause, that he has undertaken to defend. I shall make a parallel of these two forts of Combats, and consider a Soldier in three Conditions: The first, when he fights with equal force, and his Enemy has no advantage over him. The second, when he is inviron'd' with danger. And the third; when being oblig'd to yield to the power of his Enemy, he has no recourse but to the Clemency of the Victor. I shall carefully observe the Postures which he uses in all these three Condi-CAAP tions,

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)-|-|5tions and shew, that in Discourse there are Figures corresponding to all these Postures, with which they have a natural resemblance.

In the first Condition, the Soldiers intention is applied to the finding out ways of obtaining the Victory; sometimes he is upon the offensive, sometimes upon the defensive part; sometimes he advances, sometimes he retreats; he pretends to give ground, and returns with greater impetuosity; he redoubles his blows, he threatens and contents the Efforts of his Adversary. Sometimes he puts himself forward, and sights with more ardour and vehemence. He considers the Designs of his Enemy, and possesses himself of the advantagious ground. In a word, he is in perpetual motion, and always disposed either for desence or invasion.

When the Mind is inflam'd, and disposed to Combate by words, the Passions with which it is provoked, with no less heat excite it to find out Reasons and Arguments to evince the Truths which it asserts. In the heat and impatience that every Man has to defend himself, and make good what he assirts, the same things are many times repeated, and delivered in different manners. Sometimes with Descriptions, Hypotyposes, Comparisons, Similitudes. Sometimes we prevent what the Adversary would say, and sometimes we answer it. Sometimes as a token of considerce

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we grant all that is defir'd, and pretend not to make use of all the Reasons that the Justice

of our Cause would suggest was some wing

A Soldier keeps his Enemy in breath; the firokes that he makes at him continually, the affaults that he makes at him on all fides, the different ways of his attacks and retreats keeps him constantly waking. An Orator entertains the Attention of his Auditors ? when their thoughts are flraggling, he reduces them by Apofraphes ; and by haterrogations obliges them to whom they are directed to give him an answer ... He awakens them, and recollects them by frequent Exclamations, Reiterations, Or. to Italiand solicitor beat a rimadest

Having consider'd this Representation of a Soldier combating with fuccess; let us next represent to our Eyes the Image of another Soldier, inviroped with danger, without any hopes of relief Sadness forces Tears from his Eyes, and Sighs from his Breaft. Indignation exasperates him against the enemy, and Fear pulls him presently back. He stands immoveable, and unrefolv'd, whilst in the mean time his defire to escape the impending danger, presses and inflames him. After this he tries all forts of ways; he excites, he animates himself: His Passion renders him dexterous and cunning, it furnishes him with-Arms, and he makes use of every thing he can reach for his defence. Can we stiffle the

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the Sentiments of displeasure that we feel, and not testifie them by Exclamations, by Complaints, by Reproaches, when we perceive the Truth (which we love fo well) obstructed or obfcur'd? In these occasions, our great ardour and impatience to fecure it against the Clouds wherewith it is obfuscated, makes us accumulate Arguments, and heap proof upon proof. Sometimes we explain them; lometimes haveing proposed them only, we leave them, to answer the objections of the Adventary. Sometimes we are filent, in great prefolution about the choice of our proofs. Sometimes we urge a thing, and immediately find fault with it, as a thing of no cogency or conviction. When our proofs fail, or are insufficienty Nature her self must Apostrophize; we make the Stones speak, the Dead to come forth of their Graves, the Heaven and Earth are invoked to fortifie by their testimony the Truth, for the establishment of which we speak with so much heat. that acknowledge his irriduction : He elecs

both the ear test in other with pleaford less properties that the plant were firstly to come the other test of the early select and delegate the plant is plant to be the plant to be the plant to be the complete to be the plant to be the p

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A Continuation of the Parallel between a Soldier Fighting, and an Orator Pleading in defence of his Cause.

O complete the Parallel that I have begun, betwixt a Soldier and an Orator, I confider the Soldier in the third Condition to which he is reduced, when not being able longer to contend, he is oblig'd to yield to his Enemy. In that case, he throws away his Arms as unuseful; there is nothing of threatning or fury in his countenance. His chief Weapon is his Tears; he humbles himfelf more than his enemy would bumble him; he postrates himself at his Feet, and embraces his Knees: Man is made, to obey those upon whom he depends, or by whom he is maintain'd; and to command his Inferiors that acknowledge his Jurisdiction: He does both the one and the other with pleasure. Two persons are bound very strictly together, when the one has need of relief and defires it, and the other has power to relieve and applies it. God having made Mankind to live together, has formed them with these Natural Inclinations. A person in affliction betakes himself naturally to all postures of Humil ity Humility, that may make him appear inferiour to the Person of whom he begs; and we
cannot without, resisting the Sentiments of
Nature, resuse to persons so humbled, the
Succours that they implore: We supply them
with a secret delight, which is as it were our
recompence and reward (in some measure)
for the Comforts we bestow. It is by this
way of Compensation, that a Trade and
Commerce is maintain'd betwixt the poor and
the rich, betwixt the miserable and the happy.

In Discourse there are Figures which answer to these Postures of Assiction and Humility. to which the Orators have frequent recourse. Men being free, it is at their own choice whether they will fuffer themselves to be perfwaded; they can turn away their face and not fee the Truth that is propos'd to them; or they can dissemble that they know it. So an Orator is many times in this third Condition, wherein we consider our Soldier. When he finds he must yield, and his defire to preferve himself obliges him to be humble, that he may obtain that by Supplication, that he cannot hope to compais by force of Argument, his Eloquence is imploy'd to pollels his adversary of the unfortunate Condition to which he is reduc'd; Prayers are commonly full of descriptions of his Misery who makes them. Job expostulating with God, tells Him, That he is but a leaf, with which the the winds do sport themselves; and as dry stubble. Contra folium quod vento rapitur, ostendis potentiam tuam, & stipulam siccam persequeris. And David, Psal. 6.

I weary out the day with fight,

And when that's done the night with tears; So vast a deep comes rolling from my eyes, That down its tide my bed it almost bears;

Tet the it wash my couch; it cannot drown my fears.

In a word, as there are Figures to threaten, to reproach, and to terrifie; there are Figures also to pray, to mitigate, and flatter.

#### delimina III.

Figures illustrate obssure Truths, and ren-

We may question it with our Mouth, but our Heart must be thoroughly convinced. To triumph therefore upon the obstinacy or ignorance of those who expose it, it is sufficient to expose the light of it to their Eyes, and to bring it so near, that the strength of its impression may awaken them, and oblige them to be attentive. Figures do extreamly contribute to the removing these two first obstacles, that hinder a Truth from being known, and help its obscurity, and the defects

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fects of our attention. They are useful to illustrate and explain it; they force the Hearer to an attention; they awaken him, and strike him so lively, that they do not suffer him to sleep, nor keep the Eyes of his Mind shut up to the Truths that are proposed.

My Delign being in my Lift of Figures. to infert only those which the Rhetoricians do place frequently in that number, I will not speak of Syllogifms, of Enthimems, of Dilemma's and other kind of Arguments that are us'd in Logick; and yet it is manifest they are real: Figures, being extraordinary ways of reasoning never us'd but in passion, or ardent defire to perswade or disswade those to whom we speak. These Reasonings or Figures are wonderfully effectual in this, That joyning a clear and incontestable Proposition, with another that is more doubtful and contestable. the clearness of the one diffipates the oblowrity of the other, and the two Propolitions being strictly connexed, if the reasoning be good we cannot grant the one to be true. but we must confess the other to be so likewise:

A folid Argument suppresses and disarms the most obstinate Adversary to Other Figures are not indeed of that force and conviction, but yet they are not unprofitable. Repetitions and Synonyma do illustrate a Truth. If our first Expression be too weak, the second makes us intelligible. The Synonyma when added.

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When our impatience to be understood, gives us just occasion to fear we have not sufficiently explain'd our selves, we dilate upon the things more, and are more copious in our Expression. If our Hearers have not been attentive, we repeat a fecond time what we have faid before. What darkness can obfuscate the verity of a thing that an Eloquent Person explains? of which, he makes Descriptions and Enumerations, (that leads us (if I may so fay) through all the corners and recesses. of an Affair) and fuch Hypotypofes, and Illustrations, as carry us through all difficulties, and by a pleasant Enchantment makes us believe we behold the things themselves. And. Antithesis is no idle ornament; opposition of contrary things, contributes exceedingly to the clearing of a Truth. Shadows add much to the beauty of Colours.

Our Minds are not equally open to allkind of Truths. We comprehend much more easily things that are obvious every day, and in common use among Men; than those which are rare, and mentioned but seldom. For which Reason, Comparisons and Similiandes, drawn ordinarily from sensible things, give us a more easie penetration into the most abstracted and abstruce Truths. There is nothing so subtil and sublime, but may be made intelligible to the weakest Understanding, if among the things which they know, or are capable of knowing, we can find out ingeniously such as have resemblance or similitude with those which we would explain to them. We have an Excellent example of this Address, in a Discourse that Monssieur Paschal made to a young Nobleman, to give him a true Notion of his Condition. His Parabole is thus:

A certain Person is cast by Tempest into an unknown Island, whose Inhabitants were in great pain to find out their King who was lost. The Person having much resemblance both in Body and Reature with the King, is taken for him, and recognized in that quality by the People. At first he was surprized, and knew not how he was to steer; but upon second thoughts he resolved to follow his Fortune, received all the respects that they paid him, and suffered himself to be treated as their King.

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But being unable to forget his natural condition, it stuck in his Mind at the same time that he received their Formalities, that he was not the King for whom they sought, and that the Kingdom was not his. So that he had a double care upon him; one, by which he acted as King; the other, by which he remembred his real condition, and was affored,

that

that it was only Chance which had placed him where he was: This last thought he conceal'd to himself, the other he discover'd: By the first, he treated with the People; by the

last, he treated with himself.

By this Example Monfieur Paschal fignified to the young Lord, That it was the Fortune of his Birth which had made him Great; that it was only the fancy of the People, that had annexed to the Quality of a Duke, an Idea of Grandeur; and that in effect he is no greater than other People. Instructing him in that manner what Sentiments he ought to have of his condition, and making him understand Truths which would have been above the Capacity of his Age, had he not (as I may say) brought them down to the intellect of him whom he desired to instruct.

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Were Men lovers of Truth, to propose it to them in a lively and sensible way, would be sufficient to perswade them: But they hate it because it accommodates but seldom with their Interests, and seldom made out, but to the discovery of their Grimes: Insomuch that they are assaid of its lustre, and thut their Eyes that they may not behold it. They shifle the natural love that Men have for it, and harden themselves against the salutiserous strokes that she strikes upon the Conscience: They shut all the Ports of their Senses, that she may not enter into their

Minds, where she is receiv'd with so much indifference, that she is forgot as soon as she is receiv'd.

Eloquence therefore would have but little authority over our Hearts, and would indeed find strong resistance, did she not attack them with other Arms besides Truth. The Passions are the Springs of the Soul: It is they which cause it to act: It is either Love, or Hatred, or Fear, or Hope, which counsels and determins us. We pursue what we love, we avoid what we hate. He that holds the Spring of a Machin, is not so much Master of all the Essets of the Machin, as he is of a Person, whose Inclination he knows, and is able to inspire with Hatred, or Love, according as either is necessary to make him advance, or to remove him from an Object.

But the Passions are excited by the prefence of their Object: Present Good affects us with Love, and with Joy; When we do not actually, but are in a possibility of possessing that Good, it inslames the Soul with defires, whose Flames are continued by Hope.

Present Evil is the cause of Hatred or Sadeness: The Soul is tormented with Fears and with Terrors, which turn to Despair, when we find we have no Means left to avoid them. To kindle therefore these Passions in the Heart of a Man, we must present the Objects before him; and to this purpose, Eigures do marvelously conduce.

We have feen how Figures do imprint frongly; how they illustrate, and how they explain: We must use them in the same manner to discover the Object of the Passion which we have a mind to inspire, and to make a lively Picture that expresses all the Features and Lineaments of the faid object. If we declame against a Malefactor, who deferves the hatred of the Judges, we are not to be foaring of words, nor afraid of Reperitions, and Synonyma, that ftrongly imprint upon the Mind the Image of his Crimes. An Antithesis will be convenient, and make them conceive the enormity of his Life, by oppofing the Innocence of those Persons whom he has wrong'd: We may compare him to the Malefactors of former Ages, and declare his Cruelty to be greater than the Cruelty of the Tygers and Lions. If in the description of Cruelty, and other ill qualities, that Eloquence triumphs, it is particularly the Hypotypoles, or lively Descriptions, which produce the Effect expected from our Discourse, and raise in the Mind Floods of Passion, of which we make use, to encline the Judges as we have a mind to lead them. Frequent Exclamations do testifie our horror at the representation of his abominable Crimes; and makes the standers by feel the same Sentiments of Griefand aversion. By Apostropher and Prosopopeia's we order it so. that Nature her felf feems to demand with us the Condemnation of the Criminal. IV.

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Reflections upon the good use of Figures.

Algures, as we have feen, being the Characters of our Passions, when those Pasfions are irregular, Figures ferve only to describe those Irregularities. They are Instruments used to shake and agitate the Minds of those to whom we speak: If these Instruments be managed by an unjust Passion, Figures in that Man's Mouth, are like a Sword in the Hand of a Mad Man. It is not lawful by false accusation to blacken every Man against whom we speak : nor to shew our Eloquence, is it necessary to imploy against him, the same Figures we would use to dispose a Judge to the Condemnation of a wicked and abominable person. Orators with whom this fault is familiar, do feldom deceive twice; their Exclamations are quickly understood, and it happens to them, as to those who have used to counterfeit themselves sick; when they are fick indeed, no body believes them:

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Quere Peregrinum, vicinia Rauca reclamat.

This fault in some persons is a sign of cunning, in others it is a sign of levity and extravagance. When we delight in combating

the Truth; when we delire not to fatisfie our Hearers, but chuse rather to trouble their Minds with the Clouds of some unjust Pas-Truth; the Figures imploy'd in that Cafe may the call'd Figures of Craft. But Orators are not always to be accus'd of this cunning; fometimes they do not consider the impressions which their Figures may make; their de-sign not being so much to perswade, as to hew their Eloquence; and to do that, they will put themselves into a heat, and make use of the strongest Figures in Rhetorick, when perhaps they have no Enemy to combat: Like a Mad Man, who draws his Sword up-on a Phantalm that his own troubled Imagination has represented in the Air. These are Orators that fall many times into Raptures and Enthusiasms, which take away the use of their Reason, and make them see things in a quite contrary manner to what in reality they are. कर्मा त्याहरू मालाव ता भावता

Et solem geminum, & duplices se oftendere Thebas.

This Fault is the Character of an Infant, that is angry without a cause; yet many Learned and Emineut Writers are guilty of it, as believing they could not pass for Eloquent without these kind of Figures. For this reason, they will talk loud upon all occasions, deprave

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deprave their own Judgments, and look upon every thing quite otherwise than it is; whereas they should rather reflect soberly up-on whatever is represented, and speak only by Sentences. But that which is most ridi-culous is, That these ill Orators endeavour only to please and tickle their Auditory, not concerning themselves in the least to overcome or convince their Adverlary by the force of their words. Like a distracted Perfon, never regarding how be fruck, or defended himself with advantage against his Enemy, so he drew the Eyes of the Speciators upon him, and got the Reputation of Fighting handfomly, and with a good grace.

Fur es ait Pedie, Pedius, quid? Crimina rasis Librat in Antithetis, doctas posmise Figuras Laudater rionen duan Examiner multi

They affect to measure their Words, and to give them a just Cadence that may flatter the Ear: They proportion all their Expressions, and in word, they fill up their Discourfes with Figures, but such Figures as, in respect of strong and perswafive Figures, are like the Postures in a Dance, in respect of the Postures of a Combat.

The Study and Art that appear in a compleat and polite Discourse, are not the Character of a Mind lively touch'd with the things of which

which he speaks; but rather of a Man un-concern'd, and merry. So we call these Figures of Measure, whose Cadence is a agreeable to the Ear, Theatrical Figures, Theatrales Fi-Temper to fight with. Figures proper to per-Iwade are not to be lought for . It is the heat wherewith we are animated for the defence of the Truth that produces them, and continues them in our Discourse: To that indeed Elo-quence is nothing but the Effect of our Zeal. St. Augustin tells us the lame, speaking of the Eloquence of the Stile of St. Paul: Quid fic indignatur Apostolus in Epistolis suis, sic corripir, fic exprebiat, fic increpat, fic minature Quid eft quod animi sui affectum sam crobra & sam aspe-Sophistarum pueriliter & consulto figuralle Orasionem fuam; tamen multis figuris distincta eft. Quapropter ficut Apostolum pracepta Eloquentia non jecurum effe dicemus; ita, quod egus fapien-But it is only upon great occasions that

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But it is only upon great occasions that Figures are to be used: The Passions have several degrees: All provocations are not equally alike; nor have all Figures the same efficacy and force. There are Anticheses for great, and other Figures for lesser Commotions. So that we ought not to condemn all forts of Figures in Discourse, upon a matter that affords not just and reasonable occasion

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ter ion of of emotion. The impatience Men have to express themselves well, and to make the thingsthey would infinuate to be conceiv'd, has its-Figures as well as our other Passions. In the mildest and most temperate conversation, though no relistance be found in the Mind of the Persons with whom we discourse. nothing hinders but that for the better explication we may repeat fometimes the fame-Words, and make use of different Expressions, to say the same thing. It is permitted to-make exact Descriptions, to search for Comparisons and Images of what we say, among: natural and sensible things. We may demand the Judgment of our Auditors, and interrogate them, to fix and retain their Minds in more ferious attention, and make our reflections upon what they have faid. Thus has Conversation its Figures, as well as Speeches, and Declamations.

The Stile of an Orator, who makes ill use of his Figures, is term'd a cold Stile, because whatever effort he makes to animate his Auditors, they hearken but coldly, and that coldness is so much the greater, because the Hearers are not agitated by any of those Emotions which he desired to avoite

Emotions which he desir'd to excite.

The End of the Second Part.

the total same the Words in Sich fort, then

of emotion. The impatience Men bave to ergred the affelves well, and to make the times nev would infinitely so be conceived, the its Edjudes as well at our other Pulliolist the efficient most temperate converse, tion, though no realleace be known by the Make of the Perforantishington we diferreties cothing frincers but chartfor the believeraplication we may repeat fomerimes the faith Words; and drake his artdoft, dur Express ans. to key the distance things the is permitted an rolle english Delicaprions, ca femoir for Come problems and thought to especial the special niteral and legible saings. We rose demand the Judgmont of our, Auditors, and interrogree them, to he and verification Minds in more ferinish netention, rand make our reflection ore upon what they bave faid. This bac Convertation its Pigures, as well as appreches, and Deel agerious

The Stile of an Orator, who makes ill align of his Figures, is seemed a cold Stile, because whatever effore he makes to manate his Auditors, they bear ken bac coldly, and that coldreds is to much the present because the Heavers are not agreed by any of those Emotions which he defind to excite.

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# Third PART OF SPEAKING

### CHAP. I.

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Of Sounds, and Letters, of which Words

HE Rules which we have hithertogiven, in relation to the Art of Speaking, regard only the manner of expressing our Thoughts, which are the Soul of Discourse. Letters that compose the Words, by their resemblance, are the Body of Discourse, as we have said before. We must take pains now to form this Body, that is to say, to range the Words in such sort, that the pronunciation of them may be ease and agreeable at the same time. To treat of this F 4 matter.

matter with entire exactness, we ought seriously to consider the particular Movements of the Organs of the Voice, to determin the formation of every Sound that is made by every Letter. But, besides that this exactness would be troublesome, every Man may apprehend these things without the assistance of a Master, by observing with a little attention what is perform'd by the Organs of which we make use when we speak. I shall therefore explain my self upon these things only in a general manner.

We know already how the Voice is form'd. The Air which comes forth of the Lungs, excites a Sound passing with constraint through the Larynx, or the opening of the Pipe of the Aspera Arteria, which reaches to the Throat. This opening is greater or leffer by means of Muscles that environ it, according es there is occasion for the raising or letting fall of the Voice. This Sound is received out of the Throat into the Mouth; where ir is modified in different manners, by the different dipolitions of the place which receives it, and by the Motion of the Tongue which bears it against several parts of the Mouth. Every Sound has been mark'd by a Letter: Letters compose Words; in fuch fort, That it is possible to make an Engine speak, if having observ'd the porticular disposition of the Organs of the Voice (which is necessary for

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the formation of each Letter) we should make as many Pipes as there are Letters, and gir them the same dispositions. It is possible likewise to make a Dumb Man speak, by re-presenting to his Eyes the dispositions and pollures which the Organs of the Voice do allime for the lounding of each Letter of which at the same time they are to thew them a Character, and reiterate the pronun-Ciation, till he observes the Motions of the Tongue, the Opening of the Month, how the Sound is cut by the Teeth, how the Lips beat one against the other, and imitate them. Commonly People are Dumb only because they cannot hear, and therefore they cannot learn to pronounce the found of a Letter otherwise than by this Artifice, which teaches them that by the Eye, of which they are not capable by the Ear. Monlieur de Monconys reports, that in his Travels in England, there was an excellent Mathematician at Oxford, who made a Damb Man read in his presence; and that that Dumb Man was the lecond which he had taught to speak by that Method. Tis true, he only call dover the Letters by, their Names, but knew not how to make any conjunction of their Sounds

The Letters are diffinguish'd into Vowels and Consonants: Some have observed, that Vowels are made only by moving the root of the Tongue: Others will have their Sound.

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form'd by the different opening of the Month. The Vowels are five, A, E, I, O, U. In promake them found, otherwise they will not be ealily understood; according to the measure or quantity of time, they are said to be long or short, or too long or too short, and receive different Names. It depends upon him that speaks to stop a longer or shorter time upon the Vowels, and fo to make what difference betwixt them he pleases, and therefore it is, that their Number is not the same in all Languages. The Hebrews have thirteen Vowels; the Greeks feven; the French pro-mounce their Vowels in equal time, so that they are not subject to that difference which the different measures of time may produce a mong others; but they diftinguish them another way. When the Mouth is open'd more than ordinarity, the Sound is Stronger, and more clear; when the Mouth is not open'd so much, the Sound is weaker, and less clear. These different degrees of force, cause the difference betwist an E Masculine and an E Feminine; be-twist an I and an U. When we joyn the Sounds of two Vowels, and a third Sound is produc'd, that is it which we call a Dipembong, which is as much as a Letter with two Sounds. Conforants cannot be pronounced, but by founding a Vowel, and from thence they are called Conformants. Thele Letters are formed

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med ed by the Motion of the Tongue beating the Voice against the Throat, and from thence against the Palat, As the Tongue contrasting it self, stops the Air that forms the Voice; or as it relaxes and suffers it to pass, striking upon the Teeth; and the Lips beating one upon another, it gives the Sounds of different Consonants. From whence, among the Hebrew Grammarians, their Consonants are distinguished into Consonants of the Lips, of the Teeth, of the Throat, and of the Palat. The simple Consonants are twelve, B, C, D, F, G, L, M, N, P, R, S, T; to which we might add J and P, when pronounced as Consonants.

That which makes in the Alphabets of fome Languages a greater Number of Confonants, is first, because People joyn the Sound of feveral Confonants in fuch manner, that though they be nam'd double, yet one of their Sounds is heard: As in Z and X, Z is as much as D and S; X is as much as C and S. This Conjunction augments the Alphabets with a great number of different Confonants. All Languages have not an equal mumber of these double Letters, in which one of the Confonants being pronounc'd faintly, causes the Sounds of them both to be confounded, fo that but one of them is heard. In the fecond place, when we pronounce the Confonants with Aspiration, we change their Sound, and that change forms quite different

Letters. Aspiration is made when we strike the Voice against our Throats with some kind of sorce. This Aspiration is mark'd with an H. Among the Greeks, an Aspiration added to their II makes their •, which is as much as Pb with us: An Aspiration joyn'd with their K makes their x, which is as much as our Cb. This Observation makes us comprehend, why in some Languages one Letter has so many different kinds (if I may so call them) for Example, the Hebrews have four sorts of S: The Aspiration may be made with different degrees: Wherefore to mark by particular Characters the differences of the pronunciation, we must imploy as many different Characters.

When the Voice is carried up to the Nose, it receives a certain difference: So that if we should be to treat of all Letters that might be imagin'd, as there are Letters of the Throat, there should be Letters of the Nose. Custom exercises its authority over Letters, as well as over the Body of Discourse, of which, Letters are the Members. It depended upon Men to chuse among the sounds of the Voice (which might be infinite in Number) those that should be most pleasing and commoditus; for which cause there are Letters in use in some Languages, that are not used in

others.

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one fingle Letter feveral Sounds others on the contrary mark the fame Sound by different Characters, and have feveral Letters that might be spard: Among the Latins the Kor the Q might be spar'd, as is observed by Marius Victorians, who has treated of that mate ter very profoundly. This is it that has produced so much difference in the Alphabets of Languages both ancient and Modern. ic is not necessary I observe, that the Tones of the Voice, and the divers inflections wherewith the same Letters may be pronounced, may change their pronunciation; That there are Letters of which the Sound is not difting, if we are not careful to joyn them with fuch as have fympathy with them. I pass over fuch things as are commonly regarded as trifles; nevertheless the knowledge of them, though their Object be small, is in some meafore necessary : Order has oblig'd me to repeat what I have faid of them before. O one note be extended to the Herman, This is not

What is to be evoided in the ranging and disposition of our Words.

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I IS an Effect of the Wisdom of God, who created Man to be Happy, that whatever is useful to his Conversation, is a greeable

greeable to him. The pleasure annex'd to all the actions that can preferve his life, carries him freely and fpontaneously to them. We find it no pain to eat, because the gust and relift of the Meat discovers the necessity of eating to be agreeable : And that which authorifeth this Observation that God has joyn'd ufefulness and pleasure together, is this, because all Victual that conduces to nourish ment is relifiable, whereas other things that cannot be affimulated and turn'd into our fubflance, are inlipid. of view and a series in

This feafoning of Necessity with Delight, is to be found in the Use of Speech. There is a ftrange fympathy betwixt the Voice of those who speak, and the Ears of those who hear: Words that are spoken with pain, are offentive to the Hearer. The Organs of the Ear are dispos'd in such fort, that they are offended by a pronunciation that grates upon the Organs of the Voice. A Discourse cannot be pleasant to the Hearer, that is not case to the Speaker; nor can it be easily pronounc'd, unless it be beard with delight.

We feed with more Appetite upon wholfom and relishable Meats: We liften more eafily to a Discourse, whose smoothness lessens the trou-ble of attending. It is with Sciences as with Meats. We must endeavour to make those things pleafant, that are useful. Quoni am nonmullam inter fe habent fimilis udinem vefcentes ek men ye

atque discentes; propter sastidia plurimorum, etiam ipia, sine quibus vivi non porest, alimenta condi-Vowels betwire the Confonants simil abis

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Pleasure goes far with every Man; 'cis that which is the Principal of all our Motions, and fets them on work. Prudence requires that we make use of this inclination to conduct us to our delign'd end; that we delight the Ears, which being the Perters of the Mind, may give our words the more favour-able admission. Belides, the pleasure which we give in Speaking, is preceded by our own proper advantage; because the ease of the Speaker, caules the latisfaction of the Hearer. Let us then endeavour first to difcover what is to be avoided in the ranging of our Words, what faults may be committed in it; what makes their pronunciation difficult. The first step to Wisdom, is to disclaim Vice: Sapientia prima, fiultitia carnisse: Besides, in what relates to the Sense, every thing is agreeable that is not offensive. Id omne delettat. quod non offendit, fays St. August.

Among the Letters, fome are pronounced with eafe, others with pain: Those whose pronunciation is ease, have an agreeable Sound; those which are pronounced with difficulty, do grate upon the Ear. Conforants are pronounc'd with more difficulty than Vowels, and therefore their found is less loft and fluent. It is convenient to temper the harfh-

barthness of the one, by the fweetness of the other, and that is to be done by placing the Vowels betwixt the Conforants, that there may not be too many of them together. harshness arising from the concourse of Con-fonants is obvious in the Northern Languages. Dutch and English are very unpleafant to them whose Ears have upp been accustomed to those Languages.

Custom takes off this harshage from words,

Nevertheless it is observed, that according to the different degrees of the People's inclination to delicacy, their words are composed of Letters more or less fort; they having had less regard to follow Reason, than to tickle their lars. In respect of this loftness of pronunciation, the Romans pled aufero for efere, college for sumlers, as Analogy oblig'd them to speak. Analogy has remitted of its rights in favour to the producciation; Impecratum est à Consuctudine ut suavitatis causa peceare liceret

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When Conforants have their aspirations, or are pronounc'd in a quite contrary manner, we are more particularly oblig'd to avoid their concourse. There are Consonants pronounced with the Mouth thut, as R. There are others to be pronounced with the Mouth open, as G. of G. These Confonants cannot march together; they do not agree, and three in there-

therefore cannot be pronounc'd one after the other immediately, without fome kind of difficulty; because we are forced (almost at the same time) to dispose the Organs of pronunciation in several different fashions.

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A second Error into which they fall who range their Discourse with negligence, is the concourse of two or more Vowels. This concourse of Vowels is unpleasing for a reason quite contrary to what has been given for the harshness of the concourse of Consonants. Confonants are pronounc'd with pain, Vowels with eafe; but this great facility accompanied with great swiftness, is the cause that their founds are not diffinguishable, but that for the most part one of them is lost; by which means there is a kind of vacuum in the pronunciation, that renders it unpleasing. In pronouncing many Vowels successively, it polish'd Marble, the too great smoothness is troublesome; it causes us to slip, and tis hard for us to keep upon our Legs. In pronouncing these two words in French, Hardi Ecuyer; or in Latin these, ni intersiftat & laboret animas, unless we stop for some time at the words. Hardi, or ni, the found of the first Vowels will be confounded with that which begins the following words, and create an uneafiness to the Ear, as not being able to diftinguish clearly the two different founds.

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To prevent this concourse, we either re-trench one of the Vowels that are found to-gether, or we put in a Consonant to fill up that void space which would happen without this artifice; for this reason they say in French, qu'il fit, for que il fit; a-t-il fait, for a il fait; fera-t-il, for fera il. When one of the Vowels has a found strong enough to make it self distinguish'd, this artifice is useless. This care of ranking of words ought to be without disquiet: We are not to consider as material faults, the failings in this part of the Art of Speaking. Non id ut crimen ingens expavescendum est, ac nescio an negligentia in boc, an so-

licitude sit pejer.

1 know not whether neglect or solicitude is to be most carefully avoided: But negligence has this advantage, that it makes it believ'd we employ our felves more about things than words, Indicium est bominis de re, magis

quam de verbis laborantis.

for us to keep apon out Legs. In pronouncing these two words in French Ahreds Ecayer ; 90

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In Speaking, the Voice does many times repose: We may commit three faults in ill-placing the repose of the Voice. fitigo, and fabraction of the lathral order. is

HE necessity of taking Breath, obliges us to interrupt the course of our pronuncia ation, and the defire of explaining our felves distinctly, is the cause that we chose for the repose of our Voice the end of every Sentence, to distinguish by these intervals the different things of which we speak. Two faults may be committed by ill-distribution of these intervals. If the Expressions of each Sentence be too fhort, and by confequence the pronunciation often interrupted, this interruption lessening the force of the Voice, and causing it to fall, the Mind of the Reader (that ought to be kept in breath) relaxes, and his incention abates. There is nothing that more cools the heat of an Action, than to discontinue it with too many Interruptions. Labour makes the Mind vigorous, and attentive; Idleness makes it drowfy and stupid. Fit attentior ex difficultate, S. Aug.

When our Thoughts are deliver'd too fort, and the Mind of the Reader is oblig'd to attend fometime to conceive them, this retardment keeps them in breath, and rendring him more attentive, gives him a better conception of the sense of our Discourse. We have said in the first Book, that for this reason the Romans rejected at the end of the fentence fome word upon which the understanding of the former depended. But without this transpofition, and subversion of the natural order, it foffices to hinder that our pronunciation be not often interrupted, to make choice of fuch copious Expressions as may comprehend a competent number of words; or elie it is necessary that the things expressed be so link'd together, that the first may excite the defire of undenfunding the latter, and that the voice repole after every link in such manner, that me may? perceive it has Bill farther to govern

number of words, we fall into another extream, commonly we continue the aftions we have begun a fo the voice not repoling till it comes to the end of the fense of which is has begun to pronounce the expression, if the sense comprehends many; things, the long function of words to which it is link'd, heats the Lungs, and spends the Spirits; the pronunciation is incommodious and unpleasant both

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to speaker and hearer.

One of the greatest distinuities in Rhetorick is to keep a Mean, and avoid these two Extreams. Those who speak without Art, and have

have but a weak genins, fall commonly into the first errour; they can hardly speak sour words that will hang together; every sentence ends as soon as it begins. We hear nothing but for; to conclude, after that, said he, and other such expressions brought in only to patch up the incoherence of the words. There is no fault in Discourse so contemptible and insupportable as this. Those who would exceed, run into another extreme. The first proceed as if they were lame, the other by leaps. For sear of debasing their style, they exalt it too high: They make use of nothing but bumbast, Sesquipedalia verba, and phrases long enough to take away a Mans breath.

Tis case to abridg, or lengthen a Sentence: We may link two or more concerts together, make them but one, and so continue the Discourse by a long yeries of words that make but one sense. There is no need of repairing to hollow and empty phrases, or to blow up our discourse with vain words. On the contrary, if a Sentence contains too many things that require great numbers of words, tis easie to contract the sense of that sentence, to separate the said things, and to signific them by select expressions, which may be by confequence more short and concise than that which expressed the whole body of the sentence.

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We may likewife commit a third fault against the just distribution of the repose of the Voice. In beginning a Sentence, when we lift up our Voice inlensibly, the Greeks call it raous, and at the end of a Sentence when we depress it, it is called Sious. The Ear judges of the length of a Phrase by the elevation of the Voice, if that be loud, it makes us expect many Words; if the expected words do not follow, the defect deceives them. and is uneafie as well to the Speaker as Hearer. It is hard to stop in the midst of a career: When in the dark we are got to the highest step of a pair of Stairs without perceiving it, and we believe we may go still higher, the first step we make afterwards discomposes us, and we are in as much disorder as if the Board flip'd from under our Feet: All the expletive Particles in French, as par, point, &c. have been found out to supply the place of words which the Ear expected. The Greeks have great numbers of these Particles, which have no other use but to lengthen a Discourse, and keep it from falling too fuddenly: If the Ear be offended with the length of a Discourse, all the Words unexpected are importunate. Aures (lays Cicero) quid plenum, quid inane fit judicant, & nos admonent complere verbis que proposuerimus, ne nibit desiderent, nibil amplins expectent. Cum vox ad sententiam expromendam attollitur, remiffa donec concludatur arrecta ow. Sunt,

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Sunt, quo perfecto, completoq; ambitu, gaudent; Et curta sentiunt, nec amant redundantia. Idcirco ne mutila sint, & quasi decurtata sententia, hoc est, non ante tempus cadant cavendum, ne quasi promissis aures fraudentur, aut productionibus, aut immoderatius excurrentibus ladantur.

## words, the fyllables, which enter into the computation of a different have different

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The too frequent repetition of the same Sounds, the same Letters, and the same Words, is irksome. The way of rendring the Pronunciation of a Discourse equal.

A Mong the Defects in ranging our Words, we reckon the too frequent repetition of the same Letter, the same termination, the same sound, and the same cadence. Diversity is pleasant; but the best things are troublesom when common. This Fault is the more considerable, because it is easily corrected: We need no more than to run our Eye over the Work, change the Words, the Syllables, the Terminations which follow too often. We may express the same things a hundred several ways; Custom supplying different Expressions for the same Thought.

The most of the faults of which I have fooken, we avoid to render our Discourse equal and fmooth. Tis uneafie to walk in an uneven Way; an unequal Discourse cannot be carried on without trouble: Pronunciation is incommodious and importunate. when without any proportion we fometimes advance, fometimes depress our voice, and pass from one extremity to another. The words, the fyllables, which enter into the composition of a discourse, have different founds; the found of fome is clear, the found of others is obscure: One fills the mouth, another is pronounced with a feeble tone. All do not require the same disposition of the organs of the Voice, and that inequality causes the different pronunciations. To support a Discourse, and render it equal, we must help the cadence of a weak word, with another that carries a stronger pronunciation; and on the contrary, tempering the force of one word by the genrieness of another, order it To, that the precedent words difpole the voice to the pronunciation of the subsequent, that the voice may fall by degrees: 415 14 140 500 1

I might add other Precepts, but what I have faid is sufficient for their Reflection who would write accurately upon those things which are necessary to be considered in the ranging of words. The principal, and almost the only, profit to be drawn from these

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Precepts, is that they make us regard feveral things, which perhaps would not otherwife occur to our thoughts. And further to perswade you of the usefulness of these Precepts about the disposition of Words, observe I pray, that the Anomala, or irregularities crept into feveral Languages, are admitted to avoid those Faults which we have decried. This is the reason of those multitude, of pricks which supply the place of Vowels in the Hebrew Language. This is the reason of the different long and short Points which are chang'd according to the different Inflexions of the Verbs, and the disposition of Notes signified by the Elevations, Depressions, and Reposes of the Voice. This is the Reason of that word Sceva, which fometimes is, and fometimes is not pronounced. It is only to equal the pronunciation, to strengthen it by long Points where there is occasion, and to lessen it by their brevity, when the equality of the pronunciation requires it.

The nicety of the Greeks is well known. I will not lose time to let you see how to avoid the unpleasing concourse of two Confonants with Aspirations, they change the sirst into a tenuem that answers to it, saying for example research for ofference: How to fill up the void space which happens sometimes betwirt two Vowels, of two words they make but one, for example raising, they pronounce

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nave: or infert a Confonant, as Sidoner aure for Nedwas auxã. How they use not this Artifice when one of these Vovels is long, and has a found strong enough to distinguish it, as Tui duro. You know already that to fortify the pronunciation, when the word following begins with an Aspiration, it changes the denueminto an afperum at the end of the first word, as mixe salu for mixe salu having a rough Spirit, requires a Arrang pronunciation, which would be hard to do, after you have prenounc'd the tennes K & T. whose Sounds are but weak. The Grammarians observe that the Greeks fay Assama in the Pretertense of the Medium, for J'is was to avoid the triple repetition of the fame Confenant J.

Every Man can make the fame Reflections apon the Latin, and generally upon all Languages that he knows. The great number of words in every Language, that are diversify'd in their terminations, and the number of their Syllables; the abundance of Expressions (some of which are short, and some long) were invented only to make their Sentences equal, and give them means to chuse in that variety, the most commodious words and phrases and rejecting such as could not be handsomy joyn'd, in compassione rixantes, supply their places with those that are more convenient.

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#### CHAP. II.

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Words are Sounds. Conditions necessary to make Sounds agreable. The first Condition. A Violent Sound is disagreeable: A moderate Sound pleases.

TAJE have seen in the foregoing Chapter what is to be avoided in the ranging of Words, that they may not offend the Ear. Let us in this see what we are to do to make the Sounds made by these words a greeable and pleasing: All things that are moderate are pleasing, those Meats which move the Nerves of the Tongue foftly, affect the Soul with the pleasure of Sweetness: Those Meats which prick the Nerves, or act upon them with violence, are sharp, piquant or bitter. The heat of Fire causes pain; the rigour of Cold is insupportable; a moderate Heat is useful for Health, and fresh Air is agreeable. God has decreed (to render the prison of his Body agreeable to the Soul of Man, and make him love it) that whatever happens to the Body, and disturbs not its good disposition, should give him content. It is pleasing to see, to seel, to touch, to taste, &c. There is not a sense that we can want without trouble. The sense of a sound must then be spleasing to the Ear, when it strikes it with moderation. Soft Sounds strike with moderation upon the Organs of Hearing. Those Sounds which offend them are irksome and disagreeable.

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The Second Codition; A Sound ought to be distinct, and by Consequence strong enough to be heard.

But a Sound ought likewise to be strong enough to be heard: Meats that are insipid, do rather spoil the Appetite, than provoke it: We are forc'd to season and make them relishable with Vinegar and Salt. It is with matters belonging to Sensation, as with matters belonging to knowledge that depend not upon the body. An imperfect knowledge of a thing does but trouble and perplex the curiosity; and makes us but understand that we are ignorant. We resent with some pain what we perceive but obscurely. In a Sunshing day the prospect of a Field is pleasant; whatever we discern clearly, whether by the sense.

sense or the mind, is pleasant; and thus you have had two necessary conditions to make: Sounds grateful. The first, that they be not fo violent to disturb the Ear; The second, that they be clear, and distinctly to be heard.

The Equality of Sounds contributes to the rendring them distinct, which is a Third Condition. Count of the same

**全组织 98-00129118 以外** 98 T is not always the want of Force that: renders the Sense confus'd, but sometimes inequality. Unequal Sounds that strike the Organs strongly or weakly, swiftly or slowly without proportion, trouble the Mind, as diversity of Affairs trouble the Man, who cannot apply himself to all of them at once. The fight of a multitude of different Objects difpos'd without order, is confus'd. In a Cabinet well furnish'd with Jewels, adorn'd with Prctures, Sculptures, Cuts, Medals, Shells, &c. the fight of all these Curiosities is not agreeable, if they be not dispos'd with Order. Why is it that Trees planted in order are more delightful than those that are ranged. without Art, as Nature has difpos'd them? Why is it that an Army drawn up in Battalia, is-G 3-

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pleasing

pleasing and formidable at the same time? Many Reasons may be given, but in my opinion it is the equality and order that renders our fensation more distinct. The clearness wherewith the mind perceives the things between which there is an equality and order, gives it fatisfaction, and a full enjoyment of what it defires. If there be no order betwixt the impression of Sounds, they can never be distinguished by the Ear. In an assembly of several Persons where all speak at a time, fcarce one word is to be understood. In a regular Confort, though compos'd of feveral Instruments and Voices, we understand without confusion or pain the found of every Inftrament, and the Notes of every Voice; and this distinction makes them pleasing to the early work as

#### IV.

The Fourth Condition. Diversity is as necessary as Equality, to make Sounds agreeable.

There fays very well, the Ear is hard to be pleas'd, Fastidiosissima sum nones. We many times displease, when we design to please them. Equality is necessary, and without

out it our fense is not distinct; we perceive things but confusedly, and with trouble when we enjoy things imperfectly that we love and defire: and yet this equality grows tedions and insupportable when continued too long. The Ear is inconstant as the rest of the Senses-Omnis volupt as habet finismum fastidium. The greatest pleasures are attended with disput. Those who understand the Art of pleasing, prevent these disgusts, and canse a successive sensation of different pleasures, overcoming by variety the difficult humour of Men who are diffurb'd at all these things. 'Tis not only Fancy, and Caprichio, that makes variety necellary; Nature it felf requires it. A Sound tires the Ear by firiking upon it too long. In all actions diversity is necessary, because the pain being divided, each part of the Organ is the less oppress'd

#### V.

The Fifth Condition is to unite and linktogether the former Conditions

Incompatible, and destructive the one to the other; But they agree very well, and equality and variety may consist without any.

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confusion. There is in nothing more variety, than in a Garden of Flowers, there are Tulips, and Violets, and Roses, &c. The Borders or Compartments are different, some round, some oval, some square, some triangular. Yet if this Plot be considered by a skilful Man, the equality agrees well enough with the variety, being divided into Beds, proportioned one to the other, and adorned with regular Figures.

We will show now how equality and variety may consist in Sounds. It is this consistency that makes the Consort in Musick; for, as St. Augustin says well, the Ear cannot receive a greater contentment than what it seels when it is charm'd by diversity of Sounds, and yet is not deprived of the pleasure that equality gives it. Quid enim auribus jucundius potest esse, quam cum & veritate mul-

centur, nec aqualitate fraudantur?

The appearance the two luft Conditions are abcompatible, and defirective the one to the condition of the other conditions are well, and expense very well, and ex-

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The Sixth Condition that this agreement of Equality and Diversity be sensible, and what is to be observed to make it so

His agreement of equality and variety ought to be fenfible, fo as the temperament may be perceivable to the Ear. Wherefore all Sounds in which that Agreement is to be found, ought to be joyn'd, and the Ear ought in like manner to hear them without any considerable interruption. The Symmetry of a Building cannot be observed when we fee but one part of it. For this reason a skilful Architect orders things so, that as far as is possible his House may be confider'd at a fingle view. That the Ear may discern the order and proportion of feveral Sounds, it is necessary that they may be compar'd: In all comparisons 'tis suppos'd the terms of the commparison are present, and joyn'd with the other, and it is this union that makes the Beauty and Pleasure of Harmony. Plus delectant omnia quam singula, si possint fentirilomnia. de company of the control of the state of the control of the contr

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# what to be avoided that out Diffeorests had not grate upon the TW file beatern.

What the Ear distinguishes in the Sound of Words, and what it may perceive with delight.

Hele Conditions are necellary to all Sounds to make them agreeable, whether it be to the founds of the Voice, or of Instruments; yet I have delign'd to speak only of the Sounds of Humane Voices, which I distinguish into two forts, Forc'd, and Namoral. The forc'd Voice is used in Singing, when the Air that makes the found is forc'd with violence from the Lungs. The Natural voice is that which we use when we speak, it is form'd with case, and wearies not the Organs like the other. What I shall fav hereafter in this Treatife, relates only to the Naintal Voice. Let us fee now how we may dinake the Sounds or Words have fuch conditions as may render them agreeable to the bear. 7001019 . Dea not promy

We may without much difficulty range our Discourse in such manner, that the promunciation be neither too violent nor faint; that it be moderate and distinct, and that our Discourse by consequence have the two first conditions. The first Chapter has been spent intirely in instructing what is to be done, and what

what to be avoided, that our Discourse may not grate upon the Ear, but be heard distinctly. We have shown how carefully we are to avoid the concurrence of two rough Confonants; How we are to fill up the void spaces betwint words where the course of the pronunciation would be stopd: With what prudence we are to correct the roughness of some Syllables with the softness of others; in a word, how we may equal the pronunciation, and sustain the sound of weak Letters, by

affociating them with stronger.

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The Four other Conditions may be found in different manners in Discourse. The Lar. perceives leveral things in prominciation, befides the found of the Letters. First, it judges of the meafure of time in which each Lebter, each Syllable, each Word, each expression, is diffinguished. In the third place the Elevations and Depressions of the Voice by which in speaking, each word, leach expresson, is ipponeune'd. Next it ijudges of the Ear observes the filence or repose of the Voice at the end of Words or Sentencest: when we joyn or feparate words, when we, cut off a Vowel; and feveral other things. comprized under the name of Accents, the knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for pronunciation. Thele Accents may the very numerous: There are more than thirty of them in the Hebrew Granimars. If you will

will believe Senvius Honoraus there are eight among the Liatins. The Sharp figured thus (1) which shows when the Voice is to be raised.
The Grave (') when it is to be depress'd. The Circumflex composed of the Sharp and the Grave as thus ( or ) the Long describ'd thus (-) which shows that the Voice is to ftop upon the Vowel that has that mark: The Short which hows that the time of pronunciation ought to be short (") the Hyphen or Conjunction that implys two words are to be joyn'd as Male-fanus. The Diastoleor Division, (,) which shows they are to be separated; the Apoftrophe (') which flows there is a Vowel to be rejected. The Disfiele and the Apostrophe have the same mark, with this difference, that in the Apostrophe it is placed at the top of the Letter, ad Cuput litera; in the Dieftole in the bottom, ad pedem:

But we may order it so that the Ear may receive all these with delight, by observing the sour conditions premised, disposing (for example) our words with such Artisice; that the Measures of the time of our pronunciation be equal; that the pauses of the Voice or intervals of Respiration be suitable; that the Voice be raised or debased with equal degrees. We may joyn Equality with Variety, by making several of those conjoyn'd measures to be equal, though the parts of which they are compos'd be unequal, and by order-

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ing things to that the Earsmay receive this temperament with pleasures: But this requires longer Explication.

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othe the motions of our Will, and the thoughts of our Mind. Artificial Difcourfe is used to

concto express our selves, to influditand mg-

The Art to render Pronunciation agreeable is to be used with Prudence.

issuedifficient if we obletve exactly cyclot has D Efore we demonstrate the Utility of the D Observations made in the former Chapletter, now while we speak of the Art of Pleasing, and are wholly imploy'd to find out in Discourse what is plealing to the Ear; it is convenient to reflect upon this Maxim, that the most agreeable things are disagreeable in several cases. Divertisement is not at all times feafonable; working and playing are not to be used together; we never step in measure, when we follow our affairs. When we are simply to discover our thoughts, when we are only to make the people fensible what we have in our Minds; a Man of Judgment will not always trouble himself to consider exactly, and measure his words, nor take the pains to place precifely the panfes of his Prointreachnunciation.

nunciation. Pleasure is mit Pleasure but where it its defired; if it comes unferioughly, it displeases, because it diverts our Application

on from what it was feriously fixt upon

Discourse then is to be distinguished into Discourse is that which is used in Conversation to express our selves, to instruct and signifie the motions of our Will, and the thoughts of our Mind. Artificial Discourse is used to please, and with all possible Art (beyond the Natural and Familiar way) to charm and allure our Auditors. In natural Discourse, it is fufficient if we observe exactly what has been speciaribed in the little Chapter of this Book, not but that the target becalf din Cometimes to mar Alifiquee: Matters of Natural Discourse are my slowys to authore, but they may admit of sometittle Divertisement.

wing Norse and Profe : it is fulficiently ma-niell; the Differrie that is tyed up to the Ario IR ules of Weolification, is far from a free Discourse, as that is which we ase when we talk naturally and without Art. Furthis redon Discourses in Verde are call'd partiouhady Artificial. We are obliged to begin this act of which we are breating, by showing how we may give to free and natural Difebuole (that is to Tay to Profe) the conditi-ons that reader Sounds agreeable, wishout intrench3

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intrenching upon its liberty. After which, in order we had come to artificial Diffourtle, as Nerfe, Ga. This Art in Profe is redocible to two things, either to renter our Profe Periodical, or Figurative. Let us be now what is a Period, and what a Figure i how we may render a Difcourfe Periodical, and how Figurative.

#### DECORPORATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

How we are to distribute the Intervals of Respiration, that the repose of the Voice may be proportionable.

W E are obliged to take breath from time to time; the necessity of being understood, makes us stop commonly at the end of every expression to respire, that the unpose of the Voice may force to tember our Diffcourse more clear, and give as power to reassume new source for the continuation of our speech. The Voice does not repose equally at the end of every sense; in a Sentence where there is much comprised; we repose a little at the end of every Guerra; yet this repose himsers not from pencersing, that we would speak further. That part of a perfect sense, which makes part of a greater

fentence, is called in Greek Kopped, in Latin Incifum. When we hear this part of an entire fense, the Ear is not satisfied, because the pronunciation remains suspended till the Sentence be finished. For example, when we begin, Cum Regium sit bene facere, & audire male, seeing it is a Royal quality to do right where me receive wrong. The Ear is attentive, and diligent to understand what follows. The Greeks call a perfect fense that makes but a part of a more compleat Sentence, xwoo, the Latins Membrum, a Member. The Ear is pleas'd with the part of a Sentence, but yet hankers after something that may render it compleat. Si quantum in agris, locifq; diertis audacia potest, tantum in foro atq; judiciis impudentia valeat : If Impudence could do as much at the Bar in Courts of Justice, as Courage could do in the Field. You may find by your Ear that there is sense in what is faid, and the Ear is in some measure satisfiel; but yet there remains a defire of fomething to make it more compleat, and there is fomething wanting to the Body of the Sentence, though the Members are fufficiently intelligible.

The Voice cannot repose but by depressing, nor begin again but by elevating it self; for which reason in each Member there are two parts, Elevation, and Depression of the Voice, ries, and ries. The Voice reposes not abso-

absolutely, but at the end of a Sentence: Nor debases it felf, but by finishing the pronunciation of a Sentence. When the Members which compose the body of a Sentence are equal; and the Voice in pronouncing them reposes by equal Intervals, advances and falls again with proportion; the expression of that Sentence is call'd a Period. 'Tis a word which is borrow'd from the Greeks, and fignifies in Latin Circuitus. Periods comprehend (like a Circumference) all the Senses which are Members of the Body of a Sentence. The Art of compoling Periods confilts (as is manifest) in equalling and proportioning the expressions of each Member of a Sentence. Let us fee now how that is to be done.

#### III.

Laurenger Richard architecture

## The Composition of Periods.

To compose a Period, (or which is the fame thing) to express a Sentence that is composed of two or more several Senses, with such Art, that the expressions in the said Sentence may have the Conditions necessary to please the Ear; we must first provide that the expressions be not too long, and that the whole Period be proportioned to the breath of him who is to pronounce it. We must have

have an eye to all contain'd in the Sentence that we would comprize in one Period. We may make choice of Expressions close, or extended; and retrench, or add, as we find convenient, to give it a just length: But we make have a care not to insert Periods that are useless and weak to fill up Vacancies, and complean the Cadence of the Period. Institute Complements, & valuents maner crams

The expressions of particular senses, that are Members of the Body of a Sentence, ought to be equal, that the Voice may repose at the end of these Members by equal Intervals. The more this equality is exact the more it is pleasant; as we may see in this example. Have of enim non fulla, sed nara lex; quam non didicimus, accepimus, legimus, verum ex Natura ipsa arripuimus, hausimus, expressimus: ad quam non docti, sed sacti, non instituti, sed imbuti sumus.

3. A Period ought to could at least of two Members, and at most but of four: A Beriod is to have at least two Members because its Beauty proceeds from the equality of the Members, and equality supposes at least two terms. The Masters of this Art would not have four Members crowded into one Period, because being too long, the proposition must be forc'd, which must by consequence be displaying to the Ear, because a Discourse that is incommodient to the

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4. The members of a Period ought to be joyn'd close, that the Ear may perceive the equality of the Intervals of Respiration: For this cause the Members of a Period ought to be united by the union of a lingle Sentence, of the Body of which they are M bers. This union is very discernable, for the Voice repoles at the end of every Member, only the better to continue its courfe: It stops not quite, but at the end of the whole Sentence. A Period, like a Circle, incompasses and incloses the whole sense of a Sentence; and causes the Ear with ease to perceive the distinction or union of its Members.

7. The Voice is elevated or depress'd in each member: The two parts where the inflections are made, ought to be equal, that the degrees, of Elevation and Depression may correspond. In pronouncing an entire Period we raile our Voice to the middle of the Sentence, and let it fall gradually afterward The two parts call'd value, and salvers, must correspond by their Equality.

1 6. Variety may be in a Period two ways: In the fenfe, and in the words. The fenfe, of each member of the Period ought to differ among chemfelves: In Difcoorfe variety falls in of it felf.) We cannot express the different thoughts of our mind, but by different words

of different lignifications. But a Period may be composed of two Members, of three Members, and sometimes of four Members. Equal Periods are not to follow one another too near; it is best when Discourse flows with most liberty: The exact and precise equality of the Intervals for Respiration, may become troublesome.

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Examples of some lattin Periods: Periods are Pronounc'd with Ease.

edinate mini a dnio a bioma deleniora THE Cadence of the French Language being not so intelligible, I shall present fome Pallages in Cicero that I have chosen for Examples of the Latin Periods. An example of a Period of two Members. 1. Anrequam de Republica, (Patres conscripti) dicam es que dicenda sunt boc tempore. 2. Exponam breviter Concilium & profectionis & reversionis. The following Period has three Members. 1. Nam cum antea, per atatem, bujus auctoritatem loci contingere non auderem. 2. Statueremque nibil buo nisi perfectum industria, elaboratum ingenio offerri oportere. 3. Meum tempus omne amicorum temporibus transmittendum puravi. This last consists of four Members.

1. Si quantum in agro, locifq; defertis audacin potest. 2. Tantum in fore, ac in Judicois impirdentia valeret. 3. Non minus in caufa cederet Aulus Cacinna, Sexti Abutii impudentia. 4.

Quantum in vi facienda ceffet andacia.

Sometimes we conclude the end of each member of a Period with terminations almost alike, which produces an equality in the Cadences of Members, and makes the Period more harmonious; as may be observ'd in several examples, where all the Periods are not equally studied.

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The care that we take to place properly the repose of the Voice in the Periods, makes us pronounce them without pain; and it has been observed, that things of casiest pronunciation are most grateful to the Ear. Id anribus nostris gratum est inventum, quod hominum lateribus non solum tolerabile, sed estam facile esse porest. This reason obliges an Orator to speak Periodically. Periods maintain Discourse, and are pronounced with certain Majesty that gives weight to the words. But it is to be consider'd that this Majesty is unfeasonable when it follows the motions of Passion, whose precipitation suffers not any regular way of ranging, and compoling our words. A discourse equally periodical cannot be pronounc'd but coldly Passion admits not of Rules; Periods (as I faid before) are not good, but when we would

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would freak with Authority, or delight the Ear. We cannot run and walk in Cadence at the fame time.

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The Figurative ranging of Words, and in what these Figures consist.

LAY E have faid at large in the Second Book, that Figures in discourse are the Chatasters of the agitations of the mind; that weeds do follow upon these agitations; and that when we speak naturally, the passion that causes as to speak, describes it self in our words. The sigures of which we are speaking are discount, they are traced at leisture by a mind that is quiet. The first are made by sellies; they are violent, they are shong, proper to contest and vanquists a mind that opposes the truth. Those of which we are speaking are without that force, and unfit for any thing but Diversion. I speak of those that are elaborate and studied; for it may happen that the condition of these last higures wherewith we adorn our Discourse for Dispute.

bluow

We have hown in the first Chapter, that the repetition of the fame word, the fame letter, or the same found, is unplea same: But we have observed in the Second Chapter that when that repetition is made with Art. it is not ungrateful to the Ear. In short, the most disagreeable founds are pleasing when deliver'd with fit lutervals. The noise of a Strikes upon his Anvil with proportion, it makes a kind of Confort that is pleating to the Ear. We cannot repeat a found, a letter, or word, bot it makes our Discourle figarative; The Art of Figures confids in the repetition of a letter, of the same termina on, of the same word, by proportionated time, and equality of interval, fometime in the beginning, fometime in the oud, and fometime in the middle of a feature ; as may be feen in the examples of thefe figures, which I have drawn for the most part out of very good Poets, in supports the grant and

Figures may be infinite, because the repetition that makes them may be made infinite ways, and all of them different. We may repeat the same word simply without altering the signification, as My God, my God, why hast thou for saken me to Or we may change the signification of the word.

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Quand il wous veut ifrapper, Mamour retiem

A Father's still a Father, when his rage Prompts him to strike, his Love does it assuage.

The fecond word Father is taken for the motions of tenderness which Fathers feel for their Children.

Sometimes the same expression is repeated in the beginning of every member of a Discourse and add to the local to the same and the sa

Il n'est entreles absoninable, eupo bas con Il n'est bentales actions, où suinniped ou Done les morrels ne soient coupables, &c.

There are no abominable Crimes,

There are no brusish actions,

There are no infamous pussions

Of which Man is not quilty

Sometimes the same word is placed at the beginning, and end of a Sentence.

Vengez vous dans le temps, de mes fautes passees, Mais dans l'Eternite ne vous en vengez pas. Revenge

brow oils to more.

Revenge in time my frailies and my faults; But in Eternity revenge them not.

Sometimes the same word is placed at the end of one Member, and the beginning of the next; sometimes at the beginning of a Member, and the end of the next. Sometimes the same words are repeated in the middle of the Members of a Sentence. Sometimes they are repeated in all the Members. Sometimes in the same Member the same words are used at the beginning, and then inverting the Order, placed in the end.

There is a fort of Repetition which is made by giving a lesser transposition of the

repeated word.

There is another way wherein all these repetitions are made at the same time; as in this example taken out of Prosper.

No Man do's Grace prevent; each good desire
Is kindled in him by that sacred fire.
So'tis the way that leads us in the way;
Without it's own light none beholds the day.
Who without God would go to God, is blindal.
And seeking Life, is certain Death to find.

Rhetoricians give to these several Figures, (which are but several forts of Repetition to particular Names,) with which it is not necessary to oppress the memory of the Reader.

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## Reflections upon these Figures.

Never delign'd to comprehend all forts of these Figures that may be possibly invented, I have thought it sufficient to give some examples of them. Expressions figured in this manner may be valued for the fense which they contain; but 'tis evident that these Figures of themselves are worthy but of moderate esteem. The Art of making them is very obvious, and indeed too gros: Our Language is natural, and loves them not, and the best of our Authors avoid them with more care than others affect them. They will fcarce entertain them when they fall in of themselves, and seem to come by chance. Meaner Wits are fond of these Figures, this feeble artifice being commensurate to their firength, and conformable to their Genius. Puerilibus ingeniis hot gratius, quod propius est. Yet I am not so critical as to condemn all these Figures; the examples I have inserted would rife in judgment against me: Let us try then what we can fay in their favour.

We compare all these Figures to the Knots and Figures of a Garden: As they are pleasing to the eye by their variety, and order with which they are ingeniously disposed; so

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the Sounds and words of a Discourse being figured as we have directed, are as agreeable to the Ear. Reafon permits those Figures when they are not too much affected, and fall in as it were by accident. They may likewife be compar'd to the Figures upon the works of Nature, where the feems to fport and delight her felf in diversifying. A Traveller tires himself sometimes in the contemplation of a Shell, or a Flower. choly Reader is reviv'd by this Figurative disposion of words; the Figures renew his attention, and those little Artifices do not displease him. Some of these Figures I have observed in Holy Writ, and particularly in Haich, the most elequent of all the Prophets. The Fathers wied them, either in complaisance to that Age which delighted in them, or be. cause a Sentence is easier retain'd that runs with a Gadence. But continually to affect them is a very great fault. I know not how it comes about that Men have so much esteem for fome Authors that are full of those Affectations: I cannot think it a fign of great Wit to spend whole days in ranking their words with an inconfiderable exactness. A discourse with this Artifice does not affect. nor make impression upon a serious person ; it takes only with those who delight in sporting with words, and belongs only to fuch Authors as are empty of matter; rich only the enunciation is queter.

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in trifles, and understand nothing but how to suprize the Common people with haramonious noise : Canoris Nugit

#### CHAP. DIV. 100 and Alim

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Of the measure of Time in Pronunciation.

HE Voice does necessarily stop some time upon every Syllable, to make it diftinct and intelligible. Our present Disquisition is about the Measure of Time in matter of Pronunciation; how to proportion it, and give it the conditions requisite to such things as the Ear perceives in promunciation. The manner of Pronouncing is not the same in all Countries. The pronunciation of the predent Languages in Europe, is different from the pronunciation of the ancient Languages, as Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. In the prefent Languages we stop equally upon all Syllables, and the time in pronouncing all the Kowels is the fame. In ancient Languages the Vowels are distinguish'd by difference of time Some are call'd long, because pronounced in longer rime; others are call'd short, because their We pronunciation is quicker.

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We ought not to imagine that we pronounce at this day the Greek and the Larin, Greeks and Romans did of old. In their Difour fe they diffinguisfed the quantity of every Vowel. We, when we pronounce a Latin word, observe only the time of the last Vowel but one. Though the last Vowel be short; we pronounce it as if it were long. Yet Saint Auftin tells us, that whoever in reading this verse of Virgilas

Arma, virama; cano, Troje qui primus ob oris,

should pronounce primis for primus, is being long, and as short, he should spoil the harmony of the Verfe. Whose Ear among us fo delicate as to perceive this difference Quis se sentit desarmit me soni offensum? And yet the ears of the Romans in Saint Augustin's time were offended with this alteration.

We call Measure a certain number of Syllables distinguish'd and understood by the ear, separately from another number of Syllables : The union of two, or more measures makes a Verse. The Latin word Versus lignifieth properly Ranged; and we give that name to words, because in writing they are distinguished from Profe, which is a continued Line. Profa Oratio, quali prorfa Oratio. Marius Victorinus tells us, that Versus comes a Versuris, that Is a repetita Seriptura ea ex parte in quam defi-H 3 mids mot de la to note . having begun to write first from the left to the right hand, the fecond Line was write from the right to the left hand, as Oxen plough the ground; for which reason, as the same Author observes, that manner of writing was call'd Bustrophe, a Boum versatione.

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# Of the making of Verse.

flould pronounce prime for primer, is being Qual measures of Time in Pronunciation, cannot be agreeable (as we have faid before) unless they be distinguishable: For that, it is necessary that the Ear distinguishes these Measures, and at the same time that they are heard separately, that they be joyned together, for the Ear comparing one with the other, may perceive their equality; which alley presupposes at least two Terms, and formy diffenction between the faid Terms : For we do not lay of two great things, that they ere equal; unless both of them be present to ought to be joyn'd with variety, as we have evine'd at large in the Second Chapter; from whence we collect that the Artifice of the Aructure of a Verfe confilts in the Observation of these four things. 1. Each 1. Each measure ought to be heard distinctly, and separately from every other Measure-

2. These Measures are to be equal.

fame; they must have some difference betwixt them; that their Variety and Equality

may be united in the Meafures.

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lity that they have in their difference.

The pronunciation of Languages being different, the structure of Verse cannot be the same in all Languages: All their difference nevertheless is reducible to two Heads; for the Latin and Greek Poesy do differ from the French, Italian, and Spanish Poesy, only because in these latter Languages they pronounce all the Syllables equaly, as not having the distinction of short and long Vowels. Wherefore I shall not be oblig'd to speak particularly of the structure of Verse in each Language: It will suffice for my design to discover the Fundamental Rules of the Latin and French Poetry.

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III. How

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How the Romans distinguist'd their Measures. How many sorts of Measures there are in the structure of a Verse.

Very Measure in the Latin Poetry is understood separately and distinctly by the elevation of the Voice at the beginning, and the depression or relaxation of it at the end. These Measures are call'd Feet, because the Verses seem to march or step in Cadence by means of their Measure. So the Foot of a Latin Verse, as Victorinus observes, is form'd by the raising or relaxation of the Voice. Alterna syllabarum sublatione & positione, pedes mituntur & formantur. The Romans beat their Measure as they recited their Verse: Plandendo recitabant, Pedis pulsus ponebatur, tollebaturg; from whence came this phrase, Perentere pedes versus, to distinguish the Feet or Measures of a Verse,

To determine how many different Mea-fures or Feet are used in the Latin Poetry, we mult attentively observe these following Rules which are founded upon the necessity of rendring our Measures clear and distinct.

The First Rule.

It is clear, and without dispute, a Foot ought to consist of two Syllables at least upon upon the first of which Syllables the Voice is to be rais'd; upon the Second it is to be depressed to make it more remarkable.

The Second Rule

The two Syllables of a Foot cannot be both short, because they would pass too swiftly, and the Ear would not have time to distinguish two different degrees in the Voice that pronounces them, that is to say, an Elevation and Depression.

The Third Rule:

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Two short feet in pronunciation, are equivalent to one long. That is to say, the time of pronunciation in a long Vowel, is equal to the time of pronunciation of two short Vowels.

The Fourth Rule.

A Foot cannot be composed of more than two long Syllables, or two equivalent to two long Syllables; for those in the middle, betwixt, the two extreams, (upon which the Voice rifes and falls) will trouble the harmony, and hinder the equality of Measures, as I shall show; at present I speak only of simple Feet that may form a perfect harmony. Those which are called composed Feet, consist of two simple Feet.

The Fifth Rule.

A Foot cannot be composed of above three Syllables: should it consist of four Syllables, they would be either all short, or some of them.

them long. If they were all hore, their promunciation would be too glib, and by confequence vicious; a Foot of four mort Syllables cannot be diffinelly understood. If in a Foot of four Syllables there he one long, and three short, the long Syllable will not be equivalent to the three fhort, which meafure offends against the Fourth Rule. The Sixth Rule.

The Ear reduces always the composid Measures to the simple, because simple things are understood and heard with more ease and diffinction: So a Measure compos'd of Four long Syllables, is by the Ear reducible imo Two.

These Rules give us to understand that all Simple Feet conlist either of two or three Sylbe of two Syllables, and how many of three.

A Foot confilting of two Syllables, both

of them long, is call'd Spondens.

When it confilts of two thore Syllables, it

B calle Pyrrichus.

When the first of the invo Syllables is long, and the fecond fort, 'tis called Trocheus

When the first is short, and the second

long, it is call'd lambus.

In a Foot of three Syllables when they are all long, it is called Moloffus.

When they are all fort, it is call de Tribrochus. When When the first is long, and the two other short, it is called Dattylus.

When the last is long, and the two first

short, it is called Anapafeus.

When the first is short, and the two last

When the two first are long, and the last

fort, it is call'd Anti-Bachins.

When the two extreams are long, and the middle short, it is called amphi-ma-cres.

When the two extreams are short, and that in the middle long, it is called Amphibrachus. -

But all these Feet cannot be brought into -Verse, because they have not the requisite conditions in their Measure. Many are excluded in Poetry by the precedent Rules. -The Pyrriebus by the Second : The Moloffus by the Fourth: The Bachius and Anti-Bal chins by the fame Rule: The Amphimacres and the Amphibrachus by the Sixth; besides this we shall make it appear that equality cannot be preserved in the two last Measures so that there are in effect but fix Feet, that is to fay, the Spondaus, the Trochans, the Jambus, the Tribrachus, the Dactylus, and the Anapastus. There are several others memed, but all of them naturally reducible to thele fix forts of Feet. Sounds diffrects, and, triving among counted on

There is in every Method and out of the

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# IV.

## Of the Quality of Measures,

W Hen two Syllables are pronounc'd in equal time, the quantity or time of the faid Syllables are reckon'd to be equal. This equality is found betwixt two Syllables, and a third, when in the same time that one of the faid Syllables is pronounc'd, we have leafure to pronounce the other two. We fay, that the time of one Syllable is either the double or treble of the time of a Second Syllable, if in the time that we pronounce the one, the other may be pronounc'd in the same space of time twice or thrice: so the quantity of a long Syllable is double the time of a short. When the time of the pronunciation of two Syllables can be measured by a precise measure, and the time of the pronunciation of the one is double to the time of pronunciation of the other, the proportion prevents confusion, and makes the Ear perceive distinctly the quantity of the said Syllables; for which Reason it must necessarily please, seeing the Equality (as we have said before) is agreeable only because it renders Sounds distinct, and takes away confusion. There is in every Measure or Foot an Elevation, and a Relaxation. Pes habet elationem

nem & positionem. To the end therefore that Equality may be kept, the time of Elevation ought to be equal to the time of Relaxation. In a Spondaus, the time of Relaxation, and Elevation is perfectly equal, because the Foot is compos'd of two long Syllables. It is the same in the Dallylus and Anapastus, the time of two short Syllables being equal to the time of a long Syllable. In the Trochaus and the lambus the equality is not so exact, for the difference betwixt a long Syllable and a short, is not so diffinguishable as to offend the Ear.

This is to be observ'd; a considerable silence is equivalent at least to a short quantity. So a Trocheus is equivalent to a Spandans or a Dallylus, if after that Foot the voice reposes and stops, and then the time of Relaxation is equal with the time of Elevation; which is of importance to be confider'd, in answer to an Objection that may be rais'd against what we have said, that a Measure or Foot does necessarily require two Syllables. In Odes there are Feet to be found that confift only of one long Syllable; but the Repose of the Voice, Distinctionis mora, where the filence that follows a long quantity, holds the place of a short, with that long quantity, it makes a Trochaus, which is a measure of two Syllables.

In this we may see the grounds of what we have said before, that a Foot cannot be compos'd

compos'd of more than two long Syllables; for if the Elevation or Relaxation comprehends the intervenient Syllable, there will be no farther equality betwixt the two parts. If this Syllable be not comprized in either of the two parts of the Measure, it will add nothing to the harmony, and by consequence be troublesome. For this reason the Amphimicres, and the Amphibracus cannot stand in a Venfe, because there must be either a fort quantity betwixt two long; or a long quantity betwixt two fhort; to that the intermediate Syllable not being to be joyn'd with either of the extremities, but by troubling the Equality, it becomes ufeless, and interrupts the harmony. And yet these quantities may be brought into an harmonious structure, the times of their Elevation and Relaxation being proportionable. In a Foot of three long Syllables (which we have call'd Molossus) the time of Relaxation upon the two last long Syllables, is double to the time of Elevation upon the first long Syllable, for which reafon the times are proportionable, and by confequence may be agreeable to the Ear, as we have faid before. So a Discourse compos'd of a mixture of those Feet, may be harmonious. But in this case Verse is excluded, because the harmony of Verse ought; to be distinguishable, which cannot be, if the equality of the Measures be not exactly observ'dobserved. In an lambus and a Treeheus this equality is not to be kept; but the difference betwixt a short quantity and a long is not much discernable, because a short quantity is pronounc'd quick. Whereas the inequality betwixt the parts of a measure of three long Syllables is very plain, being much greater; for two long are as much as four short, VVVV, one long, is to two long as to VV, and one long is to one short as to V. Victorinus tells us a short is a quantity, and therefore as Servine Honorius observes, a Spondant has four times.

A measure is equal to another measure. when the time of their pronunciation is equal The Spondaus, the Duttylus, and the Anapastus are of equal measures. Tempora elationis & positionis aqualia sunt. The Trochans, the lambus and the Tribrachus are likewife of equal measures, for the two fhort of the three of a Tribrachus being equivalent to the one long, that foot is equal to a Trochaur, or an lumbus. The equality is not exactly just betwixt a Spondous, or an lambus; but, as is faid, the difference being finall, a verfe may be well composed of the fix fort of Feet before mention'd, because they are equal, or very near equal. We shall speak hereafter of the placing of these Feet. reace brewixt a long cylladic and two

of whiles: to chough the time or quantity of

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Of the Variety of these Measures, and the Alliance of their Equality with their Variety.

Ariety is so necessary to prevent the disgust of the most agreeable things, that the Musitians who accurately endeavour the Proportion and consonance of Sounds, do always affect discord in their Harmony, that is to say, they neglect the perfect Union of their Voice, that grating may, like Salt, provoke the appetite of the Ear. If therefore the Poets should not approve the Rules we have given, we are not to be blam'd, because to them we have added this, that we are to correct the sweetness of the equality, by the Salt (as I may call it) of the Variety.

Variety is found several ways in Latin verse. I speak not of that which consists in the difference of Sense, and the diversity of words. First, it is clear that in the Dastylus, the Trochaus, the lambus, the Anapastus, and the Tribrachus, the Elevation is far different from the depression or relaxation: and though the quantity of two short Vowels be equal to a long, yet the Ear perceives a sensible difference betwixt a long Syllable and two short Syllables: so though the time or quantity of

a Spondaus, a Dastylus, and Anapastus be equal, yet their difference is discernable. In Dastylo tollitur una longa, ponuntur dualreves; In Anapasto tolluntur dua breves, ponitur una longa; Si in Spondao tollitur & ponitur una

longa.

A Verse is not commonly made of one fort of feet; Hexameters are made of Spondy's and Dactyles. Pentameters of Spondy's Dactyles, and Anapastes. Iambicks of several sorts of Feet. Lyrick, are more diversify'd than others; because they not only receive different Feet, but also the number of their Feet is unequal, sometimes more and sometimes less.

A verse composed wholly of Spondy's, or wholly of Dattyles, would not please; we must temper the swiftness of the Dattyle, by the flowness and gravity of the Spondy: An I mbick may be made perfectly of lambuses, because that Verse passing exceeding swift, though it consists of six Feet, seems to have but three. Wherefore the too great equality of Measures in so small a number, cannot be troublesome, as is evident in this Verse.

Suis & ipsa Roma viribus ruit.

The measures in an Hexameter are large, but very fensible: so if their equality be not accompanied with variety, the Verse is dif-agreeable. or asund orders, man shi Lyrick

Lyrick Verse is compos'd commonly of several forts of Feet; because that Verse being delign'd to be Sung in Mulick, the Harmony would not be pleasing, if the difference of Feet, did not afford occasion to the Musici-

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The alliance of Variety and Equality is manifest in Latin-Poely. It is evident, for example, that in a Dastyle equality and vari-ety is to be found; Equality, because the time of two fort Syllables is equivalent to the long; and Variety, because as we have faid, the Ear diffinguishes very well of the difference betwirt one long Syllable and two fhort. Though the Verses be compos'd of different feet, yet all those different feet are equal, becanse the time of their pronunciation is equal.

How the Romans made the Alliance of the Equality and Variety of their Verse distinguisbable.

THE Latins joyned their measures in Verse, by Sections or Retreachment of certain Syllables, of the precedent word, to make a foot, with the Syllables in the beginning of the following word; as for example, Ille meas errare boves, Oc. The

The Syllable as in meas, is a Section; The Syllable as with the Syllable er in the following word errore making a Spondaus. This Section is it that incorporates the measures, and presents them together to the Ear; for the Voice not being used to stop in the middle of a word, and divide it, pronounces the following word swifely, after it has once begun it. But this Section makes the feet to end and begin in the middle of a word; so the Voice that reposes not in those places, joyning the Syllables to each word, joyns the feet at the same time, and links them one within the other. This observation may be more visible by cutting the two following Verfes into such Sections.

Me me-as er rare bo-ves ne-cornis & ipsum
Ludere-qua vel-lem cala-mo per-miss agressi.

The Voice distinguishes each of these Measures (as is said before) by an Elevation at the beginning, and a relaxation at the end; but it binds all these Measures by these Sections. When the Voice has pronounced the Syllable me in meas, it pronounces as next, which makes part of the following Foot, and so joyns the first and the following Measure together, The second Measure is joyn'd with the third; for the Voice not stopping in the middle of the word, Errare, goes on without interruption, (after having said er) to the pronunciation of the end rare, by which means the Ear receives them united and joyn'd together. The third measure is joyn'd in the same manner with the sourth. Verses without Sections do not appear to be Verse, because (as we have said) the equality of Measures that makes the beauty of a Verse, is not distinguishable, unless they be joyn'd, and the Earsensible of their Conjunction. We may read the following words, and not observe that they make a Verse, because they want the aforesaid Section.

Urbem ! fortem | cepit | nuper | fortior | bostin

It remains now only that I speak of the number of Measures required in the composition of Verse. It is clear a Verse requires at least two Measures. We have shewn that it is the equality of these Measures that pleases the Ear; when the said Measures being presented to it, it perceives the equality by comparing them one with another: But, as has been often said, all comparison presupposes at least two terms. If the number of these Measures be too great, it is plain the Ear ought to consider them all together, will be overlay'd and oppress'd with the greatness of their number.

ber. Wherefore a Verse is never compos'd of above fix great Meafores, fuch as the Spondy's and the Dactyles. An Jambiek is capable of eight Feet, because as aforefaid, the Foot which denominates that Verse, passes very quick, and eight of those Measures make but four of the greatery hups so T . Supl son depends by the second standard of Vowel

# VII.

HE French diftinguish the measures of their Verse after another manner than the Romans. The French elevate the Voice at the beginning of the Sentence, and abate it only at the end of a Sentence; wherefore if a measure in French Poefy should begin in the middle of one word, and conclude in the middle of another word, the Voice could not diftinguish by any inflexion, the faid measure as it does in Latin. To put distinction therefore betwixt the megsures, and that the Ear may perceive that diffinction by Elevation of the Voice at the beginning, and depression at the end, each measure ought to contain a perfect sense; which makes the measure large, and so as a French Verse is seldom compos'd of above two measures. which parts it in two equal parts, of which the

the first is call'd Hemistick. So the measures of the French Verse are distinguish'd after a natural way, for naturally and without any Art we raise the Voice at the beginning of an expression with a compleat sense, and we let the Voice sall naturally at the end of a compleat sense. The equality of the measures depends upon an equal number of Vowels; in the French Language all the Vowels are pronounc'd with equal time: It is evident, if two Expressions have an equal number of Vowels, the times of their pronunciations are

equal.

The equality of two measures of which every Verie is compos'd, can give but an indifferent pleasure; so we commonly joyn two Verses together, which makes four Measures: This conjunction is made by the union of the fame fenfe. To render this conjunction the more fenfible, the Verses which comprehend the same sense; are made to Rime, that is, to end both in the same munner. Nothing is more perceptible to the Ear, than the found of words: So Rime that is nothing but repetition of the same found, is very proper for the better diffinction of the measures of Verle. When upon the declention of the Empire, they began to give the fame quantity to felves no farther than for Rime, and to equal the expressions which they ended by those Rimes.

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Rimes. This way of making Verles is very simple and quickly tiresom, unless we be careful to occupy the mind of the Reader by the richness and variety of our thoughts, fo as it may not be fenfible of their simplicity.

I shall shew in few words the Fundamentals of the French Poetry, and to render what I have faid the more intelligible, apply the

fame to the two following Verses.

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Je chante cette guerre . En cruaute feconde, Ou Pharsale jugea del' Empire du Monde. one words of the Loc

The Ear perceives only two Meafures in each of thefe Verses, and diftingishes them by raising of the Voice in the beginning, and the depression of it at the end of each of these Measures, which contain a perfect sense. The four Measures of these two Verses are bound together by the union of the fame sense, and by the Rime. Besides the equality of time, we may observe that the equality of the repose of the Voice (which is repos'd in pronouncing our Verse by equal Intervals ) contributes much to their beauty: I speak not of the different works in Verse, Alexandrin's Sonnets, Stanzas, &c. Those Verses differ among themselves only by the number of their Syllables: Some are compos'd of longer, some of fhorter measures. In some the Rimes are intermixed.

As among the Latins, works are compos'd of different forts of Verse; so among the French they couple short Verse and long Verse together. The Art that is used in these kinds of Works has nothing in it difficult enough

to deserve our explanation.

It is not sufficient to give a Verse its just measure, to have regard to the quantity or time of every Vowel, or to the number of the fame Vowels; Their Concourse, and the Concourse of Consonants with which they are found, augment or lessen their Meafures. Betwixt words of the same quantity, or words that contain an equal number of Vowels, some are rough, some sweet, some fluent, others languishing; wherefore to render the measures of a Verse equal (whether. it be in Latin, or whether it be in French,) we ought to have near as much care to the Confonants as to the Vowels. Appendix 196 is in conditions and a work of the property

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There is a strange sympathy between the Soul and numbers; and what Numbers are.

XTE have feen that a Discourse is agree-V able when the times of the Pronunciation of Syllables which compole it are meafur'd by exact meafures; That the time. (for example) of a Syllable is exactly either the double of treble time of another Syllable. The exactely measures are those which are express'd by numbers. In Geometry all exact Realons are call'd Rationes numeri ad numerum: and therefore the Malters in the Are of Speaking have thought good to call Numeros whatever the Ear perceives of proportion in the pronunciation of a Sentence, whether it be the proportion of the measure of Time, er a just distribution of the Intervals of Respiration. Cicero de Orac. lib. 3. tells us, Numerosum est id in omnibus sonis arque Vocibus, quod babet quasdam impressiones, & quod metiri possumus intervallis equalibus. And Numerosa Oratio in Latin, is the fame as an elegant or harmonious Discourse with us. The Cadence

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of a studied Discounse is likewise called a number. St. Augustin offervesthat our Souls have a sympathy and alliance with these numbers; and that the different motions of the mind do correspond and sollow certain Tones of the Voice, to which the Soul has a secret inclination. Mira animi nostri cum numeris cognatio: Amina animi nostri cum numeris diversitate habent proprios mados in voce, quorum nescio qua acculta samiliaritate connectamur. Longinus that excellent Gritick, tells us that these numbers are instruments very proper to provoke or agitate our Passions.

To fearch into the Gauses of this manvellous fympathy betwire Numbers and our Soul, and how they come to have that power and efficacy upon our Pallions, we must know that the motions of the Mind, do follow the motions of the Animal Spirits; as those Spirits are flow or quick; calm or thrbulent, the Mind is affected with different Passions: The less force is able to obstruct or excite the Animal Spirits, their relistance is but small; and their Levicy is the cante that the least unufual motion determines them; the leaft motion of a found puts them in agitation. Our Body is so dispos'd, that a rough and boysterous found forcing our Spirits into the Muscles, disposes it to flight, and begets an aversion, in the same manner as a frightful Object begets horror by the eye On the other

other side a soft and moderate found, attracts and invites our attention. If we speak loud or hastily to a Beast, it will run from us; by speaking gently we allure and make it tame. From whence we may collect that diversity of Sounds do produce diversity of motions in the Animal Spirits.

Every motion that is made in the Organs of Senie, and communicated to the Animal Spirits, is connext by the God of Nature, to some certain motion of the Soul; Sound can excite passions, and we may say, that every passion answers to some sound or other; which is it that excites in the Animal Spirits, the motion wherewith it is allied. This Connexion is the cause of our Sympathy with Numbers, and that naturally, according to the Tone of the Speaker, our Resentment is different. If a Tone be languishing and doleful, it inspires sadness; if it be loud and brisk, it begets vivacity and courage; some Ayrs are gay, and others melancholy.

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To discover the particular Causes of this Sympathy, and explain how among the numbers, some produce sadness, some joy, we should consider the different motions of the Animal Spirits in each of our Passions. It is easy to be conceived, that if the impression of such a sound in the Organs of hearing is follow'd by a motion in the Animal Spirits like that which they have in a sic of Anger,

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(that is, if they be acted violently and with inequality) it may raise Choler, and continue it. On the contrary, if the impression be doleful and melancholy, if the commotion it causes in the Animal Spirits be seeble and languishing, and in the same temper as commonly in Melancholy, what we have said cought not to seem strange; especially if we restect upon what has been derived to us from many eminent Authors, relating to the strange effects of Musick. Some have affirmed there were persons who played so excellently upon the Flute, that they knew how to accommodate their Ayes to all kind of Maladies, how to ease those who were in pain, delight those who were sad, and recover those who were sick.

#### II.

When Numbers agree with the things that are express'd, the Discourse becomes more significative and lively.

IT is not to be doubted but founds are fignificative, and of power to renew the Udea's of several things: The found of a Trumpet, does it not put us in mind, and provoke us to Combate? Upon this score

Cicero Speaking of Thucidides that excellent Historian, tells us; that when he describes a Battle, he does it with that Emphasis and Elevation of Style, that makes us think our felves present, and that we heard the Trumpet indeed. De Bellicis scribens, concitationis numero videtur bollicum canere. When we hear the noise of the Sea, we imagine it presently), though perhaps it is out of our fight; When s we hear a Man speak that we know - his image presents it felf to our mind, before we fee him with our eyes. In a word, the Idea's of things have a fecret Alliance and Connexion among themselves, and do excite one another. It is not to be question'd but certain Sounds; certain Numbers, and certain s Cadences, do contribute to awake the Images of things with which they have had alliance : and connexion. Virgil is very happy in giving Cadence to this Verse, that alone is fufficient to excite the Idea's of the things he would signifie. Who is it that reading thefe = as well around the hand the words increety. The the Character is the chiral aceived

would not conceive by the quickness and elevation of the Cadence, the precipitation wherewith Dido, the person meant in that place) threw her self upon the Pyle which

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the had preparle so burn her felfi and hen I read this description of Sleep, and a new book

is it ill sonto es printoqu voca bash a asta afo Tempus erat que prima quies monalibus agris Incipit; Co dono divum gratissma serpit s rogu-

Methinks it lulls me, and the fronth fliding of the Verfe gives me an Idea of fleep, that flides gently in my fancy without being perceiv'd. In this Speech of Sinon the Impostor, this doleful number.

Heu! que nunc tellus, inquit, que me equora possunt

Accipere, ant quid jam Misero mibi denique

control oil content of audication of teaming is enough to excite compassion in the Trepair Ofeentimes the manner of delivering a thing, the posture, the habits are more Eloquent and Emphatical than the words. neglected habit, a dejected posture, a forrowful look, prevails more than argument, or intreaty. So the Cadence of Words is many times of more force than the words themfelves. In thort, we cannot doubt of the efficacy of the Tone. A bold Tone begets an Impression of Fear. A sorrowful Tone disposes to compassion. Discourse loseth much of its force when not fultain'd with advantages of Action and Voice: It is an Instru-

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Informent that receives its virtue from the hand that manages it. Words upon Paper, are like a dead body upon the ground: In the mouth of the Speaker, they are lively and vigorous. A Cadence faitable to the things of which we discourse, keeps it (as it were) alive, by preserving the Tone with which it ought to be pronounced.

### what theng that found can most properly agree. Some Author have been very induthious in obliving these preduces. For ex-

The way of joyning our Discourse by Numbers that correspond to the things signisied...

e Conformat & expresses a Cacrent of Late pretends that the Names of things were not given by chance, and that Reason has greater share in the establishment of Language, than Fancy and Caprice. To infline this Opinion he demonstrates by feveral Examples that the first roots from whence the other words were derived, were made of Letters, whose found expres'd after a manner, the thing fignified. It would be hard to defend this Opinion of Plato in all the Redixies, but yet without doubt in all Languages there are words whose founds are fignifications and the beauty of their Names confifts in their correspondence with the thing that . Among

that they fignifies either by the agreeableness of the Cadence, as in the word Boar; or because it is derived from another name that signifies something which resembles it.

He who would joyn his Discourse by numbers conformable to his sense, needs no more than to consult his Ears, and learn from them what is the proper found of every Letter, Vowel, Consonant, Syllable, and with what thing that sound can most properly agree. Some Authors have been very industrious in observing these practices: For example, 'tis observ'd the Consonant F expresses the Wind,

Cum flamma furentibus Austris:

The Confonant S expresses a Current of Water or Blood, and Jani Sangarana

The total of the state of the sense of the s

In like manner is expresses a Tempest, some Lustances Ventos, compestances forozat, of

The Letter L agrees with fost things, some Mollin Interla pingis vaccinin valibles of the Est molis flamma Accidents.

Pirgil ules several M's very happily to express an obstreperous confus'd neiter and a series

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that they fignific, either by the agreeable. Among wtheir Vowels of fome have a clear and firong found; others are weak and obfoure: and we may compose our Discourse as we please of such as are proper for our defignon when we have a mind our Gadence should be weak or strong, clear or obscure.

Particular regard must be had to the mea-

fures of time. Among those Measures the Spondans marches gravely; the Dastylus rowls off something faster; the lambus goes faster than that; and the Trochaus feems to run. and takes its name from a Greek word of that fignification. The Anapastus, in oppoficion to the Dactylus, rowling on pretty fast in the beginning, at the latter end, feems to knock or dath against something that repells it; from whence that also has its name, and is as much as Repercussion. The effects of these measures are all different. He who would accommodate the Cadence of his words to the things of which he treats, ought to select those feet which are most conformable to them. Virgil makes use of Dattyles to express the swiftness of an action,

--- Illi aquore aperto Ante Notos Zephyruma; volant : gemit ultima pulls u Thraca pedum. Ferte cito ferrum, date tela, Jeandite Muros!

is often unperceivable

On the contrary he waves them, and makes afe of Sponde's when Gravity agrees better with this expression. ते. १००१ वर्षा निर्माण के तथा है। विकास समित्र के तथा है।

- Magnum Jovis incrementum. 1 342 911 Tanta molis erat Romanam condere gentem: Illi inter se magna vi brachia sollunt.

Cicero reports that Pythagoras finding a company of young Bully's forcing violently into a civil House, made them quit their wench that was linging to put Sponde's into her Song. Pythagoras, concitates ad vim pudica domni inferendam, juvenes, justa mutare in Spondeum modes tibicina, compescuit. The Spondeus and the Dadylus are the two largest feet, therefore Hexameters of all Verse are the most Majestick, and the Sponde at the end makes us pronounce it firong, by fullaining our Voice. The Anapastus which is at the end of the Pentameter, causes the Voice to fall; and therefore Pentameters are used to express complaints and such like, where the Voice is falling perpetually, and its course often interrupted. The Peneamerer and Hexamerre are joyn'd, that the weakness of the one may be supported by the strength of the other. The lambus is a foot to fleet, that the Cadence of a Verle compos'd of them,

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is often unperceivable. It palles with fuch fwiftnels, that that kind of Verfe is fearce diffinguishable from Profe: For which reason the Lambas, is used commonly in Plays, and pieces for the Spage, where it is requisite the style be natural, and little differing from Profe.

of a Discourse imports or rough? To make is farooth we must avoid the concourse of Vowels. which causes chafais and void places in our Discourse, and hinders its equality and union. The Concourfe of Vowels, and the Concourse of Consonants (particularly of those which are tharp, and those which do not accord) do make a Discourse rough and uneven. A rough Discourse agrees with things that are rough and unpleasant, Rebus acrocibus conveniunt verba audien afpera. To deferibe great things, we must use big words, words that make a noise, and fill the mouth. The Cadence of a mean Discourse oughe to be neglected, and languishing; for this cause is it requilite that all the terms of which it makes use, should have a feeble weak Sound.

The longer the Periods are, the Aronger is the action of the Voice: when it concerns us to speak forrowfully, our expressions ought to be short and abrupt. If the action be vehement; if we be to add weight to our words (as those who would make them-

themselves formidable, do commonly make a great noise) we must make use of long Periods, which cannot be pronounc'd but with a tone more than ordinarily strong.

But no more of this; it would be loss of time to give particular Rules for each number. It is not to be acquir'd but by long habit, and strong application, which animates and imboldens us in our Compositions; and it is naturally that we make choice of rough or smooth terms according to the things we would express. I would not have an Author perplex himself to find out a significative Gadence, as he would do to find out a leak in a Ship. I confess freely, 'tis by accident when he succeeds; 'Fis sometimes impossible, and we ought not to ingage rashly in a thing where the success is subject to many accidents.

In appearance the greatest part of Poets were ignorant of this accord betwixt numbers and things. They aimed at nothing in their Verse but a certain softness that stage'd and grew languid by degrees. With them the joyful and the afflicted; the Master and the Man, spake in the same tone. A Clown spoke as quaintly as a Courtier, and yet those Poets have their admirers, who think they savour Virgil exceedingly, when they repeat any of the rough and uneven Verses wherewith he sometimes express'd mean things, and say he did it on purpose to make the softness.

formers and gentlenels of the other more fensible. They do not relish the excellent Cadence of this Verse, where he describes the faint weak stroke that old Prismus gave to Neoprolemus, which is weak and feeble as it ought to be:

Sic fatus Senior, telumq; imbelle sine ictu

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I am alham'd to use the authority of two fuch great Malters, to evince a truth that has to little need of proof: Yet Cicero and Quincilian both do highly commend these who have that felicity of accommodating their numbers and their fenfe. Historians, Poets, and Orstors, bave studiously endeavoured for this Beauty. Ulpian in his Commentaries upon the Orations of Demosthenes, observes, that as oft as that Prince of the Greek Orators spoke of King Philips Progress, he stops the pronunciation of his Discourse, and intersperses several little particles to fignifie how flowly King Philip advanc'd in his Conquests. Quoties tardos Philippi progressas voluit oftendere, tardam, multis interjettis particulis. orationem faciebat

As for Virgil, it is in that he may be faid to be unimitable, and that no Poet has hither to come near him. We need not produce our Examples, for any one may find them in his

Book:

Book: and yet to better our Observation of the excellence of that Poer, I shall represent some few of the best places that offer themselves to my Memory. In the first of his Enead's, where he brings in Neprune speaking, he gives him words with a Cadence exalted, and suiting well with the Majesty of the Speaker.

Tantane vos tenuit generis fiducia vestri? Jam calum, terramy; meo sine Numine venti Miscere, & tantas audetis tollere Moles.

Mark the pomp of these softowing Verses wherewith he flatters the Emperor.

Nascetur pulchra Trojanus Origine Casar, Imperium Oceano, samam qui rerminet astris.

No Man can read his description of Polyphrmus, that horrible and deform'd Gyant, without impressions of horror and fear.

Monstrum, borrendum, informe, ingens, cui

As also this following:

Short

Tela inter media, atq; berrentes Marte Latinos.

The Cadence of this Verle---- Procumble humi bos, imitates the fall of that great Beaff. This Verle, Quadrupedante putrem fonite quatir ungula campum, exprelles the ardour and fury of a high metted Horse. Could Sadnels be better express'd than by this so often interrupted Cadence?

O Pater, O hominium, divumq; atorna Potestas, O lux Dardania, O spes sidissima Tencrum.

The following Veries are full of the forrow of a person in afflicton for the loss of his Friend,

Te amice requivi

Conspicere, &c. Implerunt rupes, flerunt Rhodopeia arces.

Dionysius Halicarnasseus, a Writer of the Roman Antiquities, and several Treatiles of Rhetorick, shews that Homer frequently used that Connexion, and chose his numbers proper to his matter; he instances in several Verses, and resects upon them with great judgment and elegance. He tell us, that in his Verse Homer had a way of making his Vowels clash and interfere, to stop the course of our pronunciation. To express the length of the time that Sisyphus imploy'd in

their Stops and Notches, to fignific thereby the relitance of every Stone, by reason of their own natural weights, and their dashing against every other stone: And in short, that we might not think it meer chance that his numbers answer'd to his matter, he shows how the Cadence is quite different from the next Verse, where he describes the fall of Sisyphus his Stone how it tumbles from the top to the bottom, after it had been carry'd up with so much difficulty and pain. The Cadence is very swift; and the words seem to rowl and tumble with the same precipitation as the Stone.

It is not to be imagin'd that writing of all forts of things it is necessary the founds of our words should be so expressive. This exactness is not necessary every where, but only where our Judgment is most obvious, and where our design to work upon our Auditors is greatest. Besides, this Cadence must be natural; we must not subvert the Order of Nature, transpose words, retrench a good expression, insert an ill, to give a just Cadence to our Discourse. How precious soever a Discourse may be, whose numbers express the things as well as the words; yet great care is to be taken that we do not prefer that beauty to the more solid just-ness of Argument, and greatness of thought.

Chaptes V. The Art of Speaking.

Our Mind cannot attend two different things at one time, and therefore it happens often that whilst we are busie in concenting our Senfes, we displease our Reason. Sense is the Noblest part of Discourse, indeed it's very Soul; and that Soul is it which delerves our principal care; and an of the and and and TO DOLLARS SAIR STOP FOR BUSINESS

to appreciate the subject of the state of the or there is the sale of all and the delivery

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Cadence is very faith a wood the words tocor to row and comble with the fame needing. execution is not not detected or de la present pour where our, redenient is most povious, and where our steam to work upon our BHT 1 is straight - Berries, this Cadence Star of Narra transpose words, retreated expression information to give a sacret to our Dicource May pre-Sever a Olf-ourfe may be, whole somyet great care is to be tagen that we do not merce that be mey to the more fold juste a del Argue in, and stemmes of the sent

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#### THE

# Fourth PART

OF THE

## ART of SPEAKING.

#### CHAP. L

I.

We must make choice of a Stile suitable to the Matter of which we treat.

What Style is.

Thoughts, we ought to use among our Terms such as represent their true lineaments, and their natural Colours, that is to say, such as awaken in the Minds of other people, the same Ideas, and the same Ideas, and the same Sentiments as we have

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have in ours. In this fourth Part we shall make it appear, that according to the difference of the matter, we must make use of a peculiar manner of Writing; and that as every thing requires convenient words, so an entire subject requires a style that may be proportionable to it. The Rules we have given for Elocution, regard no farther than (if we may so say) the members of Discourse; that of which we are now speaking relates

to the whole Body.

Style, in its primitive fignification, is taken for a kind of Bodkin wherewith the Ancients writ upon Bark, and little Tables covered with Wax: To fay who is the Author of fuch a Writing, we fay 'tis fuch a Man's hand, whereas, the Ancients said it was such a Man's Style. In process of time, the word Style came to be apply'd only to the manner of expressing: When we say such a Discourse is Cicero's Style, we intend Cicero used to express himself in that manner. Before I decermine with what Style we are to treat of feveral things that are the subjects of com-mon Discourse, what ought to be the Style of an Orator, an Historian, or Poet, who would delight, or instructs I thought it not impertinent to enquire into the different Expressions wherewith several Authors express themselves in the same Language, and who writing on the lane Subjects endeavour the fame.

fame Style. Some are diffuse, and though they pretend to be succinct, half their words may be retreached without prejudice to the sense: Others are dry, flat, barren, and what Effort soever they may make to beautifie and adorn things, they seave them half-naked; The Style of some is strong; in others it is weak and languishing; in some it is rugged, in others it is smooth. In a word, as Faces are different, so are the ways of Writing, and it is the cause of this Difference of which we are going to enquire.

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The Qualities of the Style depend upon the Qualities of the Imagination, Memory, and Judgment of the Writer.

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W HEN the outward Object strikes upon our Sense, the motion it makes is communicated by the Nerves to the very Centre of the Brain, whose substance being soft, receives thereby certain prints and impressions. The Alliance or Connexion betwint the Mind and the Body, is the cause that the ideas of Corporal things are annex'd to these Prints; so that when the Prints of an Object, (for Example of the Sun) are im-

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imprinted in the Brain, the Idea of the Sun prefents in felf to the mind; and as oft as the Idea of the Sun is prefented to the Mind, the Impressions cous'd by the presence of the Sun, begin to open and dilate. We may call these Prints the Images of the Objects. The power the Soul has to form upon the Brain the Images of things that have been perceived, is call'd Imagination, which word fignifics both that power of the Soul, and the

Images that it forms. The to the spulle at of the

The Qualities of a good Imagination are very necessary to Well-speaking; for Discourse is nothing but a Copy of those things of which we are to speak, form'd before by the Soul. If the Original be confused, the Copy must be so also; if the Original be not, the Copy cannot be like. The form, the clearnefs, the good order of our Ideas, depend upon the clearness and distinction of the Impressions which the Objects make upon our Brain : To that it cannot be doubted but the Quality of the Style must depend upon the Quality of the Imagination. The substance of the Brain has not the fame qualities in all Heads, and therefore we are not to wonder if the ways of Speaking be different in each Anthon, which the broad bread a tribed

Words read on heard leave their imprefitons in the Brain; as well as other Objects, for at we commonly think of Words and

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Things at the same time; the Impression of Words and things which have been opened in Company at feveral times, are linked together in fach fore that the Things nepresent themselves to the mind with their Names: when this falls out, we fay the Memory is happy, and its Felicity confilts only in the cannels wherewith the prints of words and the things to which they are hinked, d open themselves at the fame time; that is to fayor when the name of the thing follows the thought we have of it. When the Momory is unfaithful in reprelenting the proper terms of the things committed to it, we cannot speak justly; we are forced either to fay nothing, or make of of the first words that occur, though perhaps they are not proper to express what we would fay. Happy and just Expression is the effect of good Memory

In short, it is manifest the Qualities of the Mind are the cause of the Difference observed among all Authors. Discourse is the image of the Mind; we show our Humours and juclinations in our Words before we think of it. The Minds then being different, what wonder if the Style of every Author has a character that distinguishes it from all others, though all use the same Terms and Expressions in the same Language.

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The advantage of a good Imagination

A Good Imagination contributes particular larly to the clearnes and facility of Discourse. Tis easie to speak of things that we fee, their prefence guides and re-gulates our Discourse; but Imagination supplies us with things. A Man whose Imagina tion is easie, represents to himself whatever he is to fay: He fees clearly before the eyes of his mind; so that expressing by his words, the things as present to him, his Difcourfe is clear, and the things do range and take their places of themselves in his Difourfe. In the Imagination there are two things; the first is Material; the second Spiritual; the Material is the prints caused by the impressions the Objects make upon the fense. The Spiritual is the Perception or Knowledge the Soul has of thefe prints, and the power we have to renew or open them when once they are made. We find the quire here only into the Material part of cannot explain exactly these prime without ingaging my felf in Philosophical Disquisitions remote from my Subject I shall only fay these prints are made by the Animal Spirits, which being the purest and most subtile

from the Heart to the Brain: These Spirits are uncertain in their course. When a Nerve is stretched, they sollow its motion, and by their Current they draw leveral Figures in the Brain, according as the Nerves are differently stretched or contracted; but which way soever these Figures are made, it is plain, the cleanness of the Imagination depends upon the temperament of the substance of the Brain, and the quality of the Animal Spirits.

# Spirits move with more codes and show with cold, the Spirits of VII we land retained at and cold in the course of the beneficiation is delly kind.

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bile The Qualities of the Sabstance of the Brain, and the Animal Spirits, are necessary to make a good Imagination.

In Iguara drawn upon the Surface of the Materileave no Prints, because they are immediately sill'd up. Figures ingrav'd upon Marble are seldom perfect, because the hardness of the Matter gives too much resistance to the Chisself. This gives as to undenstand that the substance of the Brain ought to have certain Qualities, without which is cannot receive exactly the Images of such things as the Soul imagines. If the Brain be too moist, and the little Threads and Fibres which

cannot retain the Foldings and Impressions given them by the Animal Spirits, and by consequence the chings drawn there are confos'd, and like those we endeavour to draw upon Mud: If the Brain be too they, and the Fibres too hard, 'tis impossible all the strokes of the Objects should leave their impressions, which makes every thing seem dry and meagre to men of that Temper. I speak not of the other Qualifies of the Brain, of its Heat or its Coldness: when it is hot, the Spirits move with more ease; and when it is cold, the Spirits are flow and retarded in their course, the Imagination is dull, and nothing to be imagin'd but with trouble.

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The Animal Spirits ought to have three Qualities; they ought to be plentiful, hot, and equal in their motion: A Brain whose Animal Spirits are exhausted, is Void of Fancy Plenty of Spirits makes the Imagination fruitful: The Prints drawn by the Spirits in their course being large, while the source that produces them is full, they represent all things easily, and under multitude of Figures which supply us amply with matter for Diffeourse, those who have not this Percitely sopply do them by abundance of Spirits, are commonly day. Things imprinting themselves but weakly upon their imagination, they appear little and meagre, and day to their these printings themselves but weakly upon their imagination, they appear little and meagre, and day to their

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their Discourse expressing nothing but what passes in their imagination, is dry and neagre and jejung. The first are great Praters; they speak nothing but Hyperboles, every thing appears great to them. The others are low, mean, and insiple in their Discourse. The Imagination of the last thing greater; the imagination of the last lesses them as much.

lessens them as much.
When there is liest enough, and the Animal Spirits are warm, quick, and in great quantity, the Tongue is not infliciently nimble to express all that is represented in the Imaginstion; for belides that abundance (which is the first Quality requisite to the Spirits) forming the Images of things in their full Dimensions; the second Quality (which is Heat) rendring the Animal Spirits lively and quick, the Imagination is full in an instant of differing Images to Those who possess these two Qualities, do immediately, without thinking, find more Matter upon any Subject proposid than others after long Meditation. A cold Spirit cannot move the Imagination without Helps. Experience tells us, that want of Heat is a great Obstruction to Eloquence : In violent Pollion where the Animal Spirits are extraordinarily flirid, the dryest Temper'd Men deliver themselves with case, the most barren want no Words ... And this Diversity of Images in the Imagination, causes a plea-K 2 fant

fant variety of Figures and Motions that follow those of the Imagination. The Hotel ob

That the Imagination be clear and unconfus'd, the motion of the Animal Spirits ought to be equal. When their course is irregular, sometimes flow, and sometimes swift, the images that they imprint are without proportion; as in fick People, where the motion of the whole Mais of Blood is irregular. Those who are Gay and of a Sanguine Complexion, express themselves gracefully and readily. In those Tempers the Animal Spirits move quick and equal, and their Imagimation being clear, their Discourse being but a Copy of the Images drawn in it, must meceffarily be clear and diffine.

I be fame may about it done in mories care their overothing but impr

Words stonwing housing in their Marks The Advantage of a good Memory

HE Goodness of the Memory depends upon Nature and Exercise, seeing it consists only in the easiness wherewith the Prints of receiv'd Objects are renew'd; by Confequence the Memory cannot be good, if the substance of the Brain be not proper to receive those Draughts, or Prints of things, and retain them; and when those Prints (which

(which cannot always be expanded and open) do not open themselves with ease. Exercise adds much to the Memory; Things folded. The Fibres of the Brain do harden and grow Riff, if that fliffness be not prevented by frequent folding them, that is to fay, by often repeating what we have learn'd already; and continual endeavours to fuck in more. Wemust fill our Memories with proper Terms, and contrive that the Images of things and their Names be of fo Strict Coherence, that the Images and Expressions may present themfelves together. An excellent Person has refembled the Memory to a Printing-Press; a Printer who has none but Gothick Characters, prints nothing but in Gothick Characters, let the Treatife be never fo good. The fame may be faid of those whose Memories are full of nothing but improper Words; having nothing in their Minds buc Gothick Molds, and their Thoughts clothing themselves with Expressions from thence, nowonder if they always assume a Gothick Air and Fashion. and the West of the

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Qualities of the Mind nesessary to make a Man Eloquent.

That we have hitherto faid relates only to the Corporal Organs : The Qualities of the Mind are more confiderable and important. Reason must regulate the Advantages of Nature, which are rather Defects than Advantages, when we understand not how to use them. He that has a fertile Imagination, but knows not how to cull and pick his Expressions, loses himself, and runs out into long and tedious Discourses. Among the moltitude of things that he delivers, half of them are improper; and those which are good, are stifled and incommoded by these that are impertinent. If his Imagination be hat as well as fertile, and he follows the motion of his Hear, he falls into thousands of other Faults; his Discourfe is nothing bot a continuation of Figures; the feldom speaks without Passion, but for the most part without Reason. Being hasty and hot, the least thing excites him, and fets him on fire; without respect to Civility, without confidering the Merits of the Caufe, he flys out into a Fury, and foffers himfelf to be hurry'd away by the Imperes of his Imagination, whose

whole Irregularity and Extravagance is difcover'd in his Words.

To enjoy the Sovereign Perfection of Eloquence, the Mind must be adorn'd with these three Qualities: First, A Capacity to discover abundantly all that may be faid upon any propos'd Subject. A narrow Apprebension is incapable of giving things their

juft Latitude and Extent.

The fecond Quality confifts in a certain fagacious Vivacity, that strikes immediately into things, rummages them to the bottom, and cleanles every Corner: These whose Minds are heavy and dall, do not penetrate intothe Folds or Intricacies of an Affair, and therefore can only four off what they find

at the top.

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The third Quality is exactness of Judgment, and that regulates both the other Qualities. A good Judgment chuses and picks, it stops not at every thing presented by the Imagination, bot difcerns and difcriminates betwixt what is fit to be faid, and what is fit to be pass'd: It dilates not upon things according to the bigness of their Images, but amplifies Discourse, or contracts it, as the Thing and Reason require; it relies not upon first Idea's, but judges, whether things are as great as they appear, and felects convenient Exprefions according to the light of Reason rather than the report of Imagination, which like mag-

magnifying Olaffes do many times reprefent things greater than they are: It flops the Idea's where they are too light; it excites and chares them when they are cold: In a word, it uses and improves many Advantages that Nature has given it; it prevents Faults, and endeavours to correct them.

The good Qualities of the Mind are not always concomitant with the Qualities of a good Imagination, and happy Memory; which canles a great difference betwint Speaking and Writing well. Oftentimes those who write well upon Premeditation, speak ill Extempore: To write well there is no need of a prompt, hot, and fertile imagination. Unless our Wit be very bad indeed, upon ferious Medication we hall find what we ought, and what we might fay upon any Subject propos'd; those who speak easily and without Premedi-tation, receive that Advantage from a certain Fertility and Fire in their Imagination, which Fire is extinguish'd by Repole and cold Con-templation in a Study.

The Quaffiles of the Mind are preferrable to the Qualities of the Body; the Elequence of those endu'd with these last Qualities, is like a fiall of Gun-powder, gon in a moment; this Eloguence makes a great noise, and flathes for a time, but tis quickly spent and forgot. A Treatile composed with Judgment retains its Beauty, and the ofther it is

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read, the more it is admired. This is obferv'd by Taciens in the Fourth Book of his Annals, where he speaks of one Halerius, a Famous Orator whill he liv'd, but when dead, his Writings were not fo much admired : bis Talent lay in speaking well Es tempore, not in Writing, having more Flame in his Imagination than Judgment in his Mind. A Work that is folid and elaborate (favs Taciens with reflection upon the Eloquence of Halerine) lives, and is efteem'd after the Death of the Author; whereas the Softness and Flashiness of Hulerim's Eloquence expir'd with him. Quintus Halerius, Eloquentie quand vixit celebrate, monumenta ingenii ajus hand perinde retinentur. Scilicet impetu meger quam cura vigebat : utque meditatio aliorum & labor, in posterum valescit, sic Halerii canarum illud, & profluens, cum ipfo fimul excinitum efter and the transfer of the laws in the well in a not a mar by the fall has speed of our or

### scyle is the whome of Incidence and more required in their littly and therefore were

Diversity of Inclinations alter the Styles:

Every Climate, every Age, hath its

Style.

Discourse is the Character of the Mind; our Humour describes it self in our Words, and every Man incogitantly follows the

the Style to which his Disposition naturally carries him to We know not only the Humone of a Man by his Style, but also his Country: Every Climate hath its Style. The Afaricks whose Imaginations are warm and full of Images, speak nothing but by Allegories, Similitudes, and Metaphors; by which means their Style is obscure to those whose Imaginations are not so lively and prompt. The Northern People have not that Heat, and therefore speak more plain and intelligibly.

Antient Rhetorleians diftinguish into three Forms the different Styles recommended to the People by their different Inclinations. The first Form is the Afinisk, high, pompous, and magnificent. The People of when have been always ambitions, their Discomfe expresses their Humour, they are Lovers of Luxery, and their Words are accompanied with feveral vain Ornaments, that a fevere Humour cannot approve. The second form of Style is the Actick: The Achenians were more regular in their Lives, and therefore were more exact and modest in their Discourse. The third is the Rhodian Style; the Rhodians had a couch of the Ambition and Luxury of the Afiaticks, and the Modesty of the Arbenians; their Style characterizes their Homour, and keeps a medium betwixt the liberty of the Afarick, and the refervedness and rerention of the Arick of yarre bus sebea le

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Divertity of Styles proceeds again from a nother Caufe, that is to fay, from the Precogitancy or Preoccupation wherewith we speak or write; when we have taken a Fancy to any way of Writing, we make it our Model, and endeavour to imitate it. A Style A lamode is follow'd by the whole World; but as we change our Modes, and those who in-vented them, finding them common, contrive new, to distinguish themselves from the People, there is a perpetual Change, and every Age has its peculiar Modero A good Critick gueffes the carle when an Author writ; by oblineing his way ? The Style of each Age gives his to abderfland the Inclinations of those who sived mother Age of Commonly the Styleris dry, rugged; without Ornament in those Ages where the People were ferious and regular Luxury was increduc'd during the Licenticular of Governments, in Land guages as well as Habite, in Books as well as Convenies Addres and Frences sembling to the natural order of PoliceIndestodelour

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The Matter, of which we treat aught to determine as the chair of ann Styles

HE Matter is to direct in the Electiton of our Seyle. Noble Expressions
that render a Busia. Magnificent, a great
Words that fift up the Mouth, appears
things great, and argue fireagal of Judgment
in the Berson who speaks in to dublime a
way: But is the Matter it salf be introctely,
if it be great only in the Imagination of the
Author, bit Magnificence turns to his Prejudice; and shows the weakness of his Judgment,
in putting a Value pon that is only worthy of
Contempt. Figures, and Tropes, unknown
to the natural order of Discourse, discover
likewise the motion of the Heart; but that
these Figures may be just, the Passion, of
which they are the Character, ought to be
reasonable. There is nothing comes nearer
Folly, then to be transported without Capse;
to put ones self into a heat for a thing that
ought to be argu'd coolly; each Motion has
its Figures: Figures may enrich and imbelish

a Style, but unless the Motion that causes them be laudable, the Figures cannot be worthy of Commendation

I fay then, 'tis the Matter that regulates the Style: When things are great, and cannot be considered wishout great Emotion, is is necessary that the Style which deferibes them be sprightly, full of motion, and inriched with Figures and Tropes, and Metaphors. If in the subject of which we sreat there be nothing extraordinary: if we can confider it without passion, the Style is to be plain. The Art of Speaking having no peculies master, every thing subject to our thoughts being matter for Discourse, there are infinite divertity of Styles, as the forts of thing of which we may speak are infinite: Yet the Masters of that Art have reduced the peculiar matter for Writing under three kinds; Sublime, Mean, or Indifferent. There are three Kinds of Styles answerable to these three Kinds of Matters; the Lofty, the Plain, and the Moderate: Sometimes their Styles are called Characters, because they denote the quality of the matter that is the subject of the Discourse. I shall in this Chapter huddle together the Rules to be observed in each of thefe three Characters. When a Work is undertaken, we always propose a general idea; for Exemple, when an Oracor makes a Pane-gyrick upon some Prince, the design is to magevan

magnific and illustrate the Actions of that Hiro, to advence him to fach an Elevation of Glory, that he may be looked apon as the melt accomplished and most venerable perfor of his Sex. An Advocate pleading the cause of a Pumper, with be contented if he perforables his Auditory that the perford whose defence he has undertaken it algood Many an inhotent Man, and one that behaves himself its his sphere like a very good Chizen. That which I shall say of these three Characters, relates to our prudence in carrying on our Work, so as we never suffer the general sides we have proposed to our selves to be out of again to easie still a carrying on our spanish our proposed to our selves to be out of again to easie still a carrying on our selves to be out of again to easie still a carrying on our selves to be out of again to easie still a carrying on our selves to be out of again to easie still a carrying on our

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Pollor being to draw the Picture of his Priend Antigonia, who had lost his left by in the Wars, drew him in Polite with the half-face that had no deformity! We must imitate this Artifice: Let the Subject of which we design to give a losty Idea, be never so Noble, its Nobleness will never be seen, unless we have the skill to present it with the best of its faces: the best of things have

have their imperfections, and yet the least new blemish discovered in what we valued before, above our esteemy and perhaps exting guishes it quite. After we have spoke at housand fine things, if among them all we shuffle in but one Expression that is mean or impertinent, some people (and those Wits) are so ill-natured as to regard nothing but that impertinence, and to sorget the rest. We must likewise be careful not to say my thing in one place that may contradict or interfere with what we have said in another. We have an Example of this Fault in Hesiod, who in his Poem called the Buckler, speaking of Proserpine, says that she had a sitely burnow runding at her Nose: Longings observes well, that Hesiod's design being to make her terrible, this Expression did not suit, but made her rather oditos and contemptible.

We are likewise to imitate the address of another Painter no less samous than Apelles, and that is Zenzie, who being up represent Helen as fair in colours as the Greek Poets had done in their Verse, he cook the natural touches of all the Beauties of the City, where he drew it, uniting in her Picture all the Graces that Nature had distributed in a great number of handsome Women. When a Poet is Master of his Subject, and can inlarge or retrench as he pleases; if he designs a defeription (as sor example of a Tempest) he

its feriously to consider what happens in a Pempelby sud to examine all the Gircum-Rances, that he may felect and make use of what he thinks most extraordinary and for-Dilzingracile mont success it with market in

difference this per winds has isomeration and property Comme P on wais les flots Souleves, par l'Orage, Pondre fin un paiffaen qui s'oppose a leur rage, Le vent avec fineur dans les vailes frequit, Le mer blanchir de conne, Ordain autoin gemit: Le muselos erouble, que son art abandonne. Crait voir dans chaque flot, la mort qui l'envini raine. Januar me simplemis in plantes so

ve depost a blod she femiliar fraction of fra-As when by Storm inrag'd, the Sea does beat, And dash against th' Vessel that refilts its heat. The Wind begets a trembling in the Sails, The Sea grows white with foam, the Air rails; The Seaman troubled, his Arr loft, each Wave That wimbles next, he looks will be his, Grave. another Raintee no left famous than Abellet.

an Our expressions aught to be Nobless and able to give that lofty diten which we delign matter, be not equal in all its parts, yet we are to observe a certain liniformics in our Seples the a Palacet there are apartments for inferior. Officers mat well as choice who are near the King a there are Rooms of State id there are Stables, the Stables are not built with the Magnificence of the Rooms

of State, and yet there is a futtableness and proportion betwise them, and every part fliens its relation to the whole. In a lofcy Scyle, though the expressions ought to correspond with the matter, yet we must speak of in-different things with an Air above their condition, because our delign being to give a high idea of the thing, tis fit all that depend upon it should wear its Livery, and do it honour. An ambitious vain Writer to shew the magnificence of his Style in all that he writes, foilts in great and prodigious things, not confidering whether the invention of his Prodigies be confiftent with Reafon. The Greeks call this vanity, requiredly! Horas in his Abridgment of the Roman Hillory, fut-nimes us with a confiderable example of this Teratologic. His business was to have told us, as Sextus Rufus has done, That the Reman Empire was exended as far as the Sea, by the Con-quest which Decimus Bruens made of Spain, Hispanias per decimum Brutum obtinumus, O nique ad Guder & Oceanum pervenimus. Horus goes higher, and tells us, Decimus Brutus ali quanto lacios Gallacos, atque omnes Gallacia pol pulos, formidatumque milicibus flumen oblivionis, peregratoque victor Oceani lictore, non prius figna conversit, quam cadentem in Maria folem, bbrutumque aquit ignem, non sine quodam Sacrile-gii meta & horrore deprehendit, Ruffing up his Natration with Prodigies. He fanises thee

the Roman having carried their Gonquells to the farthest parts of Span, trembled at the light of the Sea, as if they had thought themfelves criminal for beholding with prefump-tuons eyes the Sun when it was fetting, and as in were quenching its flames in the waters

of the Oceans is called Inflation, because the namer of speaking things in so incongruous and extravagant a way, is like the talle corand in good liking, when he is only puffed up with Water and Wind. This inblime Charafter is hard to attain ; 'tis not every one can raise bimiels above the common pitch, at least continue his flight: It is easy to fly out into great Expressions, but then it those great Expressions be not sustained by greatness of matter, and replete with solid and serious things, they are but like Stiles that shew the Smalloes and defect of the Party at the same time they exale him.

By the Engine of a Phrais we may horit up a triffe, and place it very high, but it quickly relapfes and by its elevation is exposed to their eyes, who perhaps would never have confidered it, had it remain'd in its primitive objective. This vanity of making every thing, we mention feem great, of cloathing out. discourse in Magnificent Language, makes is suspicious to persons of judgment, that the

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Author has a mind to conceal the meanness of his thoughts under the vain pretention of Grandeur. And Quintilian tells us, there are others who by the creeping humility of their Style affect to be thought Copious and Lofty.

Little People to thew themselves with advantage, delight to stand on tip-tae; those who write most weakly, use most Rhodomontades. This inflation of Style, this affectation of Words that makes a noise, are rather Arguments of Weakness than Force. Que quisque ingenia minus valet, box se magic attollere & dilarare constur; & statura breves in digitor erigunum, & plara infirmi minantur; nam & tumidos, & corruptos, & tinnulos, & quocunque also Cacoxelia genere peccantes, certum habea, non virium sed infirmitatis vitio laborare.

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HE Simple and Plain Character has its difficulties: Tistrue, the choice of things is not to difficult, because they ought to be common and ordinary: But the plain Character is dissicult, because the greatness of things dazles and conceals the saults of a Writer. When we speak of things rare and extra-

we make use of Metaphors. extraordinary, Cultom not affording us expressions of sufficient strength. Discourse may be inriched with Figures; because we feldom hear of great things without fentiments of admiration, Love, Hatred, Fear, or Hope. On the concrary, when common and ordinary things are to be mentioned, we are constrain'd to imnot the liberty to ale Pigures in our Discourse, which cannot be forborn without difficulty: For, in a word, those who are Writers cannot be ignorant that the liberty of using Pigures laves them the labour of fludying for proper words, which are not always at haud, and that it is called to speak by Figures than to speak Naturally.

When I call'd this Character Simple, I isttended not to fignific by that Epithete, meanmels of exprellion that is never good, and always to be avoided. The matter of this Style has no elevation; and yet it ought not to be vile and contemptible. It requires not the pomps and ornaments of Eloquence, nor to be drely'd up in magnificent clasits. But yet it abhors an abject way of Expression, and requires that its Habits be cleanly and near its magnificant and meaning and ाटवा में में के के का मान के किया है। के किया के किया है। किया है। किया है। किया है। किया है। किया है। किया है

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T Shall fay little of this middle Character L becanse it is sufficient to know that it conletts in a Mediocrity that ought to participa of the grandent of the follime Character, and of the implicity of the plain Character. Vincil has given us examples of all these three Characters; his Eneads are in the fublime Character, where he speaks of nothing but Combats, Sieges, Wars, Princes, and Hero's In them all is magnificent, both fentiments and words. The grandeur of his Expression is fuitable to the grandeur of the Subject . Every thing in that Poem is extraordinary; he uses no terms profan'd by the custom of the Populace. When he is oblig'd to name common things, he does it by fome Trope on Circumlocution. For example, when he speaks of Bread, he expresses it by Ceres, who among the Pagans was the Goddels of Corn. The Character of his Ealognes is imple. They are she pherds who speak and entertain themselves with Love with Dialogues of their Sheep, and their Fields after a plain simple manner, fuitable to the discourses of Shepherds.

His Georgicks are of the middle Character: The matter of which they treat is not fo forblime blime as the matter of his Eneads; he speaks not there of Wars and Combats, and the establishment of the Roman Empire, which are the Subject of his Eneads; nor are his Georgicks so plain and simple as his Eclogues. In his Georgicks he searches into the most occult and remote causes of Nature. He discovers the mysteries of the Roman Religion; he mingles them with Philosophy. Theology, and History of his Breaks and the simplicity of his Breaks.

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Styles peculiar to certain matters as the Styles of Pecta, Orators, and bliftorisms: But it is not amile to premile certain Observations relating to the Qualities that are common to all Styles. Among those who use the same Style, some are soft, others more strong: Some are gay, others more severe. I shall shew

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them in what these Qualities consist, and how they may be attributed to a Soyle; when they are convenient as the quality of the subject.

The first of these Qualities is calinos: A Style is faid to be easy when things are delivered with such clearness and perspiculty, that the mind is put to no crouble to con ceive them. Thus we fay tohe declenion of alcend. To give this calinels to a style, but mufilleave nothing to the Reader's deverall nations we must preventiall doubts, and remove every thing that may people it. In a word, we must deliver things in their necesfary latitude and extent, that they may be cally comprehended for finall things are not forvisible no the Byel. A have faid in the precedent Book how Cadence is to be sweet. ned; and pronounciation in discourse The calinels of the number contributes frangely to the calinels of the Style. This cannels may have feveral degrees: The Style of an Author that writes with extraordinary cafe, is faid to be wender and delicate. I will not for get in this place that there is nothing contributes mone to the formers and entirely of a Style, than the caneful inferting in their due places all the panciculars necessary to make the confequence and connexion of the parts of discourse perceptible and plain. agon tim tind, enter engine corbin-procedured by

The second Quality is Seconder, and it is directly opposite to the diameris Arikes the mind holdly, and forces at untioned To ren-der a Style strong, we multiple short expressi-ous that signific much, and excite many lake's, The Greek and Latin Authors are full of these frong expressions. They are more rare among the Branch, who chuse rather to have sheir Discouts natural, free, and with some kind of diffusions for which reason we are not to wonder that the French in their Trandations of Greek and Latin Authors are more copions and verbole than the Originals, the cause they have not those short and compact Expressions; the Grains of our lianguage chooling rather to explain and diffintangle those lides's which the Greek and Latin Gords prefling his readines to Ducolays very nobly in Greek in and it wird war The Datin Tran-Dation renders it, Ego enim jam deliber, To turn it into French, it must be done thus, Gar pour may, je fuis comme une victime qui a dejs reast afterfor pour erra factifice. For home as a victim that has already received afterfor to be factified. All these words do but explain the Idea's given by the word anisopen when we consider its force with necessary attention.

The third Quality renders a Style pleafant and florid. The Quality depends in part upon the first, and ought to be preceded by \*

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though an intention. Tropes and Figures are the flowers of a Style, Propes give a feafible conception of the most abstracted thoughts; they are pleasant defineations of what we define to figure. Figures awaken our attention, they warm and animate the Reader, which is pleasant: Motion is the principle of life, and Pleasure; Coldness mortifies every thing. The last Quality is severe, it retranches whatever is not absolutely necessary; it allows nothing to pleasure; it admits of no Ornament nor decoration, and like an old Arcopagico, rejects in Discourse every thing that is sprightly; it banishes all things capable of intenerating the heart.

We are to endeavour that our Style have such qualities as are proper to the subject of which we treat. Viruvius that excellent Architect, who lived under Angustus observes, that in the structure of Temples they followed that order that expressed the character of the Deity to whom the Temple was dedicated. The Dorick, that is the most solid and plain order, was used in the Temples of Mars, Minerva, and Hercules. The Temples of Venus, Flora, Perserpina, and the Nymphs, were built according to the Corinthian Order, which is sprucer and delicater, adorned with Garlands and Flowers, and all the Ornaments of Architecture. The Ionick was consecrated to

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Diana, June, and others Deities, of whose Humour the rules of that Order gave a character, obliging the Builders to a Medium betwirt the solidity of the Dorock, and the Spruceness of the Corinthian Order. It is the same in Discourse: The Flowers and Ornaments of Rhenorick are not proper for grave and majestick Subjects. Austerity of Style is unpleasing, when the matter is litter for mirth.

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What ought to be the Style of an Orator:

Hose who have writ hitherto of the Anterior of Speaking, seem to have intended their Rules only for Orators: Their precepts relate only to the Style of an Orator; and those who study that Art, do look upon the copiouses and richness of Expression so much admired in the Discourses of great Oratours, as the chief and only First of their Studies. Tis true, Eloquence appears more illustrious in that Style, which obliges me to give it sthefirst place.

Orations commonly are to clear up some obscure and contronverted truth; and theresome they require a diffuse Style, because in those

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those cases it is necessary to dissipate all the clouds and obscurities that obsuscate the truth. Those who hear an Orator speak, are not so much concerned as he in the Cause he defends: They are not always attentive, or their apprehension not being so quick, they conceive things with more trouble; so that an Orator is bound to repeat the same thing several ways, that if the first be desective, the second or third may supply.

But this copionsness consists not in multitule of Epithets, Words, and Expressions entirely synomnious. To evince a truth, to make it comprehensible to the dullest and most distracted Wits, we must present it under, several different Aspects, with this Order, that the last Expressions be always more forcible than the first, and add something to our Discourse, in such manner that without being tedious, we render that sensible and plain which we desire to inculcate. A skilful man accommodates to the capacity of his Auditors; he keeps close to his affertion, and quits it not till he has imprinted and fixed it in the mind of his hearers.

Varieties in Pleadings and Orations are not of the same nature with Mathematical Truths. Mathematical Truths depend only on a sew, and those infallible Principles. The other Truths depend upon multitudes of circumstances, that seperated signific nothing, and

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are of no conviction but when they are joyn'd and united. They are not to be amais'd but by Art, and in this it is that the subtilty of an Orator appears. They husband the least circumstance, and lay the stress of their argument upon little particularities, that perhaps another would have rejected with difdain. Upon this score Cicero swells his Orations with circumstances that seem useless and mean. Why does he tell us of Milo's changing his Shooes, of his putting on his Riding-Cloths, of his departing late, and waiting for his Wife, who was more tedious in her Dress according to the custom of women. It is, that the simplicity and life of the picture which he would fet before our eyes, without omission of the least stroke eor circumstance of the action, might per-Swade the Judges that there was nothing viafible in the conduct of Mile, that could make him reasonably suspected of meditating the murder of Clodius, as Milo's Enemies pretended.

Great Orators make tile only of fuch exprellions as put a value upon their Arguments. They endeavour to dazle the eyes
of the Understanding, and to that end fight
with none but glittering Arms. Custom not
supplying them always with words proper to
expels their judgment of things, and to make
them appear in their genuine grandeur, they
betake

betake themselves to Tropes which are useful. to give what Colour they defire to an actions. to make it appear greater, or less laudable or contemptible, just or unjust, as the Metaphors they imploy are capable of exalting or debaling them. But they do often abule this Art, and make themselves ridiculous. We have no just right to difguise any action, to habit, it as we please a to call a venial fault a Crime, or a Crime an excufable fault. Crimes and faults give two different Idea's: If we do not afe thefe terms with exactness, it implies want of Judgment, or want of Faith. A fober hearer respects principally the thing, and before he fuffers himself to be perswaded by words, he examines whether they be just. I cannot but admire those Orators who fancy they have utterly overthrown their adversaries, when they have but droll'd upon their Arguments; they think they have clearly refuted them, when they have only loaded them with Injuries, turned their Reafons into Ridicule, and spent all the Figures of their Art to represent them as contemptible as they defire.

We cannot defend a Truth well, if we do not interest our selves seriously in its defence. That discourse is faint and inessectual that proceeds not from a heart zealoufly disposed to contend for the truth when it has undertaken its protection. We have thewn in our Second

Second Book that as Nature puts the members of the Body into postures proper for defence, or insult, in a single Duel; so the same Nature prompts us to Figures in our Discourse, and that we give them such touches and circumstances as may justifie the controverted south, and refute all that is brought in opposition. Thus we see there is nothing so artificial as the Harangue of an Orator, who espouses the Sentiments, and drives at nothing but the Interest of the person for whom he pleads.

### III.

What ought to be the Style of an Historian.

Where Eolquence appears with more advantage, than in History: and indeed it is the properest business of an Orator to write History. Cicero tells us, Historia, opus est maxime Oratorium. By his mouth the actions of Great Men ought to be published; by his Pen their Memory ought to be transmitted to posterity. The chief qualities of an Historical Stile are clearness and brevity. An Eloquent Historian relates not only the action, but every considerable circumstance. An inspired man gives us only the Carcass, and delivers

livers things but by halfs; his relation is drye and jejone. When we tell of a Fight, and Victory that enfued; 'tis not like an Historian: to fay barely they Fought : we must tell the occasion of the War; how it was begun, upon what delign, what force was in the Field, in what place it was Fought, what accidentshapped, and by what stratagems it was obtain'd. But above this, Hiltory, like a Glass, is to represent the Object simply as it is,

without magnificence or diminution.

Brevity contributes to perspicuity: I speak not of that brevity which conlists in things, in the choice of what we are to fay, or what we are to omit. The Style of an Historian ought to be close and compact, free from long phrases, and periods that hold the mind in suspense; it must be equal, not interrupted with numerous Figures, partiality, or passion, all improper for an Historian: Not but that an Historian that is a good Orator may make use of his Eloquence; he must relate what is faid, as well as what is done := Speeches are Ornaments to a History, inwhich, Figures are necessary to describe the: zeal and pallion of the Agents. and soft ten the think of the com of

this end by le of a Godinera fetting ought to ac and dold most and has been then the bill medies that Person inspires line on Otstor,

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What dught to be the Style of a Dogmatical Affertion.

He zeal we hew in the defence of a Controverted truth, fets our thoughts on work, makes us look about every way for Arms, and make use of all the Forces of Rhetorick to trimmph upon our adverlary. In Dogmatical points, where our Auditors are docible, and receive all as Oracles chat we fay, we have no occasion for that zeal and fervour: Particularly in Geometry, the Politions are certain and evident ? to propole them is fufficient, without Rhetorical Mustration. It is not there as as in the Daw, where the knowledge of truth is pleasing to one and displeasing to another, inriches the one and impoverifies the other. Who is he that will trouble himfelf to contest or defend a Proposition in Geometry ? The Geometrician demonstrates that the three Angles of a Triangle are could to two right Angles: Whe ther this be true or falle is indifferent and no man will concern himself; for this Reafon the Style of a Geometrician ought to be plain and naked, and free from those Ornaments that Passion inspires into an Orator. Befides, the clearer and more evident a truth

is, the more are we disposed to express it in

When we treat of Natural or Moral Philosophy, our Style is not to be so dry and barren, as when we write of Geometry; the truths discovered in them depend not always upon fuch simple Principles. A Man that applys himself eagerly to the solution of a Problem in Geometry; to find out the Equation of Algebra, is strict and austere, and cannot endure words introduc'd only for Ornament. Natural and Moral Philosphy are not so knotty as to put the Reader into an ill humour by studying them, and therefore the Style of those Sciences needs not be so severe. The truths discovered in prophane Sciences are barren, and of Little importance. Pallions are not just and reasonble, but when they provoke the mind to the discovery of some folid good, or the avoiding of some real evil: It is therefore a ridiculous thing to express passion in the defence of an indifferent thing; to fly out into Transportations. and Raptures, and Figures, that discretion would referve for more confiderable occasions, I have not patience to fee a man furious in defending the Reputation of Arifforle: to hear one man rail aginst another for not having so profound a Reverence for Cicero as himself; to exclaim and fall to work with his Figures against a poor Man that is per-

haps mistaken in the description of the Roman or Greek Habits: And if you will have the truth , it is with little less aversion that I read the Works of some Divines, who handle the fundamental verities of our Religion as drily and slightly as if they were of no importance at all. It is a kind of Irreligion to be present at Divine Service, without some outward expression of love, respect, and veneration; we cannot communicate in an itreverent posture without sin. Those who profess Divinity, and would instruct others, must as much as in them lies imitate their great Master Christ Jesus, who convinc'd the understanding, wrought upon the will, and inflam'd the heart of his Disciples whils he taught them. It was this divine fire that he kindled in their minds, that the Disciples acknowledged Nonne cor eras ardens in nobis. dum nobiscum loqueresur in vin? With what coldness do the greatest Devotees read the Writings of our Scholiests? There is nothing in them that corresponds to the Majesty of their Matter: Their Arguments are low and flat, and fufficient to depreciate the Authority of the most Authenick truths. Their expressions are reptile, their Style mean, without efficacy or vigour. The holy Scripture is Majestick: The Writings of the Fathers are full of love and zeal for those truths that they teach. When the heart is on fire, the words that come from it must of necessity beardent.

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What ought to be the Style of a Poet.

Poet is unconfin'd; we give him what a liberty he pleafes, and do not pin him up to the Laws of Cultom : This liberty iseafily justified. Poets are defirous to delight and furprize us by things that are great, wonderful, extraordinary; they cannot arrive at their deligned end, unless they maintain the grandeur of things by the grandeur of words. All that they fay being extraordinary, their expressions being to equal the dignity of their matter, ought likewife to be extraordinry; for this cause in Poccey we say nothing without Hyperboles and Mesuphors, Cultom not being able to Supply us with terms that are strong enough. A Poetical Discourse is Figure all over. The dignity of the matter filling the Soul of a Poet with Raptures, Efteen , and admiration, the course of his words cannot be equal; he is necessarily in by his mind is agitated. So, when the Cabject of his Verse has nothing in it that can cause these commotions and raptures (as in Eclogues and Comedies, and certain other Verse whose matter is low: ) his Style must befplain without Figures. It is the quality of:

of great and extraordinary things that excuses a Poet, and authorizes him in his manner of speaking; for his matter being common, tis no more lawful for him than an Historian to decline common Expression. Ordinarily we do not affect abstracted verities that are not to be perceived but by the eyes of the mind. We are fo accustomed to conceive only by the mediation of our fenses. that we are not able to comprehend barely with our minds, unless what we would understand be grounded and established upon fome fenfible experiment. Hence it is that abstracted Expressions are Enigma's to most people; and those only please which are fentible, and do form in the imagination the picture of the thing that is to be conceived Poets, whose great end is to please, do use only these latter Expressions ; and for the same reason it is that Metaphors which (as we faid before) make every thing fo plain' are fo frequent in their Style! This defire of firiking effectually upon the fense, and making themselves easily understood, has prompted the Poets to make use of so many Fictions, and endue every thing they mentioned with body, foul, and shape. It is to find cacle the fe'r colo most remarkable

A Vapour rends the Clouds, and makes the

The frighted World at armed Jove does quake.

Tis terrible to see torn Sails, broke Masts, Theel's face grown rough with Evlus blasts. But raging Neptune's he, which makes the Graves

For Fleets, those flying Cities, in his Waves.

When a Poet tells us, that Bellona Goddefs of War put fear and terror into a whole Army, that she god Mars quickned the courage of the Soldier these ways of expressing things gives a different impression upon our sense, from what we receive by the common way of Expression, The whole Army was terrified; the Soldier was incouraged. Every Virtue, every Raffion is a god among the Poets. Mineros is Prudence: Fear, Choler, Envy are Furies. When these words are considered only with the Idea's that common cultom has joyned to them, they make no great imprefion ; bot the Goddess of Choler cannot be represented with her Eyes full of Fury, her hands Bloody, her Mouth breathing Fire, her Serpents, her lighted Torches, Garbut it begets a trembling and horror. In the Divine Poems, and in those which were funglibefore the Sanctuary, the Prophets made use of fuch ways of speaking, to make themselves intelligible to the people. David makes us conceive how God had fuccoured and protected him against his Enemies in as lively and emphatical a ftyle as any of the profane Digres Poets

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Poets could have done. He represents God Almighty coming down in the Glouds to fight in his defence.

Hook't not long e're th' earth began to shake;
The Rocks to tremble, and the Hills to quake:
And to attest the presence of its God,
Who to the Judgment on a Cherub rode:
The World its firt foundation did for sake;
Out from his Nostrita a thick smook did go,
And from his mouth devouring fire,
Which more impetuous as it large did grow,
And made the Heavens almost with heat ex-

He bow'd the Heavens, and then came down,

And Tempests that no will but his will own, in hast flew on before to make him way. He follow'd close, and their flow pace did chide,

Bid them with greater speed and swiftness ride.

And that he dreadful might appear,

Yet not consume till got more near,

Dark Waters and thick Clouds his face did

Poely awakens, Profe inils and disposes to sleep. The Narratives of a Poet are interpreted with Exclamations, Apostrophes, Digressions, and thousands of other Figures to allure attention. Poets regard things only in places

places which they are most capable of charming, and mind nothing of them but their Grandeur or Rarity. They consider not any thing that may cool their admiration. By this means they seem to beside themselves; and giving way to the fire of their Imagination, they grow Enthusiastick, and like the Sybil, who being full of extraordinary Inspiration, spake not the common Language of Mankind;

Sed poëtus aubelet,

Et rabie fera Corda tument; Majorq; vederi,

Net Mortale fonans, efflata oft numine quando

Jam propiere Dei———

### CHAP. IV.

#### Ι

The beauty of Discourse is an effect of an exact Observation of the Rules of Speaking.

A N ancient Author has told us that Beauty is the flower of health. Flowers are the effect and declaration of the good condition of the Plant that produces them. Flourishes in discourse proceed in the same manner B

manner from the good Complexion, that is, from the justaels and exactaels of a discourse. The same thing admits of several Names according to the several saces by which it is represented. When Beauty is considered in it felf, it is the flower of health; but when it is confidered with reference to those who do judge of that Beauty, we may then fay, that true Beauty is that which pleases Ingenious Men, who are they that judge of things most reasonably. It is a hard matter to determine what it is that pleases, and in what consists that To no loay quoy of delight that we feel in the reading a good Author. Nevertheless upon reflection we shall find the pleafarewe conceive in a well-compos'd Discourse, proceeds only from the resemblance betwixt the Image form'd by the words in our mind, end the things whose Image they bear; so that it is either the truth that pleases, or the conformity betwixt the words and the things. That which is call'd Great and Sublime, is nothing but that conformity in its perfection and excellence. Longinus in his Book of this Sublimity, has given us an example of a fublime expression taken out of the First Chapter of Genesis, where Moses speaking of the Creation, uses these words; And God Said ter there be light, and there was light; an expreffion that gives a strong Idea of the power of God over his Creatures, which was the thing that Moles delign'd. The

The greatness of an Expression being founded upon its perspiculty and force, it is no hard matter to determine which are the true Ornaments of Discourse, and in what they consist. A Discourse, is beautiful when it is compos'd according to the Rules of Art; it is great when it is more than ordinary perfpicuous: when there is not one equivocation : no sentence unintelligible; no expression ambiguous; when it is well-disposed, and the mind of the Reader led directly to the end of the deliga, without the remera or impediment of impertment words. Such clearness like a Torch dispells all obscurity, and makes every thing visible. We have shewn already in our Third Book, that when we range our words in fuch manner as their pronunciation is fluid and easy, they make a delightful harmony to every body that hears them: fo we need no other Rules for speaking Ornately, than the Rules already given for speaking justly.

Ocnaments in Discourse, like Ornaments of Nature, have this property, they are both pleasant and profitable. In natural Beauty whatever is comely, is useful. In an Orchard where the Trees are planted in rows, or in squares, the disposition of them is pleasant and useful; because they are so set, that the Earth may communicate its juice equally to them all. As bores in Ordinam, certaque intervalla redacta, placent; Quincunce nebil speciosius

liter trabient. Pillars are the principal Ornaments of Building, their beauty is linked for feraitly with the foldity of the Work, that the Pillars cannot be pull'd down without deltruction to the whole House. The Ornaments of a good Discourse are also inseparable. Allusions and sporting with words, Figurative repetition of certain Systables, and other Ornaments not altogether essential, can give but small satisfaction to those who consider them with the eye of Reason; for in a word, it is Truth only that satisfies a rational Man; in Ornaments there is nothing of truth: they do rather perplex and Embarass, and render things more unconceivable than if our Discourse were simple and natural.

### II.

The false Idea that Men have of Grandeur, and sheir desire to speak nothing but Great things is the Cause of ill Ornaments.

Here are but few Men that examine judiciously the things which present themfelves. We suffer our selves to be taken with Appearances, because great things are rare, and

and extraordinary. Men do form to them felves an Idea of Grandeur, that whatever carries an extraordinary air, appears to them great. They put no value upon any thing that is common. They despise the manners of Speaking that are not natural, for no other reason but because they are not extraordinary. They affect big words, and bombaft phrases, Sefquipedalia verba & ampullas. To dazle and amaze, we need only cloath our Propositions in Brange and magnificent Language. They confider not whether under that dress there be any thing conceal'd that is effectually great and extraordinary. That which makes their Rupidity the more remarkable is, that they admire what they do not understand, Mirantur que non intelligune; because obscurity has fome appearance of Grandeur, fublime and exalted things being for the most part obscure and difficult.

Men having then so salse an Idea of Grandeur, it is not to be admired if the Ornaments wherewith their works are adorn'd be salse and numerous, because as we have said before, they desire to speak nothing but what is great. But Mens Ambition carrying them beyond their pitch, they miscarry in their slight, and puss themselves up, till they crack with the too great quantity of wind. Copiousness is a mark of Grandeur; our impationce to appear copious, chokes up our thoughts with

with too great abundance of words. When Men are pleas'd with a thing, they infift upon it too much, and repeat it over and over Nesciunt quod bene cessie relinguere. They are like young Hounds that worry their Prey, and are not easily got off. Every thing is to be llowed its natural dimension. A Statue whose parts are disproportionable, whose legs are great, and arms small, whose body is large and head small, is monstrons and irregular. The greatest art of Eloquence is to keep the hearers attentive, and hinder them from losing the prospect of the end to which we would conduct them. But when we stop too long upon particular parts, we are many times imploy'd fo much upon them, that we forget the principal Subject. Copioninels therefore is not always good. Repletion and emptiness are both Causes of Disease.

Amongst Learned men those are most esteem'd who are best read. The difficulty of a Science advances its price; we have a value for those who understand the Arabian and Persian Languages; we never examine whether by those Languages they have acquir'd any knowledge that is not to be found in other Authors; it is sufficient if the skilful in these Languages understand that which is hard to be understood, and understood by few people. Our Ambition to be thought Learned, and to imitate and oftentate our Erudition,

Erudition, causes that either in Speaking or Writing, we name continually our Anthors through their authority be necessary no farther than to hew we have read them, and to make us pals for Learned men .- This humour St. Austin reproaches to Julian , Quis hac audiat, & non ipso nominum, sectarumque conglobatarum frepitu terreatur, fieft inerudieus, qualis est bominum multitudo, & existimet te aliquem magnum, qui bec scire potueris? they heap Greek upon Latin, and Hebrew upon Arabick. A trifle delivered in Greek is well enough received. An Italian phrase however apply'd in discourse, makes the Author pass for a polite, well bred man. Were it not customary and common, we should be as much frighted at this wild way of speaking as at the discourse of a mad-man. This is a fault that difgraces a style, and hinders it from being natural and clear. If it be to add weight to our words, that we add the Names of our Authors, we ought to do it only when necessity requires us to make use of the authority and reputation of an Author. What need is there that we quote Euclid to prove thatthe whole is equal to all the parts : Or cite Philosphers to perswade the World that Winter is cold? I do not blame all these citations; on the contrary they are commendable. when the words are clear, and convenient to awaken the mind of the Reader by variety: It

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is only excess in this kind that is blameable. Those who have read much are to imitate the Bee, which digefts what it has fuck'd from the flowers, and turns all into Honey. Nature loves simplicity. It is the sign of distemper to have the skin markt with fpots of feveral colours. Too frequent Sentences trouble also the uniformity of a Style: By the word Sentence is understood those exalted and abstracted thoughts that are to be expresid in a concise way, and in few words; and thefe Sentences are called points. I speak not of those childish and false Sentences which have nothing in them but what is forced and unnatural. The best expressions plac'd too thick, do but perplex and incommode a Style, and render it rugged: and when they are fe-parated from the rest of the discourse, the Style may be faid to be rough and unpleasing. These abstracted thoughts are like patches fow'd together, which being of a different colour from the rest of the stuff, make the Garment ridiculous , Curandum eft ne fententia emineuns extra Corpus orationis expressa, sed intexto vestibus colore niteant. Some love to intersperse their discourses with these kind of Sentences, supposing they add reputation to the Wit of the Author : Facie ingenis blandiwither almo) (is an all your

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The last fault into which they fall who are delirous to have the honour of doing fomething

thing exactly, proceeds from an extraordinary endeavour to make their Works excellent. A man who writes with too much affectation, is not capable of perceving the obscurity of his words. The darkest of them feem clear to him; he discovers easily all the Idea's that his Exprellions ought to awaken to be understood, because those Idea's are present But it is not the same with those who read his Works, whose imaginations are not fo hot, and who do not address themfelves to penetrate the fense of his words with fo great zeal and application as he who compos'd them. When a man expresses himfelf with pain, we labour with him, and in some measure we participate of his pain: If he expresses himself easily and naturally. so as every word feems to fall into its place without the trouble of picking them, that easiness is pleasant. The light of a merry Man disposes us to mirth.

This facility appears in a Treatife, when we make use of natural expressions, when we avoid those which are elaborate, and carry the sensible marks of Writing with pain. Not but that to surnish our selves with terms natural and proper, we have need sometimes of study and application: But this study, this application ought not to appear. Ludentis speciem dabit, & torquebitur. As much as we may, and the mateer of which we treat will

permit,

permit, we must give our discourse this latitude and liberty of Conversation. Doubtless when a person in conversation speaks easily and pleasantly, it goes far towards the putting us into the same humour; the pleasure we take in his alsouse, renders every thing easy that he lays.

# who read his vectory whategrange melon

Of Artificial Ornaments: Rules relating to those Ornaments

Efides this natural Beauty which is the excellence and exactness of Discourse. we are oblig'd to take notice of certain Ornaments that we may call Artificial. It must be acknowledged that in the Works of the most judicious Authors, some things are to be found that might have been fpared without injury to their discourse, without perplexity to the fense, and without diminution to the strength of their style. They are introduc'd only for 'Imbellifument, and are of no other use but to detain the mind of the Reader, and make him the more willingly attentive. Many times when we have faid all that is necessary, we add something for Entertainment, and choose to express our felves

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fetves by Metaphors or Hyperboles: Though perhaps cultom affords us Terms proper ehough to express our Conceptions, yet we think it better in Discourse to make use of Figures to prevent being tedious. When one Words and Exprellions are well dispos'd, and may be conveniently pronounc'd, we go farther, we measure them, and give them such Cadence as may make them grateful to the Nature sports her self sometimes in her own Works: all Plants do not bear fruit. fome have nothing but flowers. We cannot therefore absolutely condemn these Ornaments that are inferted only for the diversion and entertainment of the Reader. They have their worth, but it is the right use of them that gives it. The following Rules will not be unprofitable for our uling this copioulnels of Expression with Dexterity and Art. The first Rule to be observ'd in the distribution of Ornaments, is to apply them in their due time and place; Recreation is of Importance when we have been over-laden with bounels. When a lubject is dishcult, and that dishculty has perplex'd and troubled the Reader, we must have a care of such sporting with words as may increase his perplexity by diverting his thoughts before he comprehends. When we aim at nothing but conviction, diversion Some things there are that is unpleasant. admit of no Ornament, such as these we call Dogmatical. Baned dicting

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Ormari ves ipfa negat; vontenta docera When the labject of our Discourte is fimple il the rest ought to be so too. Presions Stones , and extraordinary Ornaments , are afed only in great Festivals, and upon extraeidinary occasions. month will by a the briles on

The Second Rule requires that the Orna-ments be just, and the Rules of Art exactly observed. Some people are fo idle as not to concern themselves for the impertinence or falfity of what they say, if it be spoken after the manner of a Sentence: If they can but hedge a Metaphor or other Figure into their Discourse, they regard not whether what they say be for or against them: If they can bring in an Amichefu, a Repetition, a Cadence that tickles the fende, they care not how vain it be, and unfatisfactory to Reason. But we must know nothing is beautiful that is falle; and if there be any thing that purs a value upon these fallacious Ornamens, it is because they dazzle us by their laife fustre, and deafen us by their infiguticant Noile; or if I may speak my thoughts freely, it is because our judgments are defective. A Noble mind affects things of truth in discourse rum ingeniorum insignis est indoles, in verbit verum amate, non verba. I cannot value a Discourse that tickles my ear, unless the matter pleases my judgment. Walls medo mili fonat diferre, quod dicitur inepre. The 15

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Thorlast Rule is what we keep a just Mouder the frequent to The greatest pleasures are the frequent to The greatest pleasures are the frequent godo: Omis: whopen they walks: August blanch man yist diam. Mothing is more graceful than the eye, but he that should have more in his stade than two, would be a Montest Containent of Organizates hinders discourse from being clear: and it is as observable as any thing I have hisherto said, that excels of Organizates keeps the mind of the hearer from being intent upon the laboration. This happens very frequently in Palance. This happens very frequently in Palance.

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negyriks jumbere Orators and wishfolkhande a krobe of their Eloquence, and wishfolkhande a krobe about the flowers of their Acto Ehothester admires a her Oratorian bottoe ver thinks upon the person dommended when are in every thing to respect the design and her way we can find a but its must about the best way we can find a but its must be fore to conduct us thicken a When I gaves cover the Ennit, and hinder a their ripening we pull off those deaves dwithout considering that we rob the Freeze of such beautiful Original manners.

For this Reason it is that the Holy Ghost, which directed the Bens of the Apostles, shif-fered the montro make of the Rhetonick and pompous Eloquence of profanci Orators which delades the eye, and makes us confider rathenthe beauty of words, than the fenfe and reason of things ... The Sacred Scriptures were not writ to indulge our Vanity, but to edific our Souls. Those who in Books require nosbing but idle adirections do buder-value them ; but he subo loves Reafon and Moster, fool find casusbin the Holy berips cures to delight and edifie himfelf. One fingle Pfalm of Davids is worth more than all the Odes of Rinder, Asserven, and House Deco species and Circle are not so be compared to species and the Works of Photo and Apri-Redeate not equivalent to une of Sci Pan's M. Zen H in Langeguicks Chapters.

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Chapters. For in forty words being nothing. but found, we stight hot to prefer their harmony to the fold knowledge of truth. For my own part I value not the Art of Speaking, but as it contributes to the discovery of truth? as it forces it from the bottom of our thoughts where it lay conceal'd; as it difinindeed this is the crue cause that has inconvaged me to write of this Art, as a thing not only weful, but decenary o , asission Terror it is cilling language, a to

# Theis are this conjecteres of their Grand

The former Teble refuted, and the true Orginal of Languages, dechared sile billion the service or only collidering

Fothat which Diodorus Siculus has write of Languages be true, what we have fancy'd of coat them men forming a Language to themselves, would not be a Fable, bus a true Story no That Author Speaking of the opinion of the Greeks in relation course beginning of che World, tells un that after the Elements had taken their places in the Universe, and the Waters were tun down into the Sea, the heat of the Subs became fruitfuls and profanth being own most, a was chaled by the duced man hand the rest of the Greatures. His orient

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That there men being dispers disp and down in several places, sound by experience that to desend themselves against the Beasts, it would be convenient to live together: That at his their words were consuled and gross, which they possibled afterwards, sod established such terms as were jugged necessary for the explanation of their thoughts; and that in time men being born in several corners of the Earth, and by consequence divided into several Societies, of which every one had form'd to it self a distinct Language, it sollowed that all Nations did not make ase of the same Language.

These are the conjectures of the Greek, who had no true true knowledge of Antiquity Philip reproaches to their in one of his Dialogues, where he brings in Minimus telling that the Egyptians commonly call dethe Greeks Children, because Ishey understood to more than Children, from whence they fill their Griginal, on what passed in the Month before they were borne forchat was sheared before they were borne forchat was sheared much no depend upon their Salvation. Will the antiques monuments of Assignification with the weight of what Major velucies in Genesia about the Greation of the Month, and the Original of Mankind. We ender that from thence that God formed shame the first of his Sex, shad gave shion at him, guage of which alone his Children made as guage of which alone his Children made as

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se ill till the building of the Lower of Babel forme time after the Deloge. The delign of building that Tower, was to defend themselves against God bimself: If ever he should punish the World with another Deluge; they hop'd by that Edifice to protect themselves against him; and they were so insolent in their Enterprize, that God Almighty finding, them obstinate, sent such Consulton into their Language and Words as disabled them from understanding one another; by which means their delign was srustrated, and they forc'd to desist and separate into several Countries.

The common Opinion concerning this-Confusion is, that God did not so confound the Languages of thefe. Undertakers, as tomake to many feveral Languages as there were men. It is believed only that after this-Confusion, every Family made use of a particular Language; from whence it follow'd were dillinguished as well by difference of Languages, as the places to which they rethe Novelty of Words, but in the alteration, transposition, addition, or retrenchment of feveral Letters which compos d their familiar words before that Confunon. Hence it is. that we cally deduce from the Hebrey Language (which is rationally prefumed to be that which was spoken by Alam, and used Mann

## The Art of Speaking. Part TV

along time afterwards) the Original of the antient Names of Towns, and Provinces, and their Inhabitants, as hath been provid by several Learned men, and particulary by Samuel Bachart in his Sacred Geography.

The vie of words then did not come by it was God who taught them at first and from the first Language that he gave to Adam, all other Languages are derive, that being afterwards divided and multiplied as Yet this confusion which God aforefaid. brought into the Languages of the Builders of the Tower of Babel, was not the fole Cause of the great diversity and multiplicity of Languages. Those in use at this time in the World are much more numerous than the Families of the Children of Noah, when they were separated, and much different from their Languages. As in all other things, to in Languages, there are infensible alterations that in time makes them all appear quite other than what they were at first. It is not to be doubted but our present French is deriv'd from that which was spoken five hun. dred years fince: and yet we can scarce in-derstand what was spoken but two hundred years ago. It is not to be imagind that thele alterations happen'd only to the French Tongue. Quintilian tells us that the Language of the Romans in his time was to different from what it was at first, that the Priests could

could force upderstand the old Hymns composed by their Primitive Priests to be Sping beigns their idols.

The inconstancy of man, is a principal

cause of this alteration. His love to Novelty makes him contrive new words instead of the old, and introduce fuch ways of Pronunciation as in process of sime changes intirely the old. Language into new; So that those who are sinquistive after the Etymology or Original of new Languages, roudiscover how they are derived from the Autients, ought to confider what have been the different manners of pronunciation in different cimes, and bow by sholes different manners the words have been to chang'd, that they appear quite different from what they were in their Ori-giadh he for exemple, these is no great con-formity between Ecrine in France and Scribers in Lacin , betwies Exeler, and Stabilize in nonnceshed ester S after E at the beginning of a words and then they writ Esribere, Etabilers, and at dength abbreviating farther they came to write Egring Enabler, Changes of this Mature bave to dilguis d the Latin words, that they have made a new Language. In all Languages it is the same with the Exerch which with the Spanish and Italian proceeds from the Latin. Latin comes from the Greek, Greek from the Hebrew, as the Chaldee. MS

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Chaldee, and Sin lack. It is the different manners of pronunciation that have taked the
great difference at prefent in all languages.
We are much interized at first, when from
an anticult Language we can storive uny
word of a new Language. For example is
Latin from an Mebren, word i i their difference be confiderable. The furprise optuceeds from this, that no notice is taken this che
Latin word before it receive his profent form,
pair of through fereigh Obtachen and Condicions that altered it? There Conditions are
the different mainters with which is had been
pronduned.

People have particular inclinations for particular. Letters, and particular terminations; apprehending cittler by fancy or reason; that the produnctation of these Letters, and those terminations is more easy, and accommodate to their natural dispositions. This is particularly remarkable in the Greek Toague; and is it, that has introduced in the toanmon alle of that Language, the particular state salled Dialects. The Missis for Example instead of a put & the end of many of their words; they do frequently add to the end of their Adverbs: They contract their words in opposition to the lonians who leaguing them. The Doricks of the avery often. The Language was position to the lonians who leaguing them.

an they shange the (3) 410 or 15 15 100 and with the Chalder in respect of the Hebrew. The Listings Franch, and Spanish have their peculiar Letters and Terminations, as may be seen by their Grammars and Dictionaries, Thefe pecularities do manifeltly change much o their Languages, and create great difference betwist them; fo that though they proceed from the Tame Parents (if I may To Tay) they do not feem to be Silters. For the French. Lialian, and Spanish, feem to be derived from

feveral Languages

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The changes and revolutions that happen to States, produce alteration in Languages, because in alteration of Governments several different People are united, from which mixtore confusion of Language must necessarily follow. So our French Language is not de-rived subolly from Latin, but composed of several words in use among the antient Gauls and Growing, with whom the Romans cohabited in Gellia. The English Tongue has feveral Franch words, introduced upon occation of the English remaining a long time in Frances of which the greatest part was in their possession. The Spaniards have feveral Anawich words derived to them from the Moore, under whose Dominion they were for some Centuries of Years. Terms of Art proceed commonly from the places where those Arts have been studied and improved. Whence it comes that the Greeks having labour'd most towards

rowards the cultivation of Sciences, the terms of the Liberal Arts are commonly Greek. The Art of Navigation has been infinitely improved in the North, and therefore the terms of Navigation are generally in the Language of the North.

Colonies have been a great means of the multiplication of Languages. It is manifelt the Tyrians, who traded formerly all over the World, have carried their Language into most Countries. At Carthage (a Colonie of the Tyreans) they spoke the Language of the Phenicians, which was a Dialect of Hebrew, as may be prowed by feveral Arguments, but particularly by the Verles in the Punick of Carthaginian Language, to be read in Plantus. But as we have laid, Colonies multiply Languages, and make feveral out of one, because those who are removed into those Colonies, not understanding well enough their own Language to preferve is with-Language to which they are removed piby which means they by degrees begin to speak both Languages, and frame a third of them both: It is no hard matter to trace out the Original of Languages, if we have any finanter-ing of Antiquity; but my delign fuffers me not to enlarge upon this Subject. From what is faid it appears clearly that cuftom changes Languages, that cultom makes them what they are, and exercises a Soverainty over them, that shall be evinced more amply in the following Chapter.

A Discourse of the Art of PER-

ing the words as an experience we were manufactured by PAP H Sprathen who will not be the what we were what we were side of the second the seco

they promounce it some more advantager, it the later of they of the marked confider to bely keeping. This of the first of the marked the marked of the marke

What are the Parts of the Art of Pert

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Hough the Arts of Speaking and Perfunding are both comprehended under the name of Rhetorick by fereral
great Mafters, yet it is not no be denyld
but there is great difference betwint them.
Every Man who speaks well; has not the secret of working open the Affections, or working to his side, such as were before of a
contrary opinion; and this is called to Perswade. Wherefore being to treat of these two
Arts, it chose to do its separately; yet shall
in this place only give an Idea of the Art of
Personship, not being able to treat of the sin its
full latitude, because it borrows its Arms from
several

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Several other Arts, and cannot be deparated from them, as I shall show in the sequel of

this difference we much find out a way to bring People to our Sentiments, that were of a contrary Sentiment before! We must put our matter in order in our minds, and having fairly disposed it, we must make choice of fuch words as are proper to express it. 19 We must get by heart what we write, that we may pronounce it with more advantage; fo the Are of Persuasion consists of five parts. The first is, Invention of Proper Means; the second is, Disposition of those means: The third is, Elecution: The fourth, Memory: The fifth, Pronunciation. 10 When a truth is eagerly contested, unless we be blind-ed with interest, Perversence, or Passion, good proof is fafficient to convince us; bto remove all difficulties, and dispel all clouds. that the not fond of the strucks chap use pervente in their inclinations, and prepolities d by their Pallious, Renfor is too week, and we must make the of tenning w lipon this ottation two things are to be done in we must study their homeway and inclinations to gain them: And because most Men judge ing (according to sheir Pellions) that their Friends were in the right, and their Radmies in the wrong, we must infuse such Motions

Wherefore the Makers in Maners | and Palinner & to perfude we mustified proofs; the and charitions of him we would gain, or footen record to clear the interest of the contract of the con the laconicd party, madewelle, of these two

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the ser and everyage His mission & h Clapatics ineclean description of Proofs and I was the proofs of The Lagrent on the Proofs of The Lagrent of the lagrent

firmise but the fame, thing, and by confe-Thearness is the character of Tanih in No circloube can be made of a clear Truth and when it is evident in the highest dagree, the most sulen and obstinate are obliged to throw down their Arms, and submit 10 copo viction in No Man will ever deny that the whole is greater than a part; That all the parts moited are equal to the schole of a Sometimes we turn our faces, and will not fee the clearnes of fuch truths as offend us: Yet at length, when in faight of our Aversi-on, truth strikes strongly apon our eyes, we are glad to furrender, and our Tongues many times give the lye to our Minds. To perfuse those whose Disputes are grounded only F#175111 1

coposition, we multimake of of one or coposition, we multimake of of one or ore incorrectable Propositions/s and make it appears that the Vacquition dontelled is the The Roman Judges than bred whether Mile had done ith in bailings of Claudius; they doubted not havitawas lawful to nepelsforce by force. Cicero to clear the innocences of the accused party, made use of these two Propositions, We may kill him that would mura der us, and therefore Milo might kill Claudius for feeking his life. One of these Propositions is clear, the other obscure: One is granted on all hands, the other uncertains yet they fignific but the same thing, and by confequence one of them being inconcellable, the other must be so troots de is the first part of Philosophy call'd Logick, to give Rules of Argumentation, and therefore it is not without realon that we have faid in the beginning of this Difcourfe, that to handle this Art of Perfusion in its full dimension, we must treat of feveral other Arts, which could not

The matter of the Art of Perfuefus is not limited: This Art thews it felf in the Pulpir, at the Bar, at all manner of buliness and convertation; for in a word, the whole end of Commerce and Convertation is to personal trade those with whom we deal, and reduce them

them to our Sentiments. To be then a complear Orator, and ipeak well upon any thing that occurs (as the Rhetoricians pretend their Dificiples may,) we ought to be universally well read, and ignorant of nothing: for a Man indeed is not perfectly capable of Arguing, but when he understands his Subject to the bottom; when his mind is full of clear Truths, and undoubted Maxims, from whence Confequences may be deduced to decide the Controverse in question. For example, a Divine argues rationally and well, when to persuade an Adversary to his Opinion, he produces Texts of Scripture; the Fathers, the Councils, Tradition, and the Testimony of the Church.

# Chicagning of Places the proper hive divines on

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There is no way of filling the mind with certain truths upon the matters of which we are to Treat, like ferious Meditation, and long findy, of which few Men are capable: Knowledge is a Fruit environ d with Thorns, that keeps most Men at a distance: for that if it were not lawful to speak of any thing but what we know, the most part of those who

who make Operately their Recognism, ewould be obliged to hold their peace. To obviate to inevitable an inconvenience, their Orators have fought ont hort and easy ways to supply themselves with matter of discourse, even upon Subjects on which they are entirely ignorant. They distribute these ways into several Classes, which they call Common-Places, because they are publickly exposed, and every Man may take out freely what Arguments he pleafes to prove what is in dispute, though perhaps he be quite ignorant of the thing in Controverse himself. The Logicians speak of these Common Places in their Lopicks. I shall explain in few words the use of these Common Places, and afterwards shew what judgment is to be made of The Timb os th them.

Common Places do properly contain no thing but general advice that remembers thole who confule them of all the faces by which a fubject windy be considered and this may be convenient, because viewing a Subiech in that manger on all lides, wishout doubt we may find with more cale what is most proper to be faid on that subject. A wers, yet it has pleased the Authors of those Topicks to effeblish only server Common-

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Genne; that is to fay, we must consider in every fubica what its has in common with all other the like Subjects. Howe speak of the War with the Turks, we may consider War in general, and draw our Arguments

from that Generality.
The Second place is call d Difference, by which we confider what ever is peculiar to a

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The third is Definition; that is to lay, we must consider the whole nature of the hubject : The Discounse which expresses the ne The Fourth place is Enumeration of the

parts contain'd in the Subject of which we

Treated

The Fifth is the Etymologie of the Name

of the Subject.

The Sirch is the Conjugates, which are the Names which have connexion with the name offour Subject as the word low has connexion

with all these other words, to love, laving, friends are.

Movement like wife consider the similards, or dispulsively, in the things of which we treat the property of the contract of the con which two Confiderations make the Seventh and the Eighth places boh sti yam in daidw do

saldie man likewife make Comparison, and id our comparison introduce every thing to which our subject is opposed and this Compa-Ti on [everal

vision and Opposition are the Nigth and Teath

The Eleventh is Repugnance; that is to fay, in discouring upon a Subject, we must have an eye upon those things that are repugnant to it, to discover the Proofs where-

with that Prospect may furnish us.

Tis of importance to confider all the Circumstances of the matter proposed: but these Circumstances have either preceded, or accompanied, or follow's the thing in question; so these Circumstances do make the Twelfh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth places. All the Circumstances that can accompany an action, are commonly comprehended in this Verie,

Quis quid, abi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo,

That is to fay, we are to examine who is the Author of the Action; what the Action is; where it was done; by what means for

what end; how; and when

The Fifteenth place is the Effett: and the Sixteenth is the Cable; that is to lay, we must have regard to the Effett, of which the things in dispute may be the Cause; and to the things of which it may be the effect.

These Common-Places do without doubt supply us with ample matter for Discourse. The different Considerations present us with several

feveral Arguments, and are able questionless to furnish the most batten invention. I examine not now whether this supply be commendable or not. According to this method if we be to speak against a Parricide; we speak against Parvicide, in General, and then bring it home to the person accus'd, and to the rest of the Particulars, then we proceed to the discumilances of Patricide; discovering the blackacis of the Grime by Definition Deferiptions Enamerations: Sometimes the Es symplogy of the Name of the thing upon which we are speaking, and the other Names, than have reference to it, supply us with matter A long Discourse might be rais'd apon the Obligation which Christians have to live well, by only remembring them of the Name that ency bear of of the Wardender es

Discourses are much inlarged by Similarder, Diffinitioner, and Comparifort, that Serve to remove a difficulty, and illustrate an obscure troth. I los word, he who should Greunframime en action, describe what was pretedent, concomitant, and subsequent, what was somer tire his Auditory, than want matter for Discourse. The bridge season railrose

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o folially the med political invention of the constitution of the

THE Places of which we have theke are call'd Common because they are ex-posed so all the World, and because they arnish Arguments for all Causey There are other places proper to particular hibjects. bee we theak of those places, in it to be adopted than this he two softs of the agent the wife and this call a straight the behavior in a substitute and determine the second sec with the unit circumstance of time, a place, if perion, as whicher Wish be selve made. The Appelless is a question series, and circumstantiated, as whether War he to be made with the Turk in Fluingers in the Tolk Sir of these includes that the continue had a portable to three hadden por we detherate whether fuch an adion is to be done to we examine what Judgment is to be made of that action and we exhibe approve or district the schole. The first what is sail to Dether about the feeded; This had; the third. Deliberation; the feetend, Judicially; the third, Demonfrative. Each of these finds has its peculiar places, that is to fay, he is fall before, there are certain Couniels and Directions given for each of these kinds. As in case of the Deliberative, according as we would wife the undertaking, or quitting of an action.

Chap. III. The An of Sheakher.

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action, we must new that it is useful, of not useful; necessary, or nanecessary, that the success will be prejudicial, or advantage geous; and that the Enterprize is just or uniquit.

A Indiciary Question may be considered in one of these three States; either we know not the Author of the action that is the subject of our Discourse, and then because we endeavour to discover the said Author by Conjectures, that is call the state of Conjectures, that is call the state of Conjectures. If the Author be known, we examine the nature of the action. For Example, A Thief state our of a Courch the Treasure which a private person less there say deposite. We examine whether this action be Sacrilege, or simple These, we consider the definition of the Crime; and therefore we call the one the state of Desirition, and that other the state of Desirition, and that other the state of Onetin, because the quality of the action is to be examined, as whether it be suit or unjust.

whether it be just or mould.

In the first state it is to be considered whether the person suspected would have committed such a Grime; if he could, and what Tokens there are of it. We judge of his Will, by considering what advantage it would be to him to commit it. We judge of his Bower, by considering his strength opportunity, and other means, and we judge whether he was effectually guilty or not, by

the carennifences of the action; as whether he was found alone in the place where it was committed; whether before or after it was committed he did let fall, any thing that may make him rationally suspected.

In the second State we consider only the nature of the Action: All that can be said of it, depends upon particular knowledge. In the third State we consult Reason, Laws, Custom, Presidents, Compacts, and Equity.

In the Demonstrative-kind, to approve an action or condemn it, we must consider the Good or the Bad. Goods in a Man are to be considered three ways; in respect of his Body, in respect of his Mind, and in respect of his Estate. Goods relating to the Body are selicity of the Gountry, nobility of Birth, advantage of Education, Health, Strength, Beauty, Occ. Goods relating to the Mind are Virtue, Sagacity, Prudence, Learning, Occ. Goods relating to the Estate, are Riches, Honours, Imployments, Commands, Occ.

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All these places proper and common to each of these three kinds, are call'd Interious or Intrinsick, to distinguish them from the Exterior which are five, that is to say, the Laws, the Witnesses, the Practice, the Transactions, and the Answers of the Persons examin'd. The Lawyer is never put to the trouble of searching his Proofs: The Client or Solicitor puts into his Councils hands

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his Breviate, his Bonds, his Transactions; produces the Depositions of his Witnesses, and the Auswer of him that was examin'd.

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Reflections upon this method of Places.

ads upon a resultan knowledge

Hus in few words have I shewn the Art to find Arguments upon all Subjects of which the Rhetoricians are accultom'd to Treat, which makes the greatest part of their Rhetorick. It is our bulinels to judge of the ulefulnels of this method. My respect for those Authors who have commended it, obliges me to give you an Abridgment, that you may understand the bottom of it. It is not to be doubted but the belos accrewing from it are of some kind of use. They make us take notice of several things from whence Arguments may be drawn; they teach us how a Subject may be vary'd, and discovered on all fides. So as those who are skill'd in the Art of Topicke, may find matter enough to amplifie their discourse; nothing is barren to them; they speak of every thing that occurs, as largely and as oft as they pleafe. Those who reject these Topicks, do not deny their Fecundity; they grant that thev

they lapply as with infinite numbers of things; about they alledge that that Fecundity is inconvenient; That the things are trivial, and by consequence the Art of Topicks furnishes nothing that is fit for us to fay. If an Orator (fay they) understands the subject of which he treats; if he be full of incontestable Maxims that may inable him to resolve all Difficulties arising upon that subject; If it be a question in Divinity, and he be well read in the Fathers, Councils, Scriptures, &c. He will quickly perceive whether the question propos'd be Orthodox, or otherwise. It is not necessary that he runs to his Topicks, or paffes from one Common Place to another, which are unable to supply him with necessary knowledge for decision of his Question. If on the other side an Orator be ignorant, and understands not the bottom of what he Treats, he can speak but superficially, he cannot come to the point; and after he has talk'd and argued a long time, his Adverfary will have reason to admonish him to leave his tedious talk that signifies nothing; to interrupt him in this manner, Speak to the purpole; oppole Reason against my Reason, and coming to the Point, do what you can to subvert the Foundations upon which I Sustain my felf. Separatis locorum Communium Nuois, res cum re, ratio cum ratione, caufa cum canfa confligat. If

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If it be urg'd in favour of Common Places, that indeed they do not fully instruct us what to say upon all occasions, but they help us to the discovery of infinite Arguments that defend and fortifie one another. To this it is answered, and I am of the same Opinion, That to persuade, we need but one Argument, if it be solid and strong, and that Eloquence consists in clearing of that, and making it perspicuous. All those seedle Arguments (proper as well to the accused, as the accuser, and as useful to refel as affirm) deriv'd from Common Places, are like ill Weeds that choke the Corn.

This Art is dangerous for Persons of but indifferent Learning, because it makes them acquiesce and se down with small suggestions easily obtain'd, and neglect to feek after others of more folid Importance. A witty Man speaking of the method of which Raimondus Lullius treated after a particular manner. calls it, An Art of Discoursing without judgment of things we do not understand. I had rather. fays Gicero, he wife without Eloquence, than Eloquent without Wildom. Mallem indifertam sapientiam, quam finktitiam laquacem. this may be added, that in all Discourse, whatever ferves not to the refolution of the Question, ought to be retrench'd; and after fuch retrenchment I inppose very few things would remain wherewith our Topicks had furnished N 2 US.

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## The Second Means to Persuade.

comilisting clearing, of there, F Men lov'd Truth, and lought it fincerely; to make them entertain it, there would be no need of any thing but to propose it limply, and without Art, as we have already obferv'd; but they hate it, and because it confifts not with their Interests, they do willingly blind themselves that they may not fee it: They are too much lovers of themselves to be perfuaded that what is difagreeable to them, is true. Before they admit any thing to be true, they will be affored it shall no way incommode them. Tis in vain to use powerful Arguments to Persons resolv'd not to hear them, who look upon the Truth that is offer'd as an Enemy to their deligns, and reject her lustre, for fear it should make their wickedness conspicuous: We are constrain'd therefore to use the greatest part of Mankind, as we do People in a Frenzy, we conceal fuch Remedies as are intended for their Core. So that the Truths of which it is necessary they should be perfuaded, are to be deliver'd with fach

fuch Art, that they may possess the Heart before they be perceived; and as if they were Children, they are to be coaxed and flattered till they take down the Medicine that is pre-

par'd for their Cure.

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Orators acted by true zeal, are to fludy all. possible ways of gaining their Auditors to the entertaining of Truth. A fond Mother trims. up her Child, and her tenderness is such, that the disposes all People (as much as in her lies) to be as fond of it as her felf. If we loved Truth, we should be impatient to make it appear as lovely to every body elfe. The Fathers of the Church have always made it. their care to avoid whatever might render the Church grievous When Jefus Christ began. to preach his Gospel to the Jews, who were jealous for the Honour of Meles's Law, our Saviour (as is observed by St. Chrysostom) declares that he came not to destroy that Law, but to fulfil it. Without this they would have stop'd their ears, and never have heard

We have said that antient Rhetoricians plac'd the Arr of Persuading in the knowledge how to instruct, how to incline, and how to move an Auditory: All that was to be done, was decere, flestere, and movere. I have shewn the ways that these great Masters have recommended for discovery of such things as may instruct us by illustrating the Subject up-

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on which we are to speak. I shall here make fome few reflections upon the mesns of info maring into the Affections of our Heavers. Common Rhetorick hath mone of these Reflections: So though my defign was not to treat of the Art of Speaking in its full exwho pretend to omit nothing. The true, the Art of working upon an Auditory is much above the reach of a young Scholar, for whom the antient Rhetoricks were properly made. This Art is acquir'd by fublime Speculations, by reflections upon the nature of our Mind, upon our Inclinations, and motions of our Will. Tis the fruit of Experience and long Observation of the manner wherewith Men atl and govern themselves; in a word, this Art is no where to be taught fo methodically as in the precepts of Merality.

### are flopy their ears, and never have heard

Qualities requir'd in a Person who would

I T is of importance that an Auditory has an effective for the Person who speaks. An Orator is to profess and give some testimony of his Friendship to those whom he defires to persuade,

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persuade, and pretend it is pure zeal to their Interest that prompts him to speak. Modesty is absolutely necessary, for nothing is so invincible an obstacle to Persuasion, as Arrogancy and Boldness. Wherefore in an Orator these sour Qualities are especially requisite, Probity, Prudence, Civility, and Modesty.

It is clear our Esteem for the Probity and Prudence of an Orator, makes many times as great part of his Eloquence, and dispoles us to furrender even before we know what he will fay. Tis doubtless the effect of great pre-occupation; but that pre-occupation is not amis; nor is it to be confounded with a certain obstinate headiness that inclines us to adhere to falle Opinions in spight of all Reasons to the contrary. Belides that the words of a zealous Man full of Ardour for the Truth, kindle and inflame the Hearts of the Hearers. it odds great Reputation to what he fays, when he is looked upon as honest, and one who woold not delude us; nor is it more unreasonable that we submit our Judgments to their light, who are very eminent for their Wildom; fo that it is more advantage for an Orator to be famous for his Virtue than his Learning. Quintilian tells us. In Oratore non tam dicendi facultas, quam bonesta vivendi ratio elucescat. Christianity obliges those who are Preachers fludiously to endeavour to gain this Authority in the Minds of their Auditory. And the N.4 fame: :Mass

same Gospel that forbids vanity and oftentation, commands that our good Works shine with intention, that others seeing our good works, may glorisie, &c. Sie-luceat lux vestra coram hominibus, ut videam opera vestra bona. This necessity has prevailed some time upon the most Modest to affert their own Praises, and vindicate their Reputations, when otherwise their natural Modesty and Meekness would rather have inclined them to sit down, and be content with the Injuries they received. A good Life is the mark that Christ himself has given to discriminate betwitt the Preachers of Truth, and those who are sent by the Spirit of Error to delude and deceive us.

We are much pleas'd to spare our selves the pains of examining an Argument, and therefore we trust it to the examination of some credible Person: Auctoritati credere, magnum compendium, & nullus labor. The authority of a good, a searned, and an eminent Man, is a great ease and satisfaction to any Man that is dissident of his own parts. No Man would willingly be deceived, yet sew are able to protect themselves against Error; and therefore we are much pleas'd when we meet a Man upon whose Authority we may depend in all Matters of Dispute. We see many times two or three Great Men (whose Reputations for Learning have gain'd them universal esteem) dividing the whole World, whilst every one ranks

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ranks himself on his side whom he believes the most Learned and Honest. An Orator without that Authority, gains but sew to his Opinion, because sew are able to perceive the subtilty of his Arguments. If he would win upon the Multitude, he must convince them that he has those of his side, for whom the Multitude has a great Reverence and Esteem.

than Marks and Expressions of Friendship; Friendship gives us a right to the Person belov'd. We may say any thing if the Person to whom we speak be convinc'd that we love him. Ama, & die quad vis. Our love for Truth must be disinterested and entire to receive it from the mouth of an Enemy. Tis not to be imagin'd an Enemy would be so kind as to inform us of the Truth. St. Paul's Epistles are full of Expressions of Affection and Tenderness for those to whom he writes; and he never reprehends them for their Faults, till he has convinced them it was his zeal for their Salvation that prompted him to those Advertisements.

The Fourth Quality (which as I conceive is absolutely necessary in an Orator) is Modesty. Many times our Obstinacy and Aversion to the Truth, is caused only by the fierceness and arrogance wherewith an Orator would force from our own Mouths an acknowledgment of our Ignorance. Why do we wrengle and quarrel in our disputes, and re-

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fule to admir the mole indiffurable Truths? It is because one is impatient to triumph, and the other as obstinate to adhere and contend for a Victory that would be so dishonourable to Those who are diferent fuffer the eagernels of the Advertary to cool, and with foch art conceal their triumph, that the vanetim'd ther thinks himfelf victorious over that error to which before he was a Slave. A prudent Orator is never to Ipeak advantageously of himfelf. Nothing fo certainly alienates the Minds of his Auditors, and inflames them with fentiments of Hatred and Difdain, as the vanity of felf-Applaule. Honour and Reputation is a thing to which every Man pretends, and no Man will fuffer another to ingroß it: For as Quintilian well observes, we have all a principle of Ambition that will endure nothing above us. Hence it is that we love to advance those who debale themselves, because by advancing them we feem to be greater than they. Habet enim mens notra sublime gulddam. & impatiens superioris; ideoque abjectos, & fubmictenses fe, lubem er allevamus, quia hot facere tanquam Majores videmus. Yet mean; Firmnels and Generolity are inseparable from our Orator's Zeal in defence of the Truth, which being invincible, he ought never to defert it. That Man renders himfelf terrible, tible, who lears nothing more than to injure the truth; so that it is not unbreoming if sometimes he exalts the advantages of his own side, which is the lide of truth. To this may be added, that a discourse must be suitable to the quality of the Speaker: A king must speak with Majesty, and that which is the sign of lawful Authority in him, in a private person would be a sign of Insolence and Pride

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What is to be observed in the things of which we speak; and how we are to infinulte into the minds of our Andisors.

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I Aving spoken of our Orators Person, let us now see what relates to the things of which he treats. If the Auditors be not concern d, and what he says touches not too near upon their laterest, Attifice is not necessary. When we are only to prove that the three Augles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, there is no need of Art to dispose our hearers to believe us. Where there is no danger of prejudice to the Hearer, there is no sear of opposition to the Speaker; but when things are proposed contrary to the interest or inclination of the Hearer, then is address most necessary:

necessary: There is no way to infinuete with him but by ambages, and fetches so cunningly introduc'd, that he is not to perceive the truth to which we would perfuade him, till he be throughly convinced, otherwise his ears will be thut, and the Orator reckon'd an Ene-

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Men are acted only by Interest, even when they feem to disclaim it; we are oblig'd to demonstrate that the thing we would perfnade, is not for their difadvantage. We muft oppose Inclination against Inclination, and to draw them to our Sentiment, ferve them as Mariners do a contrary Wind when they make use of it to carry them to a contrary Port. This will be better understood by an Example. To possess a Woman against Painting who loves nothing but her felf, and confiders nothing but her Beauty, if you will follow the advice of Saint Chrysoftom, we must prepassion for it; and this is to be done by shewing that Cerule and Paint are prejudicial to the Face.

A Debauched Man who denies himfelf nothing of pleasure, is taken off by proposing other pleafures more fweet, or by convincing him those pleasures will be attended with very great pains; we must connive at self-love, and propose something of Equivalence to the Man whom we would perfuade from his

interest :

interest; for unless the Grace of God changes the heart, the Passions may change the Obriects, and themselves continue the same. This changing of the Object is not difficult: A proud Man will do any thing you would have him to satisfie his Pride, and avoid being undervalued; so that there is nothing to which a Man may not be persuaded, if we know his Inclinations, and how to make me of them.

When we expect to obtain from those to whom we speak a thing that they have no intention to grant, though perhaps reason requires it, we must be content to receive it as a favour. This demand is not to be made abruptly; but with circumstance; and after we have clearly provid that there will remain more of Honour and Advantage to them by granting, than by refuling it. Chrystofton commends the prudence of Flavianus Patriarch of Antisch, who caus'd the Emperor Theodofius to repeal his bloody Decree against the Inhabitants of that City for Having pull'd down the Statues of the Empress. The Patriarch being come to Considerinople on purpose to mol-life the Emperor, aggravated the fault of the Antiochians; confess'd them worthy of the highest chastisements: but at length he infi-nuated, that the greatness of their offence would make their pardon more glorious, and that a Christian Prince could not (with con-filtence) revenge an injury with so much severity.

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leverity. By this means he wideght upon The odoffu), who would have father been exalpera-ted had he gone about to mittigate their crime; belides to would have appear das if he had approv'd their Infolence, and been an Accom-

plice in their Sedition. his Auditors believe him of their own perfwallon; which is not impossible though he endeavours to diffwade them? Therewis no Opinion whatever in which all things are either falle or unrealonable: Without offence to the truth, we may fille at first with that Opinion which we deligh to subvert, by com-Mending that in it which is true, and worthy commendations. For example, a Nation repower out of his hands, and divides it among leveral persons deputed to Govern. Love of Liberty is reasonable and just; so our Harangue is to begin with amplifications upon Liberty, and at length internating into the people that Liberty is greater under a Monarchy, than under a Common-wealth, (Where the Tyranny is exercised by a greater number) we gain the point, and make use of the same pathon that provok'd them to revolt, to reduce them to

Obedience.
With the same method of prudence we distintangle people from those for whom they have an unreasonable leve, against whom great

care is to be taken that we fall not into a blunt and immediate Declamation. The sene, O Romans, never was Man more bountiful and maniform chan Spurius Milus, he spons freely, presented liberally, and to oblige you was very profuse in his expences. But have a care he be not ambicious; that his Largesses be not smarel, and his Presente the price of your liberty.

Humility is the best of Vertues, it is the companion of innocence, and seldom to be found in a Criminal. Criminals cannot endure to be reprouched by their faults, and therefore its no case matter to gain those whom we desire to correct. Nevertheless when a vicious Man is effectually persuaded that his crime is persicious; that love to his interest is the cause of his representation: when he knows the Speaker to be wifer, and capable of perceiving the Consequences of his ill ways better than bimself, he suffers his admonition patiently, as a Man in a Gangreen suffers the amputation of the part.

That which makes admonition many times ineffectual, is the infolence and imperiorness wherewith it is delivered. When we would correct a guilty person, and hope to reclaim him, it is enough that we display before him modestly what was his duty to have done, without upbraiding him by what he has actually done. Some things are not ill in themselves, but for want of some circumstance: Such things

things may be commended, but we must make it appear they were not done with due cir-cumitances of place and time.

That a Criminal may not be discouraged.

and ashamed to acknowledge his Offence, it is not amis to lessen and extenuate his Grime by comparing it with a greaten; For fear he should obstinately persist and justifie what he has done, some way is to be found out to case him of his load a some people are so sestadory they will never condemn what once they have done. We must separate betwint the crime and the perion, and take no notice that the Offender was guilty, till we have brought him in to condomn his own Grime. This was the Prophet Nathan's Method with King David, when he defired to reprehend him for the Adultery he had committed; he complained to him against another person that was guilty of the same Crime; and when King David had past'd his judgment upon the Man, then Nathan took his opportunity, and admonific him that his Majesty himself was the Original, and that he himself had committed that Sin which his own mouth had condemnid correct treating pertain and hope to recision

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The Qualities that we have shew'd to be necessary in an Orator, ought not to be counterfeit.

I Do not doubt very ill nie may be made of this Art, but that hinders not our Rules from being good. One may precend love for his Hearers, to conceal fome ill delign that his hatred has prompted him to meditate against them: One may put on the face of an Honest Man, only to delude those who have a reverence for the least appearance of Truth; yet it follows not but we may profess love to our Auditors, and insinuate into their affections, when our love is sincere, and we have no design but the interest and propagation of truth.

Pagan Rhetoricians have given the fame precepts as we have done, and Sophisters have made use of them, which obliges us to stricter and more careful application. A wicked Manis not to be more zealous for Error, than a Christian for Truth: It would be a shame that Christians should negled their natural means for propagation of the truth, whilst wicked Men are so buse and industrious to deceive. These ways are good and just in themselves, and every Man that has prudence and charity makes use of them insensibly.

How wicked foever Men be, it is our duty to love them; we mult have compassion for their persons, and detest only their Crimes. Diligice homines, interficire errores. Those who are really pious, have no need to counterfeit; their charity shews it self quite through their discourse; they pity the faults of other Men, and bear with them patiently : They correct them gently, and spflett upon them only on that fide in which they are most renial. Mo-Green Piety find obe ways not to diffult; not to afflict the persons to be reprehended.
Plety moderates correction, and with honeywords livercens the bitterness of her discipline: In a word, Pierry does for God whatever Self-love and interest does for Man: So that the ontward conduct of the one, appears the fame with the outward conduct of the other, their manners of acting being distinguished only by their principles. A good Christian has no less Complaining for those whom he would perfuede, without any delign but propagation of the truth, than a ventiding has for those from-

whom he looks for a recompense.

When I laid we were not to diffust our Auditors, I did not advise that we should not only a slight Complaisance proceeding from a vain satisfaction we take in not being repulsed; Men love those things that entertain them with delight, Logary notic placents: It is the business

business of a Flatterer to entertain people of that delicate humour. A While a Christian Preacher has hopes of gaining upon his Auditors by gentleness, 'tis his duty to use it; but when they are hardned, and will not lay down those arms which they have taken up against truth, it would not be charity, but flattery to indulge them: When prayers avail nothing, our recourse must be to menace.

The conduct used always by the Fathers, was to begin mildly; but if that mildress was ineffectual, to conclude with feverity. St. stintells us, that in his first Books wrote against Pelegius, he would not mention his Name, that he might not leave him upon Record for the Author of a Herefie : Quarte hen he found the Heretick infeasible of that Gentlehels, and that it did but contribute to the making him work, he thought the same charity that had prompted him to mildaes at first, abliged him then to remedies more violent, and proportion onables to the diffenper of that Heretick confidering that if they did not care him, and let ellem know the danger of his commotions of the Soul which incline incline

and direct is from east; which puff it ea, to the acquirties of the energiand prick it forward when it is too dell and hey to escape from the other. Thus for there is no evil in talk Doet when Men follow their talks

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#### when they are hard and all and with not law down,

It is lawful to excite in those to whom we Speak, such Passions as may conduct them according to our designs.

the Art of exciting such passions in the minds of his Auditory as may bend and incline them to what side he pleases. He is likewise to study the searce of extinguishing such heats the searce of the search of his Auditors. That it is nelled to no just means as the passions. That it but ill practice to regulate and clear the mind of an Auditor, to raise sumes of passion which will rather cheak and obspicate it. We will raply to this Objection, as a thing worthy trabocconsidered:

Reflect tre good in themselves, it is extravegance that makes them fanley. There are motions of the Soul which incline it to good, and divert it from evil: which push it on to the acquisition of the one; and prick it forward when it is too dull and lazy to escape from the other. Thus far there is no evil in Passon; but when Men follow their false

Idea's

Idea's of Good and Evil, and love nothing but the World, the Passions which were good in their nature, become bad by contagion of the object upon which they are turn'd. Who can doubt but our Passions are bad, when in the Idea of the word Paffion we comprehend the Soul with all its irregularities? If by Choler we intend the Roges, the Raptures, the Transports that trouble our Reason, it must be confels'd that Choler is an ill thing. But if we take it for a motion or affection of the Soul, that animates against the impediments which retard us in the possession of any good; If we take it for a certain force or power inabling us to contend and conquer fuch evils; I can-not fee flow any Man can reasonably think it unlawful to excite that Choler, and make nie of its efficacy to inconrage his Anditors in quest of that Good which he proposes to them.

In our most exerbitant Passions; in those whose objects seem nothing but falle and pre-tended good; there is always something that is really good. Is it not a good thing to love him that is handsome, great, magnificent, or noble? We may then make use of a motion that carries on towards beauty and grandeur, and by fo doing puts us in action. We may without the least scruple awaken this motion in the mind of our Auditory by displaying the grandeur and beauty of the thing to which we perfuade them, because it is supposed we will

recom-

great, and what is really beautiful.

Men are not to be afted, but by motion by what he loves, and follows that which gives him most pleasure: For which reason there is no other natural way of prevailing spon Men, than this we have proposed. You half never divert a Coverous Man from his avarice, and immoderate inclination to money, but by giving him homes proposed. Birthey but by giving him hopes of other Riches of more prodigious value. You shall never perforate a Voluptuous Man from his pleasures, but by the fear of some impending disease, or hopes of some greater delight. Whilst we are without passion, we are without astion; and nothing moves us from this indifference, but the agitation of some passion. The passions may be call'd the Springs of the Mind; when in Orator knows how to possess himself of chese springs, and how to manage them wisely, gothing is herd to him, there is nothing but he can persuade.

Christians will confess that so many illustrious Martyrs have triumphed over death, and tortures, only by the support they received

Christians will confess that so many shuffrione Martyrs have triumphed over death, and
tortures, only by the supportathey received
from Heaven: that so many Nuns and Holy
Virgins have fostained with their weak bodies
a life fost of sufferinges, and as it were worn
out with strictness of penance, only by affistance of the Divine Grace: But it is their the
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most wicked are capable of the same actions, and can do whatever was done either by the Holy Virgins or Martyrs, if it falls out that they cannot satisfie their predominant Passion, but by suffering those Pains. Cailine was a very ill Man, yet in his Life we may observe Examples of extraordinary Austerity and Patience; but his pretended Virtue was only subservient to his Ambition : So I make this reflection only to prove that a Man is wholly in our Power, when we are able to ftir in him such Passions as are proper for our design: And therefore a Propugner of the Truth is not to neglect fo efficacious a means.

St. Auftinadvis'd the Sinner very well, when he bid him do that for fear of Peniment which he would not do for love of Justice: Fac timore pana, quod nondum potes amore justitid. It would not be difficult to make a painted Dame abhor Paint, by convincing her that it is an Enemy to the Face: The fear of that would possibly affright her from it sooner than the love of God. This fear is not without Sin: But at length the Fathers approved this holy Artifice, by the use they made of it. Great Confusions must be open'd; an Impostume must be cured by Incision: This Practice may easily be justify'd, but this is not a convenient place. Stagnin Pro the state of our ashine.

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II.

What is to be done to excite the Passions.

HE common way of affecting the heart of Man, is to give him a lively fenfe and impression of the object of that passion wherewith we delire he should be mov'd. Love is an affection excited in the Soul by the light of a present good. To kindle this affection in a heart capable of loving, we must present him with an object of amiable qualities. Fear has for its object not only certain evil, but evil contingent. To fright a timerous person, we need no more than to make him fentible of the Evils that threaten him. It is not without reason that the Arts of Perfuading and Well-speaking are not separated; for the one ferves for little without the other. To ftir and affect the Soul of a Man. it fuffices not to give him a bare reprefentation of the object of that passion wherewith we would animate him; we must display all the riches of our Eloquence to give him an ample and sensible delineation that may strike it home, and leave an imprellion, not like those phantaims that flide by suddenly before our eyes, and are feen no more. . To dispose a Man to Love, it is not sufficient to tell him bluntly the thing we propose is amiable; we Must II. What

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must convince him of its good qualities make him fentible of them by frequent and effectual descriptions; we must represent them with all their faces, that if they prevail not by their appearances on one fide, they may not fail by being display'd on the other: We must animate our felves, and (if I may fo fay) kindle a flame in our hearts, that it may be like a hot Hurnace from whence our words may proceed full of that fire we would kindle

in the hearts of other people.

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To treat exactly of this Subject, I should be oblig'd to speak at large of the nature of Passions, to explain them every one particularly; to tell what are their feveral Objects. what raises, and what allwages them: But this would be to stuff into this Art both Natural and Moral Philosophy, which cannot be done without confusion. Nevertheless I cannot excuse my self from speaking more exactly of some Passions, that is to say, of Admiration, Efteem, Contempt, and Laughter. which are of great use in the Art of Perluation.

Admiration is a motion of the Mind, that converts it upon some extraordinary Object, and inclines it to consider whether the faid Object be good or bad, that it may either perfue, or avoid it. It is of Importance to an Orator to excite this Passion in the mind of his Auditory. Truth perswades, but first h ons

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shrift it must be known; and that it may be known, it is necessary he to whom we declare it, applies himself to understand it. We see every day many Arguments rejected, that are afterwards approved, because at that time we were not at leisure to examine them. There are several Opinions that after they shave been neglected, and lain dormant several Ages, have revived again, and made a noise in the World, because they are studyed, and thy studying it is that we know the truth or

fallity of them.

'Tis not enough therefore to produce good Arguments, to deliver them with clearness and perspicuity; but we must use them with extraordinary address, that may surprize the hearer, make him admire and draw the eyes of the whole World upon us. I have read in a certain Author, of a witty Man who chaving often presented himself before his Prince about some Affair that concorn'd him very much, the Prince never youchfaling him to much as a look; he refolv'd the next dime to present himself naked, cover'd only with some few Figg-leaves. And it succeeded as he delign'd; for the odness of his thabit having stir'd the curiosity of the Prince, and carry'd him to him to inquite who he was, the took occasion to make answer, and by degrees found opportunity to propose that to thim; which before he had attempted in vain. Saint e

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Saint Chrysoftem observes that Saint Marthew begins his History of our Saviour by saying he was the Son of David, and of Abraham, (whereas he should have said Abraham and David) to oblige the Jews to read his History with more attention; for the Jews expected the Messiah from the Line of David: and therefore nothing was more like to win upon their attention, than to speak to them of a Son of David, All Books that are read, all Orators that are heard, have some thing or other extraordinary, either in the matter or manner of what they treat, or in the circumstance of time and place.

Admiration is follow'd by esteem, or contempt. When we observe any thing good in the Object on which we look with Application, we esteem it, we desire it, we love it. For this reason, as you see, we esteem nothing properly, but what is true, what is great, and what is handsome. When we value ill things, it is either because we are deceived in our judgments, or because we consider them only according to appearance. A deceifful Orator persuades only for a time, and the esteem and Love of his Auditors, turns into hatred and contempt, as soon as they find

themselves deluded.

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The Object of Contempt is meanness and error; that Passion is never excited but when the Soul perceives nothing in its Object, but

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meannels and error. To this Passion we do willingly incline; it is pleasing, and flatters the ambition that Men have naturally for superiority and grandeur. We do not properly contemn any but those who we look upon as Inferiors. We look down upon them with divertisement, whereas it is trouble-some to lift up our eyes in contemplation of what is above us. Other passions spend and disturb us, but this refreshes, and is useful to our health; and indeed this passion may be call'd rather the repose than commotion of the Soul, because the Soul seems quiet and at ease in this passion, though in others it labours and is disturb'd.

Yet all contempt is not pleasing, for if the evil that is its object be dreadful, it affects us with fear, which is really an affliction; but where the Evil touches us not too near, and concerns us not too much, the contempt that follows us accompanied with laughter, and so commonly accompanied with great and unexpected joy. There is no way so effectual for turning a Man from an Error, as to make it appear contemptible. There is nothing we apprehend more, than to be rendred ridiculous and contemptible to the World. Therefore a scassonable piece of Rallery has sometimes better effect than the solidest Argument.

--- Ridiculum acri,

Fortius & melius magnas plerumq; secut res. When

When we fight with strong Reasons, the trouble the adverfary finds to conceive the confequence of a folid Argument, confounds him: When we propose to him any thing that is high, that height dazles and discourages him. But when his business is only to laughand be merry, he applies himfelf readily, that application gives him entertainment; and his concempt of the thing that is represented as ridiculous, flatters his vanity, and makes him look down upon the object as a thing infinitely beneath him. For this reason we easily excite this contempt, because Men are more prone to it naturally than to esteem, as they are tofoorts rather than to work. To this may beadded, that feveral things are fit to be laught. at, for fear we should give them weight and reputation by confuting them foberly.

#### FII.

How things worthy to be laught at are to be made ridiculous.

Ince it is allow'd us to stir and provoke the Passions, thereby to excite Men to action, the Art which we teach of turning things into ridicule is not to be blam'd, of pecially when by so doing our design is only to reclaim and instruct

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instruct our Auditors; but then if these Ralleries be not done with discretion, they will have a quite contrary effect. The Poets in their Comedies pretend to mock People ont of their Vices; yet their pretensions are vain, experience making it too evident that a Reader of this fort of Plays, never made any serious conversion. The cause is plain, we despise and laugh at only such things as we think below us, and such as are but trisles in our estimation. We laugh not at the ill treatment of the Innocent: If Licentious persons make a mock of Adultery, and such Offences as will force tears from a pions Man, it is because they have not a true notion of those Grimes, and consider them amiss.

Poecs in their Comedies labour not to give an aversion for Vice, their business is only to make it ridiculous; fo they accultom their Readers to look upon Debauches as inconfiderable Offences. From a Play we shall never receive that horrour that is necessary to deter our Concupiscence; the fear of being laugh'd at will never discourage our inclinations to pleasure: and we see Debauched persons are the first will laugh at their own extravagances. There are Vices to be suppress'd only by oblivion and silence, of which modesty and good-breeding will not permit us to speak. The descriptions of an Adulterer never made any Man chaste, and

yet those fort of Crimes are generally the subject of Comedies.

The Orator is likewife to keep his Decorumy, and omit in his Ralleries fuch things as modelty recommends rather to our filence. If we be prudent and honest, there will be no need of advertifing that we are carefully to avoid unfeafonable and ridiculous buffoonries; and toconsider that nothing but ill things are fit to be derided: If the Evil we would describe be pernicions and great, we are rather torender it horrid and detestable. Nevertheless in declaiming against great offences, we may begin with Ralleries, if it be but to draw attention from the hearers, which indeed is the chief end of those things, and that which obliges me to fet down some Rules how we are to turn things of that nature into Ridicule .-

Laughter being a motion excited in the Soul, when after it has been struck with the sight of an extraordinary object, she perceives it very little; to render a thing ridiculous we must find out some rare and extraordinary way of representing its vileness. No particular Precepts can be given for Ralleries. Those, says Cicero, who would give directions for the laughing at other People, would be laught at themselves. And yet all tricks and extraordinary ways are proper, and may be used upon that occasion, that is, to discover the meanness of that object we would render

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contemptible. Wherefore the Ironia is of great use in these cases: For speaking quite contrary to our thoughts in terms extraordinary and inconvenient with the thing of which we fpeak, this disposition makes us obferve it more effectually. When we call a Rascal Honest Man, that expression remembers us that he is quite another thing. We cannot better convince a Man he is a Coward. than by putting into his hands a Sword that he has not courage to use in his defence. So Maiab droll'd with the Prophets of Samaria when with great yells and cries they begg'd of their Idol, that it would fend down fire from Heaven to consume their Sacrifice. Isainb told them, You must Cry louder, perhaps your God does not hear you ; it may be he is in discourse with other people; it may be he is not at bome; it may be he is upon the Road; it may be afteep, and cannot be awaked but by more than ordinary noise. And this way of speaking of this Idol being unufal, made it appear impotent and mean.

Allusions are likewise proper for Rallerics, because the disticulty of understanding them makes us apply more seriously to the finding out the sense, and that application causes us to discover it more clearly. So also when we have applauded a thing that we intend should be ridiculous, and have advanced it by magnificent expressions that raise an expectation

of some great matter, if on a sudden we discover its meanness, it is manifest the forprize makes the hearer attentive, and by consequence more sensible of what is said.

If we lay a thing open, and leave it quite naked, by diverting it of all fuch qualities as may recommend it to our esteem, we make that thing infallibly ridiculous. Lucian relates nothing of the Gods, and the Sages of Greece, but what the Adorers of the one, and the Admirers of the other, have publish'd in their Paneg yricks: Yet Lucian in his Writings renders them Ridiculous, because he divests the Gods of the Geneiles, and the Wife-men of Greece, of those imaginary qualities which the Antients admired in both: wherefore we cannot read his Books without conceiving a contempt for the Religion and vain wisdom of the Greeks. Besides, the very nature of Dialogues (which is Lucian's way of writing) is very proper to discover the Vileness of any thing we would abuse; by making every one fpeak according to the principles he follows. thereby we make them their own Informers, and publish whatever in them is either ridi-ALL SO & LIFE OUT IO culous or mean.

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nakéda bijangan (contrata dana) ganalanganga abahlan The Disposition and Paris of which a Discourse is to be compos'd.

### Of the Exordium.

Ffectually to Persuade, we must first di-Spole our Auditors to a favourable attention of what we have to fay. Next we are so give them intimation of our business, that they may have some notion of what we are about. It is not enough to affert and produce proofs of our own, but we must refel the arguments of our Adversary: When a Dicourse has been long, and 'tis to be fear'd part of what has been said at large, may have escap'd the memory of the hearer, 'tis convenient at the end of our Harangue in few words to fum up what has been deliver'd at length. So a Discourse is properly to confift of five parts, the entrance, or exordium; the Narration or Proposition of the thing of which we speak; the Proof in confirmation of what we affirm; the Refutation of what is alledged by the Adverlary, in opposition; and

and the Epilogue, or recapitulation of all that has pass'd through the whole Body of the Discourse. I shall speak of these five parts diffinally. The has been been derbiated

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An Orator in his Exerdium is to respect: three things, the favour, the attention, and the capacity of his hearers. We gain much upon our Auditors, and infinuace firangely into their favour, when at the entrance intoour Discourse we assure them that what we speak is out of our sincere zeal to the truth. and for advantage of the Publick: We work upon their attention when we begin with what is most Noble and most Illustrious in the Subject of which we speak, and what is most likely to excite a defire of hearing the rest of our Discourse.

A Hearer is susceptible when he loves, and liftens to what we fay. Love opens his mind, and clearing it from all pre-occupations with which we hearken to an Adversary, the disposes it for the reception of the truth. Attention makes him penetrate the most obfeure things: There is nothing lies fo close, but will be discover'd to a diligent and affiduous Man, who makes it his bufiness to inquire into fuch things as he is ambitious to know.

I have faid before, that 'tis good at first' to furprize our Auditors with fomething that? is lofty and noble; but we are likewise to be

careful

careful that we promise no more than we are able to perform; and that after we have soar'd and mounted up to the Clouds, we be not forc'd to come down, and crawl upon the ground. An Orator beginning too high, raises in the hearts of his Hearers a certain Jealousse that disposes them to criticize, and gives them a design not to excuse him, if he stags in his Tone. Modesty is better at first, and gains more upon an Auditory.

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# PROPOSITION.

Sometimes we begin our Discourse by proposing the Subject of it without an Exercium, which is to be done so as the justice of the cause we defend may appear in the said Proposition that consists only in the declaration of what we are to say, and by consequence admits no Rules for its length. When we are to speak only of a question, it suffices to propose it, and that requires but sew words: When we are to speak of an action, or thing done, we are to recite the whole action, report all its circumstances, and make a description of it, that may lay it before the eyes of the Judges, and enable them to determine

as exactly as if they had been present when the action was done.

Some there are who to make an action appear as they would have it, do not feruple to cloth it with circumstances favourable to their defigns, though contrary to the truth; and they fancy they may do it because their pretence is to advance the truth, by augmenting the goodness of their Cause. It is not necessary I should confute the falleness of this persuafion; for 'tis clear, that if it be contradictory to truth, we make use of a lye; it is an ill thing, because we deviate from the end of Speech, which was given us to express the truth of our Sentiments, though against truth it felf; and when we equivocate for truth, we do that which is displeasing to her, because the needs not equivocation to defend her felf.

We ought therefore to deliver things simply as they are, and be cautious of inserting any thing that may dispose the Judges to give wrong Judgment. There is no affair but has several faces, some agreeable that please, others disagreeable that discourage and disgust our hearers. It is the part of a skilful Orator to propose nothing that may beget in the hearer a disadvantageous opinion of what is to follow.

An Orator is to select the circumstances of the action he proposes, and not inlarge equally

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equally upon them all. Some are to be pass'd in filence, others to be touch'd by the by When we are to be oblig'd to report an ill circomftance, that may discommend the action we would defend, we are not to pass it over and proceed; till we have apply'd fome remedy to the evil impression that recitation may make, for we must not leave our Auditors in any ill opinion that they may conceive thereupon. We must subjoyn some reason or circumstance to change the face of the former, and present it less odious. You must relate the particulars of his death who was kill'd, to justifie the person you would defend: Being to fpeak only in the behalf of an innocent person, at the same time when you relate the manner of the others death, you must add the just causes of bis death, and make it appear that he who kill'd him, did it by misfortune, or accident, without any delign. We must therefore preoccupy the mind of the Judges, and prepare them with all the realons, occasions, and circomflances that must justifie the action, that when it is related, they may be disposed to examine it, and confess that there was only an appearance of Crime; and that in effect it was just, because accompanied with all the circumstances that render such actions innocent. This Artifice is not only lawful. but it would be a fault to omit it. We must have

have a care of rendring verity odious by our imprudence; and certainly it would be great imprudence to deliver things in such manner as may dispose our hearers to give rash judgment. Men do take their first impressions immediately, and persue their judgments, and therefore it is of importance to prevent them

Rhetoricians require three things in a Narration; that it be short, clear, and probable. It is short, when we fay all that is necessary, and nothing more. We are not to judge of the brevity of a Narration by the number of words, but by the exactness in saying nothing Superfluous. Clearness follows this exactness impertinences do but stuff up a History, and hinder the action from being exactly reprefented to the mind. It is not hard for a good Orator to make what he fays probable, because nothing is so like the truth that he defends, as truth it felf and yet for this fome Cunning is required, fome Circumstances are of that nature, that deliver'd nakedly and alone, they would become suspected; and would not be believ'd unless back'd and sustain'd by other circumstances: Wherefore to make a Narration appear, true (as it is in effect ) those circumstances are not to be forgot. the state of the second of the second

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### III.

Of Confirmation or Establishment of Proofs, and of Refutation.

THE Rules we are to follow to establish by solid Argument the truth we would defend, and to subvert the fallacy oppos'd to that truth, belong properly to Logick, from thence it is we are to learn to argue. Yet

here we may give some Rules.

First we are to consider the Subject upon which we are to speak; we are to mind and observe all its parts, that we may find out what course we are to steer for the discovery either of the truth, or the fallacy. This Rule is not to be practis'd but by those who have great latitude of understanding; by those who are exercis'd in the folution of Problems. and in penetrating the most occult things; by those who are so well vers'd in affairs of that nature, that as foon as a difficulty is propos'd to them, though never fo intricate, they can immediately find out the knot. and having their minds full of light and of truth, discover without trouble the incontestable Principles to prove the conceal'd verity of things, and to convince those of fallacy that are false.

The Second Rule respects the clearness of the Principles upon which we ground our Argument. The source of all salse Arguments that are used by Men, is our easie and rash supposition that things doubtful are true. We suffer our selves to be dazled by a salse lustre that we perceive not, till we find we are precipitated in great absurdities, and oblig'd to consent to Propositions evidently salse.

The Third Rule respects the Connexion of Principles examin'd with the Consequences drawn from them. In an exact Argument the Principles and the Consequences are joyn'd fo ftrictly, that having granted the Principles, we are oblig'd to confent to the Confequence. because the Principles and the Consequence are the same thing; so that we cannot reafonably deny in the one what we have confess'd in the other. If I grant it lawful to repel force by force, and to take away the life of my Enemy, when I find no other means of preserving my own; when it is prov'd to me that Mile in killing Cledius did but repel force by force. I am oblig'd to acknowledge that Mile is innocent; because in effect allowing the Proposition. That it is lawful to repel one force by another, I confess that Mile is innocent of the death of Clodins, who would have taken away the life of Milo The Connexion betwixt that Principle and that Consequence being manifestly clear. There

There is great difference betwirt the argumentation of a Geometrician, and an O-rator. Maxims in Geometry depend upon a fmall number of Principles: The proofs of an Orator cannot be illustrated but by great number of Circomstances that fortifie one another, and being separated, would not be capable of convincing. In the most folid Arguments, there are always fome difficulties that afford matter of Controversie to those who are oblinate, and are not to be convinced but by multitude of words, and by clearing of all the difficulties and objections that may be made. An Orator is to Imitate a Soldier fighting with his Enemy. The Soldier is not fatisfied with drawing his Sword; he firikes, and watches to take the first advantage that is given: He moves up and down to avoid the infults of his Enemy, and in a word affirmes all the postures that Nature and Practice have caught him for inration or defence. The Geometrician lays down his proofs, and that is fafficient.

There are certain tricks and ways of propoling an Argument, that are as effectual as the Argument it felf, which oblige the Hearer to attention; which make him perceive the firength of a Reason; which augment its force; which dispose the mind; prepare it to receive the truth; disintangle it from its first Passions, and supply it with new. Those who

who understand the Mustery of Eloquence, do not demur or amufe themselves with throngs of Arguments; they make choice of one that is good, and manage it as follows. They do folidly lay down the Principle of their Argument; they make it as clear and perspicuous as possible. They flew the connexion between the Principle and Confequence deduced from it, and defire to demonstrate it. They remove all obstacles than may binder the hearer from being persuaded: They repeat their Reafons fo oft, that we cannot escape from its efficacy: They represent their design with fo many faces, that we cannot but own it, and they work it so effectually into our minds, that at last it becomes absolute Master.

The Precepts of common Rhetoricians touching Proofs, and Refutations, are not considerable; Rhetoricians advise us to place our strongest Arguments in the Van and Front of our Discourse; our weakest Arguments in the Battle, and keep fome few of our best Arguments as Referves. The natural Order to be observ'd in the disposition. of Arguments, is to place them in such fort that they may ferve as fteps to an Auditory to arrive at the truth, and make among themfelves a kind of Chain to Rop those whom

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Of the Epilogue, and other Parts in the Art of Persuasion.

A N Orator who apprehends the things that he says, may slip from the memory of his Auditors, is oblig'd to repeat them before he gives over. 'Tis possible those to whom he speaks are distracted and perplex'd for some time; and the multitude of things that he has profer'd, has not had room in their minds. It is fit therefore that he repeats what he said before, and contracts all into such an abridgment as may not be burthensome to the memory. Great number of words,

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words, amplifications, and repetitions are only for better explication of things, and to render them more perspicuous. Wherefore after we have convinc'd our Auditors of the truth of our Propolition, and made them understand it clearly; that the conviction may be lasting, we must contrive that our Auditory may not lose the memory of our Arguments. To do this, our abridgment and repetition mentioned before, ought to be made in a brisk way, but not so as to be troublesome. We must at the same time awaken the motions that we have excited. and as I may fo fay, unbind the wounds that we made: But reading of Orators (among whom Cicero is excellent for Epilogues) will give you a better notion (than my words) of the address and cunning to be us'd in ramaling and contracting in the Epilogue, what in the body of our Discourse was more large and diffuse.

I shall now finish this Discourse, in which my design was to give an Image or Idea of the Art of persuasion. There still remains for Explication three parts of this Art, Elocation, or the manner of disposing our Matter; Memory and Pronunciation: Of Elocation I have writ a whole Treatise: Memory all the World knows is a gift of Nature, not to be improved by any thing but exercise; for which no Precepts need to be given: and

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Pronunciation is of fuch advantage to an Orator, that it deferves to be treated on at large; for there is a Rhetorick in the eye, the motion and air of the Body, that perfuades as much as Arguments. When an Orator with this air begins his Harangue, we comply immediately: Many Sermons well pronounc'd are well receiv'd, which ill pronounc'd would be despised. Men are generally content with the appearance of things. Those who deliver themselves with a firm and emphatical tone, and are graceful in their Miene, are fure to prevail. Few persons make use of their Reafon; common recourse is to the Sense. examine not what an Orator fays, but judge of him by our eyes and ears: If he fatishes their eyes, and pleases their ears, he shall be certain of the hearts of his Auditory. The necessity of taking advantage of our weakness, obliges an Oracor (if he be zealous for the truth) not to despite Pronunciation. We have certainly many defects; Postures that are indecent, ridiculous, affected, mean, and not to be suffered: There are likewise Imperfestions in the Voice, that are tirefome and unpleasant to the Ear. 'Tis not necellary that we particularize; every Man daily observes them. Every pallion has its peculiar tone. its peculiar gesture, its peculiar Miene, which if good or bad, makes a good or a bad O. rator:

rator: If good, they contribute not a little to the conception of what we would persuade, and the pains that we take to pronounce things well, will neither be vain nor unprofitable. But in Books or Writing it will be more vain. Rules for Pronunciation cannot be well taught, but by Experience and Practice.

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